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Sub-regional Economic Communities have increasingly become important in the promotion, 
protection, and human rights in Africa. Sub-regional human rights courts potentially bring 
international justice closer to victims in their respective regions. However, there is a debate 
surrounding the acquisition of human rights jurisdiction by the SADC Tribunal and the East 
African Court of Justice through broad purposive interpretation of their respective treaties. 
Many scholars however agree that the judges correctly afforded human rights jurisdiction to 
both Courts. They argue that human rights jurisdiction is an incident of the principles rule of 
law, democracy and good governance, which find meaning within the ambit of both treaties. 
The cases of Mike Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe, in the SADC Tribunal, and 
Katabazi v The Secretary General of the EAC, in the EACJ resulted in the conferment of 
human rights jurisdiction on both Courts. Even though these cases were fundamentally 
similar, they received varying responses from their respective Sub-regional Economic 
Communities. This work critically analyses the human rights jurisdiction of these Courts 
and unpacks these different reactions. The SADC Tribunal is currently suspended and a 
New Protocol to establish a new Tribunal without human rights jurisdiction was adopted. By 
using Roux’s theory of ‘tactical adjudication’, it aims to show how the negative reaction to 
the SADC Tribunal’s judgment might have been avoided or mitigated, thereby maintaining 
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Where do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home. So 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet 
they are the world of an individual person; the neighbourhood he lives in; 
the school or college he attends; the factory, farm, or office he works. Such 
are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal 
opportunity, equal dignity, without discrimination. Unless these rights have 
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen 
action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in 








Post World War global integration resulted in the formation of several regional and sub-
regional blocks. The Council of Europe and the Organisation of American States established 
their regional system with their main focus being on human rights. Africa was no exception 
to this, though it only joined the bandwagon at a later stage. The African Union2 (formerly 
known as the Organisation of African Unity3), as well as sub-regional economic- political 
groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)4, the East 
African Community (hereinafter referred as EAC), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), formerly known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Committee (SADCC) are notable examples. The above-mentioned organisations have their 
own courts and tribunals. Sub-regional systems are a uniquely African phenomenon. Their 
 
 
1 Words of Eleanor Roosevelt, the first Chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights, she was also 
involved in the drafting of the UDHR as quoted by Weissbrodt and de la Vega International Human Rights: 
An Introduction (2007) 342.   
2 The OAU initiatives paved the way for the birth of AU. In July 1999, the Assembly decided to convene an 
extraordinary session to expedite the process of economic and political integration in the continent. Since 
then, four Summits have been held leading to the official launching of the African Union.  
3 Organisation of African Unity established on 25 May 1963.   




purpose, at conception, was for conflict resolution and economic integration. As Ebobrah 
points out, they were ‘originally founded as rallying points for progressive economic 
integration aimed at improving the living standards of the citizens…’5 Economic integration 
can only become a reality in conflict free zones hence human rights have become an 
indispensable part of regional and sub-regional jurisprudence. This has, however, resulted in 
problems ranging from the jurisdiction of the courts to the enforcement or implementation 
of the decisions. 
 
The importance of human rights has been increasingly acknowledged by the 
intergovernmental bodies that have striven for African unity since the 1960s. The founding 
document of the OAU (replaced by the AU),6 among others, identifies the promotion and 
protection of human rights as its key objective and undertakes to function in a manner 
consistent with this objective.7 Consequently, the African Charter on Human and People’s 
 
Rights (ACHPR)8 adopted in 1981 is a clear testimony of the OAU’s commitment to human 
rights. The African bloc set up a Commission9 to be the guardian of the African Charter10. 
 
The establishment of sub regional courts therefore come as a compliment to the ‘OAU 
founding fathers’ commitment to human rights. 11 Given that sub-regional human rights 
systems are relatively new and unique, their development has been a subject of debate and 
filled with controversy.12 
 
Notably, the scope of human rights in the East African Court of Justice and the Southern 
African Development Community Tribunal is highly contentious. The Courts have, 
however, interpreted the relevant provisions of the founding documents so as to afford both 
 
5 S. T Ebobra “Human Rights Developments In African Sub-Regional Economic Communities During 2009” 
(2010)  23 African Human Rights Law Journal  312. 
6 OAU Charter of 1963, Addis Ababa .   
7 OAU charter states at Article II that 1. The Organization shall have the following purposes: (a) To promote 
the unity and solidarity of the African States; (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to 
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and 
independence; (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (e) To promote international 
cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.   
8 The uniqueness of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) that it deals with African 
problems. For example, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights has a set of third generation 
rights, also known as rights of solidarity. Human rights scholars have applauded the African Charter for 
including socio-economic and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights in one binding instrument.  
9 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.   
10 African Charter adopted also known as the Banjul charter adopted in 1981 and came into force 1986.   
11 One may however argue that the fact that the charter on came into force 5years after its adoption speaks 
into the sincerity of the African leaders.   
12 Decisions of the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal in the cases of Katabazi v Secretary General and Mike 
Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe respectively illustrate this.  
 
2 
courts a human rights mandate.13 These developments were seen by the political organs of 
both regions as judicial activism on the part of the courts. In the East African region 
recommendations were made for the Council of Ministers to come up with a legal 
framework for the Court in order to clarify its human rights jurisdiction. In the Southern 
African region, human rights cases led to the suspension of the Tribunal. A proposed New 
Protocol to reinstate the Tribunal, adopted in August 2014, excludes individual petitions to 
the Court and, therefore, eliminates the Tribunal’s human rights jurisdiction. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
Although notable progress has been made in the area of human rights in sub-regional courts, 
the interpretation of the courts’ competence in human rights cases has been contentious. 
Both the SADC Tribunal and the East African Court of Justice adopted similar 
interpretations of their human rights jurisdiction in the cases of Campbell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe 14 and Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community 15 
respectively. In spite of support from civil society, human rights lawyers and human rights 
organisations, the two courts suffered backlashes from the political arms of these Regional 
Economic Communities as a result of these decisions. Their responses were varied. Whilst 
the EAC called for the adoption of a Protocol extending the jurisdiction of the Court, SADC 
summit of heads of states and government suspended the tribunal and adopted a New 
Protocol on the Tribunal. The EAC has not yet extended the jurisdiction to human rights and 
the SADC’s New Protocol has not yet been ratified by the requisite two thirds of member 
states.16 
 
It is on this basis that the need to critically examine the interpretation of human rights 
jurisdiction of the two courts arises, and consider the extent to which the courts can ensure 
their institutional security when faced by similar cases in the future. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
 
This work addresses a number of questions. Firstly, whether sub-regional systems can be 
effective human rights mechanisms. Secondly, what was the legal basis of the human rights 
jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal and EACJ. Thirdly, how the different reactions of 
 
13 Particularly Article 27(2) of the East African Community Treaty and the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal.   
14
 Mike Campbell Private Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 02/2007 and Mike Campbell 
Private Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 03/2009.   
15
 Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (2007) AHRLR 119 (EAC 2007).   




political arms of the Regional Economic Communities to the interpretation of jurisdiction 
adopted by the SADC Tribunal and the EACJ can be explained. Finally, whether these 
reactions could have been avoided despite the threats to institutional security of the SADC 
Tribunal. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
 
There is a substantial amount of literature on the role of sub regional courts in protecting and 
promoting human rights. A number of scholars have also written on human rights 
jurisdiction of sub-regional courts. 
 
Ebobrah traces the development of sub-regional courts in Africa and their role in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. He defines sub regional courts as, ‘judicial 
bodies set up to interpret and apply the treaty of the relevant REC.’17 Ebobrah points out 
that in East and Southern Africa no clear human rights competence exists. This scholar 
illustrates the gradual movement that the Courts have taken towards acquisition of 
competence to receive human rights cases. In this regard, this paper will look at how the 
SADC and the EAC have dealt with this acquired human rights jurisdiction and the 
consequences thereof. 
 
Swart puts across the argument that regionalism in the context of human rights law has 
distinct advantages. Regional systems of human rights supervision reflect specific needs and 
cultural preferences and regional arrangements are frequently seen to be more effective with 
a higher capability to pay attention to local conditions and detail18. This text is useful in 
explaining the role that is played by sub-regional courts at sub regional level; it however 
overlooks the contentious nature of the jurisdiction of these courts. 
 
Much of the literature on this subject focuses specifically on the viability of the regional 
courts as human rights courts. For example, Ebobrah writes on what he calls supranational 
judicial protection of human rights by sub-regional courts. He further argues that the courts 
were established as ‘rallying points for progressive economic integration aimed at 
improving the living standards of their citizens.’19 His argument follows that courts operate 
as human rights courts in order to create an environment conducive for economic 
 
17 S T. Ebobrah, “Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts In Africa: Prospects And 
Challenges” (2009 ) 17 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 79-101.   
18 M Swart. “Alternative Fora For Human Rights Protection? An Evaluation Of The Human Rights 
Mandates Of The African Sub-Regional Courts” (2013) 3 South African Law Journal 437-452.   




integration. Murungi is of the same view, she points out that the adoption of strong human 
rights values and institutions creates confidence for investors and trading partners and 
ensures effective participation of individuals.20 
 
Ebobrah gives an extensive discussion on the enforcement mechanisms available in these 
courts and illustrates how politics has been a deterring factor in the effective implementation 
of the Court’s resolutions. In addition to that, he argues that the cases in these courts allow 
for a development of sub-regional human rights system jurisprudence. Finally, he concludes 
that the ‘pursuit of economic integration on the continent would be meaningless if conflicts 
prompted by human rights violations at national level are allowed to continue.’ 21 This 
indicates that according to this scholar, the courts only operate as human rights courts as a 
consequence of the objective of promoting regional integration. In this regard, it is critical to 
note that this research seeks to explore the human rights jurisdiction as contemplated in their 
respective protocols through interpretation of the relevant provisions and interpretative 
methods adopted by the courts in various cases. 
 
Similarly, other scholars such as Gathii explore the general reluctance of national courts in 
the East African Community to implement the decisions of the courts. These scholars argue 
that this reluctance to enforce human rights ‘guarantees’ is particularly because at its 
conception the founders of the EAC did not contemplate having a court with a human rights 
mandate. However, in recent times the EACJ exemplifies an emerging trend of human rights 
enforcement. Gathii stresses the fact that even though this emerging human rights trend is 
commendable a lot still needs to be done in order to bridge the enforcement gap. This 
scholar also deals with how the EACJ has transformed itself in redefining its role.22 This 
therefore needs to be explored further in light of recent developments in SADC and see how 
the EACJ can be used to mould a new SADC Tribunal. 23 Viljoen supports the activist 





20 L N Murungi “Revisiting The Role Of Sub-Regional Courts In The Protection Of Human Rights In Africa”   
(2009) University of Pretoria. Accessed at  
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/12656/murungi.pdf?sequence=1   
21 Supra note 17.   
22
 J Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice's Human Rights  
Strategy (2014) Forthcoming 24th  Duke  Journal of  International  Comparative Law. 
23 From Campbell to the new Protocol.   
24 See F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) for a general discussion on the changing 




Bossa illustrates the need to extend the jurisdiction of the EACJ and expresses concern on 
the slow pace at which the transformation is taking place.25 The EACJ adopted a resolution 
that it will adopt a protocol to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to human rights matters. 
The reluctance on the part of the politicians, that is, the Council of Ministers is dealt with. 
Bossa points out that at times the Council of Ministers’ meetings have been postponed at 
short notice regardless the urgency of the council business. This signals lack of political will 
to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to human rights matters. 
 
In addition, Ruhangisa explores how the existence of concurrent jurisdictions in the EAC 
has hindered the adoption of the protocol extending the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
regional bloc continues to establish other dispute resolution mechanisms which erode the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has concurrent jurisdiction with other regional blocs.26 
 
He notes that ‘while this increase in judicial and quasi-judicial dispute settlement 
mechanisms may be considered an indication of willingness of states to submit themselves 
to the rule of law in their interactions with international community, a number of dangers 
concomitant to the same way may also be identified.’27 One such danger is that the new 
protocol will not be adopted. 
 
Naldi writes an analysis of the decision of the SADC Tribunal in the case of Campbell v 
Republic of Zimbabwe. This author argues that while the Tribunal’s decision was correct it 
could have been reasoned in a more persuasive way. This scholar however commends the 
Tribunal for establishing itself as a human rights forum.28 
 
Tembo is of the view that African human rights system as a whole strengthens the 
universality of human rights and places a substantial limit on the principle of sovereignty.29 
 
Nevertheless, the same cannot be true for Southern Africa, if viewed in isolation, where 
seemingly sovereignty is the determining factor. In this regard, this research will explore 





25 S Bossa  “Towards a Protocol extending the Jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice”  (2006) 31   
East African Journal of Human  Rights and  Democracy.  
26 ECOWAS court being a notable example.   
27 J E Ruhangisa ‘The East African Court Of Justice: Ten Years Of Operation (Achievements And Challenges)’   
Paper presented during the inter-parliamentary relations seminar, Burundi National Assembly, Bujumbura.   
28
 G J Naldi “Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al v The Republic of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe's Land Reform 
Programme Held in Breach of the SADC Treaty” (2009) 53 (2) Journal of African Law. 305-320.   
29 S Tembo “An Analysis Of The SADC Tribunal And The East African Court Of Justice; A Human 




Adjarmi’s text explores the status of international human rights law in national courts 
(domestic) and argues that due to lack of independence in some African countries 
governments intervene to overturn progressive court decisions on human rights issues.30 
 
Moyo notes that, “the regional commitment echoed in the provisions cited above suggests 
that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence is an integral part of its institutional mandate. Member 
states should therefore co-operate with and assist the Tribunal in the performance of its 
duties. However, there are no mechanisms through which the Tribunal can supervise the 
implementation of its decisions. Thus, political leadership and good faith are needed at the 
 
Summit level if the Tribunal’s judgments are to be worth the paper they are written on.”31 
 
It is important to note that that there has not been much literature or published work on the 
new SADC protocol signed in 2014. However, Tembo points out that ‘the new Protocol to 
the Tribunal needs provisions that stipulate the measures that should be taken in order to 
deal with non-compliance.’32 This gives rise to critical research questions, which will be 
dealt with in this paper. 
 
1.5 Relevance of the Study 
 
 
This study aims to show that the importance of sub regional human rights systems cannot be 
underestimated. Sub-regional human rights systems bring international justice close to the 
victims of abuses by state machinery. As such, any conduct that is deemed to be inconsistent 
with human rights principles in the founding documents of the Regional Economic 
Communities should be deemed unlawful and invalid. In addition, it is suggested that the 
regional judicial bodies can grow stronger if they learn from each other’s weaknesses and 
strengths. Finally, this study serves to suggest a strategy of adjudication that could see sub-
regional courts existing in harmoniously with the political bodies of sub-regional blocs 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
 
The study takes the form of a comparative analysis of the jurisdictions of the SADC 
Tribunal and that of the EACJ. Other regional and sub-regional systems are used as points of 
reference. This is a library-based study, digital and physical, published and unpublished 
 
30 M E. Adjami, “African Courts, International Law, And Comparative Case Law: Chimera Or Emerging   
Human Rights Jurisprudence?” (2002 ) 24  Michigan  Journal of  International Law 103.  
31
 A Moyo “Defending human rights and the rule of law by the SADC Tribunal: Campbell and beyond” (2009)   
2 African Human Rights Law Journal  590-614.  




resources containing primary and secondary sources are used. The two Courts are 
juxtaposed and a comparative analysis undertaken. 
 




The very nature of the research methodology in this study places a huge barrier to other 
relevant sources of information. A pure desktop study confines the researcher to literature 
that is readily available for the researcher. This means that information that could have been 
obtained through interviews or visits to the SADC Tribunal or EACJ is not relied on. In 
addition, there is limited literature on the New Protocol on the SADC Tribunal hence 
newspaper articles are relied on thereby limiting this study to speculation and opinion. 
Finally, new developments in the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal limits the scope of this 
study; hence the need to limit this study to events, cases and advisory opinions prior to 31 
August 2015. 
 




This will take the form of an introduction to the study, taking the format used in the research 
proposal, but will not necessarily be a replication. It will comprise of a detailed background 




Regional human rights systems are unpacked in this chapter. This comprises the historical 
development of regional human rights mechanisms including a discussion on the importance 
of human rights protection at regional and sub-regional level. Finally, a discussion on the 




This chapter makes a detailed analysis of the concept of jurisdiction of international 
organisations. The relationship between human rights jurisdiction and use of individual 









This chapter introduces the SADC Tribunal. It focuses on the human rights jurisdiction of 
the SADC Tribunal. This chapter will analyse how the SADC Tribunal acquired its human 
rights jurisdiction. The issue of implementation of the decisions of the Court by domestic 
courts is also scrutinised. Lastly, the human rights implications of the proposed protocol are 




The East African Court of Justice is introduced. The human rights jurisdiction of the EACJ 
will be the focal point. This chapter will acknowledge that the Court has done relatively well 





This chapter will serve as a concluding chapter. It will sum up all the arguments raised in the 
preceding chapters. It will also make a comparative analysis of the decisions of the SADC 
Tribunal and the East African Justice and the reactions of the political organs thereto and 





This study is confined to the period running up to 31st December 2015. Any new 
developments in respect of the new Protocol on Tribunal will substantially affect the scope 
of the study. Since the new Protocol is not yet in force, the Tribunal shall be deemed 
suspended throughout the study. If the new protocol comes into force before completion of 
this study, it will not be incorporated and will consequently be referred to as the ‘proposed 
protocol.’ This is because any developments in respect of the new protocol fall outside the 



































































































The notion of human rights protection at sub-regional level cannot be discussed without first 
looking at the historical development of human rights at the regional and international level. 
As such, it is important to discuss how the early international organisations led to the 
 
‘universalisation’ of human rights. The end of the World War II marked the beginning of a 
new era of a ‘universal’ human rights system. In December 1948, the United Nations’ 
General Assembly 33 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 34 (hereafter 
referred as the UDHR). As Baderin and Ssenyonjo put it, ‘the UDHR is considered today as 
the legal baseline for modern international human rights law…’35 The adoption of human 
rights legal framework was prompted by the atrocities committed during the Second World 
War. The war crimes ‘provoked significant humanitarian concerns and moved the world 
community to call for international measures aimed at ensuring the legal protection of 
human rights and achievement of world peace and security.’36 International efforts were 
made to prevent a repeat of the crisis. Other scholars have observed that ‘gradually over the 
same period the United Nations, other international organisations, regional institutions and 
governments have developed various procedures for protecting against and providing 
remedies for human rights abuses.’37 It is the development of those procedures at regional 





33The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. 
Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and 
budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority. Each 
country has one vote.  
34The preamble of the UDHR says ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the 
end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive 
by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
Human rights jurisdiction of sub-regional courts.’  
35MA Baderin and M Senyonjo “Development of International Human Rights Law Before and After the  
UDHR.” (2010) SOAS School of Law Research Paper No. 02/2011; See also M Mutua Human Rights; A 
Political and Cultural Critique (2002) 15 who shares a similar view that the UDHR is the “grandest of all 
human rights documents.” 
36 Baderin and  Senyonjo, Ibid.  




Since its formation, the United Nations undertook to promote and protect human rights. 
Article 1 of the UN Charter states that, inter alia, the purpose of the UN is ‘…promoting 
and encouraging human rights and fundamental freedoms…’38 Pursuant to these objectives, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)39 and the International 
Covenant on Social Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR),40 were adopted in 1966 and 
came into force in 1976. The two documents cover wide ranging aspects of human rights 
and have been hailed as comprehensive human rights instruments. 
 
Various regional human rights mechanisms were established around the 1950s thereby 
facilitating the proliferation of regionalised human rights. Sub-regional human rights 
systems were established later in the century and these are particularly unique to Africa as 
will be shown in the following chapters. Weston et al 41 notes that, ‘… the regional 
development of human rights norms, institutions and procedures is likely to grow.’ The 
reasons for the development of regional and sub-regional systems are explained by Weston 
et al as homogeneity that exists within regions, and geographic proximity, cultural proximity 
and the socio economic interdependence that exist at regional level. Human rights 
instruments thus flourish when facilitated by alliances based on commonalities, and these 
are found at regional level.42 According to the European Union Directorate;43 ‘regional 
human rights protection mechanisms constitute the main pillars of the international system 
for the promotion and protection of human rights.’44 There is a tendency worldwide to 
consider regional human rights systems as important pillars of international human rights 







38Article 1 of the United Nations Charter.  
39 ICCPR was designed to protect civil and political rights of citizens of signatory states together with the 
ICESCR; they have evolved to become part of international customary law and are often jointly referred to as 
the International Bill of Rights.  
40 Ibid.   
41 Weston et al ‘Regional Human Rights; Comparison And Appraisal’ (1987) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 585.  
42 Ibid.   
43
 Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union is responsible for organising the work of Parliament's 
committees and inter parliamentary delegations in the field of external policies. For more information on the role of 
the Directorate see  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-secretary- 
general/en/organisation/directorategenerals/externalpolicies.html   
44
 Directorate-General For External Policies. Directorate B Policy Department Study. Role of Regional Human 
Rights Mechanisms. DROI 2010.  
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first international human 
rights instrument. Article 55 of the Charter provides that; 
 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being, which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote… [inter alia] universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
In 1977, having seen the proliferation of human rights at regional levels, the United Nations 
advised member states to ‘consider agreements with a view to the establishment within their 
respective regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.’45 This set into motion the regionalisation of human rights protection and promotion. 
According to Shelton, ‘as a consequence, no State today can claim that its treatment of those 
within its jurisdiction is a matter solely of domestic concern.’46 
 
The Council of Europe47 and the Organisation of American States (OAS)48were the first to 
draft their own human rights instruments at regional level and were later followed by the 









45Supra note 45, 585. See especially Resolution 32/127… ‘mindful of suggestions made for the establishment 
in regions where it does not exist, of regional machinery for the protection of human rights, Aware of the 
importance of encouraging regional co-operation for the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…1. Appeals to States in areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights 
do not yet exist to consider agreements with a view to establishment within their respective regions of suitable 
regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights; 2 Requests the secretary general, under 
the program of advisory services in the field of human rights, to give priority to the organisation, in regions 
where no regional commission on human rights exists, of seminars for the purposes of discussing the 
usefulness and advisability of the establishment of regional commissions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights.’ 
46D Shelton Regional Protection of Human Rights (2008) 1.  
47Comprises of 47 member states, all members are also signatories to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  48It is made up of 35 independent states of the Americas. It was established in 1948 after the signing of 
the Charter of the OAS.  49European Convention of Human Rights was signed in 1950 and the Inter- American Convention on 
human rights was signed in November 1969. 
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2.2.1 The American System 
 
 
The 9th International Conference of American States adopted the American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948.50 The Charter of the Organisation of American States 
was signed in 1948 and it eventually entered into force in 1951.51 Article 34 of the Charter 
provides that: 
 
Member states agree that equality of opportunity, the elimination of extreme 
poverty, equitable distribution of wealth and income and the full participation of 
their peoples in decisions relating to their own development are, among others, 
basic objectives of integral development.52 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted in 1969 in San José in 
Costa Rica. It subsequently came into force in 1978 after the requisite number of countries 
ratified it. 53 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (referred to as the Commission and ACtHR or the Court 
respectively) were established to interpret and implement provisions of various 
instruments.54 The Commission was established in 1959 and later amended through the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires to implement the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man and subsequently acquired a role to implement the Convention in 1978. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction. In order 
for a case to be decided, State parties have to accept the jurisdiction. State parties can also 
consult the Court in respect of interpretation of the Convention or other human rights 
treaties. It is important to note that these instruments come on the pretext of widespread 
dictatorship, communism and chronic states of emergencies in the region.55 
 
 
50See for example Weissbrodt and de la Vega, Supra note 45, who argue that while the declaration was not a 
binding resolution it has gradually developed into a binding interpretation of the OAS Charter.  
51 As amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1970, Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1988, Protocol 
of Managua in 1996, and Protocol of Washington in 1997. 
52Article 34 of the Organisation of American States Charter.  
53 Ratified by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican  
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,  
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay and Venezuela  
54Including the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter-American Convention To Prevent 
And Punish Torture, Protocol on San Salvador”: Additional Protocol To The American Convention on Human  
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights; Protocol To The American Convention 
On Human Rights To Abolish Death Penalty, Inter –American Democratic Charter, among others  
55Supra note 37. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights came into force in 1953 and was followed by 
the adoption of several human rights protocols. 56 The European Convention of 1953 
established the European Commission of Human Rights (the European Commission) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (the European Court). Essentially, this was the birth of a 
regional human rights system in Europe.57 The two institutions had automatic jurisdiction 
over interstate disputes. 
 
The Court is now the only human rights adjudication body in the region, the Commission 
became obsolete following the restructuring of the European Court after 1998. The European 
 
Commission was abolished after the adoption of Protocol no 11 to the Convention on the Protection 
 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights addresses 
three types of disputes. It accepts complaints from individuals, groups of individuals and 
non-governmental organisations whose rights have been violated by any one of the 
Convention States.58 Article 33 of the Convention provides for the Court’s jurisdiction over 
inter-state disputes and a limited advisory jurisdiction.59 
 




The Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) eighteenth Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, also known as the 
Banjul Charter, in 1981 in Banjul. The Charter came into force six years later, on October 
21 1986. 60 The Banjul Charter made provision for the establishment of the African 
Commission of Human Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights. 
 
56 Such protocols are 1. Enforcement of certain Rights and Freedoms not included in Section I of the 
Convention 2. Conferring upon the European Court of Human Rights Competence to give Advisory Opinions 
3.Protecting certain Additional Rights 4.Amending Articles 22 and 40 of the Convention and 5. Amending 
Articles 29, 30, and 94 of the Convention  
57The Commission became obsolete after the restructuring of the European Court after 1998; however, its 
main function was to consider admissibility of cases and to attempt to secure friendly settlements.  
58 Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, Latvia, Luxembourg. Malta, republic of Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, san Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.  
59 Issues of accessibility by individuals will be discussed at length in the following chapters.   





Pursuant to this provision, the African Commission on Human Rights came into force in 
1987 and the African Court of Human Rights (African Court) subsequently came into force 
in 2004 with a mandate to interpret the provisions of the Charter. 
 
In June 1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights.61 The 
African Court was intended to complement the African Commission’s oversight in regional 
human rights. Nmeheille points out that, ‘the adoption of the Protocol was a culmination of 
an effort that began four years earlier in 1994 a year that marked the beginning of a new 
dispensation in the mission to strengthen institutional mechanisms for human rights 
protection.’62 Before the creation of the regional mechanisms, ‘among the decisions taken 
by African heads of states during the summit meeting was creation of an African human 
rights defence mechanism. They spoke in unison and expressed concern over violations of 
human rights and stated that these have become a disturbing feature in the continent.’63 
 
The OAU had been for long been contemplating establishing human rights at a regional 
level. Dlamini points out that: 
 
At the 1961 Lagos Congress on the Primacy of Law, the meeting recommended a 
study to consider the possibility of both a Human Rights Convention for Africa and 
a regional Human Rights Tribunal, similar to the European or the American 
Commission on Human Rights. This proposal resurfaced at many subsequent 
seminars and in particular at the 1969 Cairo Seminar where it was agreed that this 
move was desirable. Although the Secretary-General of the UN subsequently 
communicated that recommendation to the OAU and all the governments of the 
OAU member states, no action was taken.64 
 
This shows that even though it took unnecessarily long for the African block to agree on a 
human rights body, it did not ignore its desirability. However, concerns have been raised 
over the issues of resources of the commission. Murray, for instance, submits that ‘certainly 
 
 
61To date, only the following twenty six (26) States have ratified the Protocol: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,  
Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique,  
Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda.  
62 VO Nmehielle  ‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ Human Rights Brief 
11 no 3 (2004). 
63CRM.Dlamini ‘Towards a regional Protection of human rights in Africa: The African Charter on Human and 





in the course of its history, the ACHPR has faced difficulties. Some of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ members are clearly not independent of 
government, it has lacked resources and impact of its work is often debatable.’65 
 
Sub-regional courts in Africa also form part of the international human rights system. 
Initially formed as part of sub-regional community structures, the Southern African 
Development Community Tribunal (SADC Tribunal), 66 Economic Community of West 
African States Court (ECOWAS Community Court)67 and the East African Court of Justice 
(EACJ)68 have become an integral part of their respective regions’ human rights systems. 
 
The development and acquisition of human rights jurisdiction by these Courts/ Tribunals 
will be discussed in more detail in the chapters to follow. 
 




The importance of supranational human rights protection cannot be underestimated. 
Regional human rights systems have evolved over time to become an important aspect of 
international law. The main reason for evolvement of regional human rights systems, for 
example in Europe, is explained by Shelton; 
 
Europe had been a theatre of greatest atrocities of the Second World War and felt compelled 
to press for international human rights guarantees as part of European reconstruction. Faith 
in western European traditions of democracy, the rule of law and individual rights inspired 
belief that a regional system could be successful in avoiding future conflict…69 
 
In addition, regional human rights mechanisms are ‘commonly thought to be potentially 
more effective than the United Nations70 because they are better able to take account of 
regional conditions.’ 
 
In Africa, international human rights instruments and institutions emerge as part of regional 
integration. Regional integration is instrumental in the promotion and development of trade, 
 
 
65R Murray “International Human Rights Neglect Of Perspectives From African Institutions” (2006) 
55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 193-204. 
66Established on the 18th of August 2005.  67Created pursuant to the provisions of Articles 6 and 15 of the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1991.  68The Treaty establishing the EACJ was signed in 1999 and it only became operational in 2000. Judges 
were sworn in on the 30th of November 2001.  69 D Shelton, The promise of regional human rights systems, in D Shelton, Regional Protection of Human 
Rights, (2008).   




social and political cohesion amongst states. Regionalism in Africa resulted in the formation 
of sub-regional political and economic groupings that have lately become important human 
rights platforms. Many scholars prefer to discuss the notion of sub-regional human rights 
under the much broader concept of Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Ebobrah 
argues that, ‘in pursuit of regional economic integration supranational organs were 
established in the RECs to enhance the smooth operation of various groupings. One organ 
that commonly appears in RECs is a judicial body set up to resolve disputes within 
communities.’71 This therefore reinforces the idea that, at inception, regional bodies were 
established ‘as rallying points for progressive economic integration aimed at improving the 
living standards of their citizens’ 72 The African Union is not an exception. Murray 
describes the AU as: 
 
… Africa’s principal organisation for the promotion of socio-economic integration 
of the continent. It focuses on issues of peace, security and stability as a prerequisite 
for the implementation of the Union’s development and integration agenda. AU’s 
stated objectives, as follows, include human rights; to promote and protect human 
and peoples rights in accordance with African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.73 
 
The importance of RECs is reiterated by Babatunde where he says, ‘… the idea is premised 
on the logic that the successful realisation of both political and economic aspects cannot 
disregard the existence of basic legal norms that promotes national and transnational 
democratic development, accentuates uniform compliance with transnational directives and 
promotes and sustains continued interaction amongst relevant stakeholders.’74 It should be 
noted that scholars tend to ignore the fact that the successes of these RECs depend largely 
on political will. African political leaders have a well-documented history of non-
compliance with international laws and disregard for human rights.75 Ebobrah makes an 






71Supra note 17.  72S T Ebobrah ‘Human Rights Developments In Sub-Regional Courts In Africa’ (2009) 9 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 312. 
73 R Murray cited in Shelton, Regional Protection of Human Rights, (2008) 88-89.   
74 F. Babatunde ‘Exploring legal imperatives of regional integration in Africa’ (2012)  4  (1) The Comparative   
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 66.  
75See T Murithi ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?’ 2013 8  




appears there are issues that need to be addressed before RECs would become havens for 
human rights realisation.’76 
 
In Africa, the regional organisations were established not only for the purposes of economic 
integration but also as part of the process of the formation of a political union. However, 
lack of homogeneity in the African region has been a deterring factor. Babatunde is of view 
that, ‘the extent to which member states adhere to indicators such as fundamental rights, 
good governance, transparent electoral processes, independence of the judiciary and the rule 
of law determines the smooth and uniform implementation of integration goals.’ 77 This 
shows that human rights are an indispensable part of the integration process. 
 
In Africa there exists serious human rights issues such persecution of political opponents, ill 
treatment of aliens, over reliance on the military in dealing with civil unrest, genocides and 
endless civil wars. Adjami points out that, ‘state collapse, humanitarian crisis and war are 
the faces of Africa that the world see today. Lost in the tide of dark images are incremental 
steps for protection of human rights.’78 Africa has done much in order to ensure 
regionalised human rights protection. Regional and sub-regional mechanisms were created 
to counter these human rights violations on the continent. 
 
The importance of regional human rights systems is that once a state ratifies an international 
instrument, it means it has recognised the rights contained therein, cannot act contrary to 
those provisions, and cannot raise the principle of sovereignty as justification of any 
violation thereof.79 Ebobrah agrees with the view that human rights protection appropriately 
belongs to the supranational platforms and a state cannot raise the issue of sovereignty.80 He 
says, ‘at inception, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa generally stuck with 
their economic focus leaving political issues to wider continental forum. With respect to 
human rights, the feeling among some African leaders was that the issue was too political 






76Supra note 17, 79-101.  77F. Babatunde “Exploring Legal Imperatives of Regional Integration In Africa.” (2012) 4 1 The Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 66. 
78M E. Adjami “African Courts, International Law, And Comparative Case Law: Chimera Or Emerging 
Human Rights Jurisprudence?” (2003) 24 Michigan  Journal of  International  Law 103.  79C R M. Dlamini “Towards a regional Protection of human rights in Africa: The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights” (1991)24 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 189.  




was argued that the treatment of human rights more appropriately belonged in other 
international fora.’81 
 
Having discussed the importance of regional and sub-regional human rights protection 
above, it is crucial that the enforcement mechanisms available at these levels be discussed. 
 




In his 1994 Wieck Lecture at the University of Akron’s School of Law, Judge Edward Re 
stated that;82 
 
Regardless of the underlying basis, no nation today can claim the sovereign right to 
violate those universal rights deemed to be fundamental or unalienable. Hence, 
because of the acceptance of international legal norms in the area of human rights, 
the effort today is not merely to assert fundamental rights and freedoms to which 
human beings are entitled, but rather to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms that 
must exist to give these rights vitality and to make them a reality.83 
 
Regional instruments were designed to promote and protect human rights. Enforcement 
mechanisms are however still far from ideal. There have been some criticisms levelled 
against some of the enforcement mechanisms. Human rights are enforced by means of both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. 
 




With the development of constitutionalism in a number of African States, human rights have 
become easily enforceable at domestic level. Regardless of whether or not a state has a 
codified bill of rights, it is likely that it has legislation or a provision in the constitution that 
 
81S T. Ebobrah, “Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts In Africa:  Prospects And Challenges” 
(2009) 17 (1)  African Journal of International and Comparative Law  79.  
82 Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of International Trade and Distinguished, Professor of Law 
St. John's University School of Law. Judge Re was Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of 
the United States and Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. He served as Chair of 
the American Bar Association's Section of International and Comparative Law, and President of the American 
Society of Comparative Law and is a Member Emeritus of the Board of Higher Education of the City of New 
York. Having served in World War HI and during the Korean conflict, Judge Re is a Colonel in the Judge 
Advocate General's Department of the United States Air Force (Retired). Effective December 15, 1993, the 
International Association of Judges appointed Judge Re as its Principal Representative to the United Nations. 
On January 13, 1994, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed Judge Re a member of a new U.S. Judicial 
Conference Committee on International Judicial Relations. Accesses at  
http://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/e8af5cfc-e8ce-4552-98a8-4a07de1b4c15.pdf  




binds the State to conform to the principles of human rights or recognise the application of 
international law in domestic courts. According to Steiner and Alston, ‘human rights 
violations occur within a state, rather than on the high seas or in the outer space outside the 
jurisdiction of one state. Ultimately, effective protection must come from within a state.’84 
 
Courts play a crucial role in enforcing international human rights law. Various national 
constitutions require courts to apply international law when faced with human rights cases.85 
 
Some international laws have provisions that require states to incorporate international law 
into domestic legislations. For example, the ICCPR encourages states to ‘adopt such 




Application of international law, however, depends on whether a country subscribes to a 
monist or a dualist legal system. Monists have international law as part of the overall legal 
system. According to Killander, monist theory provides that international and national law 
are a manifestation of a single conception of law.87 Dualists place a distinction between 
domestic and international law and courts apply only international law that has been 
incorporated into the domestic legal system. 88 Even so, some international laws have 
evolved to form part of international customary law89 and such laws are applied regardless 
their status in domestic legislation.90 
 
In both the European and African systems, there is no formal obligation on the member 
states to incorporate provisions of the convention into their domestic law. Application and 
status of the Convention therefore varies from one state to another. 91 Even so, most 
 
84HJ Steiner and P Alston  International human rights in context; Law, Politics and Morals.(2000) 987  85For example the South African constitution section 39 (1) when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum (a)…(b) Must consider international law… the Zimbabwe constitution (Amendment No.  
20.Act, 2013) section 46 (1) when interpreting this chapter, a court, tribunal, forum, or body – (a)…(b)… 
(c) Must take into account all international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a 
party… 86 In particular Article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  87M Killander International Law And Domestic Human Rights Litigation In Africa 2010. 
88J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2011.  
89 According to Rosennein, Customary international law “... consists of rules of law derived from the consistent 
conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way.” The elements of customary 
international law include: 1. The widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (State 
practice); 2. The requirement that the acts must occur out of a sense of obligation (opinion juris) and; 3. That the acts 
are taken by a significant number of States and not rejected by a significant number of 
States.’ S Rosennein  Practice and Methods of International Law (1984) 55.  90See generally Killander, Supra note 87, 11, who argues that ‘… the epitome of dualism is arguably 
exaggerated .Firstly; most would argue that customary international law form part of the law of the land in 
common law countries. Secondly, unincorporated treaties play an increasingly important role, though 
courts may not directly apply them 11.  




countries embark on constitutional reform in order to align their national legislations and 
constitutions resulting in an indirect application of the Convention in domestic courts. 
 
Semi-judicial organs such as human rights commissions and ombudsmen also play a part in 
the enforcement of human rights in the domestic setting. These organs are normally 
independent or semi-independent and quasi-governmental. Scholars acknowledge the 
importance of these organs, and they term them National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs).92 The development and operations of these organs is guided by what are called 
the Paris Principles 93 . The Paris principles emphasize the necessity for NHRIs to be as 
‘autonomous from the government as possible, to represent the pluralist interests of civil 
society, and to be given adequate powers of investigation, as well as sufficient resources.’94 
 




Human rights can been forced by domestic or international mechanisms. Human rights 
enforcement at regional and sub-regional level has been problematic for quite some time 
now. The major impediment to judicial enforcement of human rights is the notion of state 
sovereignty. States run on autocratic lines are usually quick to raise state sovereignty when 
faced with a human rights crisis. This makes it difficult for enforcement mechanisms to fully 
operate without any hindrance. It should be noted that States bear the primary responsibility 
of enforcing human rights, however, lack of consensus on the enforceability and application 
of certain rights has made it difficult.95 Human rights treaties acquire a legal effect after 
being incorporated into domestic laws of a State. 
 
Human rights are enforced through use of courts, statutes, tribunals and human rights 
treaties. One issue that has been problematic is the authority to impose sanctions on states 
 
92See for example Weissbrodt and de La Vega, Supra note 37.  93These are principles relating to the status of national institutions in the enforcement of human rights adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. Paris Principles state that  
‘a national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities (a) To submit to the Government,  
Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the request of the authorities 
concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matter without higher referral, opinions, 
recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of human 
rights; the national institution may decide to publicize them; these opinions, recommendations, proposals and 
reports, as well as any prerogative of the national institution…’  94Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993.  95Justiciability of socio-economic rights has proved problematic in developing countries. For detailed 
analysis on whether socio-economic rights are justiciable, see SERAC v Nigeria AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001);  
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 




that have violated their human rights mandate. International courts have often been viewed 
as the ‘gold standard’ for the enforcement of human rights at both domestic and 
international level. 
 
Other than through courts, human rights instruments are also enforced through reporting and 
monitoring mechanisms. 96 According to Saunders, ‘far from being “toothless” these 
enforcement mechanisms have potential to directly impact human rights courts with strong 
enforcement authority.’97 This argument was made in support of the notion of an integrated 
enforcement.Integrated enforcement is described by Saunders ‘as integrated enforcement 
requires interaction between overlapping treaties that, between them, contain a reporting or 
monitoring mechanism, as well as an adjudicatory tribunal.’ 98 The potential that 
international mechanisms have in enforcing human rights cannot be understated. For 
example, the Council of Europe provides for the expulsion by the Committee of Ministers of 
states found guilty of the most serious and repeated breaches of the principle upon which the 
Council is based including the protection of human rights. Most treaties are supported by 
mechanisms that monitor and report States’ compliance with their human rights obligations 
and not by courts or tribunals. Saunders further argues that even though monitoring and 
reporting is often criticised, critics overlook the potential that they may have if used in 
tandem with other mechanisms.99 
 




The effectiveness of monitoring and reporting is limited by the fact that the organs 
responsible lack authority to impose certain obligations or even sanctions to ensure 
compliance. Saunders notes that, ‘it is true, of course, that reporting 100 committees are 
 
 
96See for example  http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/994-what-is-human-rights-monitoring.html. 
Human rights monitoring mechanism gathers human rights information in a country through various means 
and advocate to address found violations. It involves documentation, of violations so that the information can 
be used effectively.  97P Q Saunders “The Integrated Enforcement of Human Rights.” ( 2012) 45 International Law and 
Politics 98. 
98Ibid. 
99Supra note 97, 100.  
100 For meaning see for example Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring - Chapter XX: Human Rights 
Reporting; Reporting is an essential element of the human rights monitoring function. Reporting must be adapted to 
the mandate of the human rights field operation and to the needs of those officers who are managing it... External 
reports are those which are produced by the field operation staff, using information contained in the internal reports, 
for a wider distribution including, for example, UN Headquarters in Geneva or New York, other UN bodies (e.g. the 




generally not vested with authority to order operations or demand that non-compliant states 
correct their behaviour.’101 The problem has always been on how to obtain such authority 
and if obtained what form of punitive measures can be used for non-conformity. 
 
It should be noted that the reporting mechanism has its own distinct advantages. It allows for 
a number of key players to be involved in the system. This has the potential of ensuring 
efficiency and production of thorough reports. Saunders is of the view that, ‘even though 
reporting is neither coercive nor persuasive; it contributes to the creation of a human rights 
culture.’ The use of reporting by state parties is an indispensable part of the implementation 
process. Symonides argues that reporting is, ‘an important contribution to the promotion and 
protection of these rights at the national level.’102 This is considered to be the basic method 
of independent international monitoring of compliance by State parties with their treaty 
obligations. 
 
It should be noted that since reporting is done by states themselves, there are international 
mechanisms set to counter ‘manufactured reports.’ Chances are that some states may give 
reports that do not necessarily reflect the actual situation within a country. Even though it is 
state parties who do the reports, according to Symonides, ‘treaty bodies are not passive 
recipients of the governmental ‘products’ but on the contrary, are active and enquiring 
examiners.’ This helps in curtailing malcontents in the reporting process. 
 
The African system adopted a unique monitoring mechanism called the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003. This monitoring mechanism is broad and is not 
confined to human rights only. It aims to ‘encourage conformity in regard to political, 
economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards among African states and 
the objectives in socio-economic development within New Partnership for Africa’s 
 
Development (NEPAD).’103 It should be noted that this APRM is under the direct control of 
the AU and therefore not a judicial mechanism per se. du Plessis and Stone are sceptical 
about the prospects of the APRM, they point out that, ‘these developments are important, 




or thematic rapporteurs), the international community, or the media. accessed at  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/monitoring/chapter20.html. 
 
101Supra note 97, 98. 
102J Symonides Human Rights: International Protection Monitoring, Enforcement. (2003) 59  103See for example M du Plessis and L Stone “A court not found?” (2007) 7 African Human Rights 




have the political will to mobilise the AU Peer Review Mechanism, to act against errant 
member states who abuse human rights.’104 
 
African states also have an obligation to submit biennial reports to the African Commission 
for examination in terms of article 62 of the African Charter.105 The Charter says states 
must present reports on ‘the legislative and other measures adopted to give effect to the 
African Charter.’106 
 
In the European system, there are various monitoring mechanism that operate under the 
supervision of the European Council, these include the European committee on the 
prevention of torture and inhuman degrading treatment or punishment (CPT), the European 
Committee on Social Rights (ECSR), Commissioner for Human Rights, Advisory 
Committee On The Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities 
(FCNM). According to Beco, the monitoring the European system can be classified into 
three forms, the first is treaty based monitoring, the second is judicial monitoring and the 
third is by looking at the nature of the right, whether it is a substantive right or vulnerable 
groups.107 
 
The monitoring and reporting mechanism if employed properly has the potential to inculcate 
a human rights culture amongst states. 
 




The Inter-American Court has been instrumental in the enforcement of human rights within 
its region. States that do not comply with decisions of the Court face serious repercussions 
in terms of the American Convention. However, no state has ever been denied membership 
or expelled based on human rights violations since the organisation was established, but 
other measures have been taken, including suspending the right of a government to 
participate while maintaining the state’s legal obligations.108 This is what transpired in the 




104 Ibid.  105GWM Mugwanya “Examination of State Reports by the African Commission; A Critical Appraisal” (2001) 
2 African Human Rights Law Journal. 
106Article 62 of the African Charter. 





It is evident that the ties of the Cuban government with the Sino-Soviet bloc will 
prevent the said government from fulfilling the obligations stipulated in the Charter 
of the organisation and Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Such a situation in an 
American state violates the obligations inherent in membership in the regional 
system and is incompatible with that system…110 
 
In the European system, the European Court of Human Rights is only used when domestic 
remedies have been exhausted. According to Murray, ‘the role of international tribunal is 
subsidiary and only becomes necessary and possible when the state has failed to afford the 
required relief.’111 The two ways in which member states can be held accountable for 
human rights violations is through individual petitions as recognised in Article 34112 and 
through the interstate procedures as set out in Article 33.113 
 
Denmark v. Greece; Norway v. Greece; Sweden v. Greece and Netherlands v. Greece (the 
Greek Case)114 illustrates how the Council of Europe enforces its human rights mandate. 
What transpired in the Greek case is that Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands filed 
two interstate applications against the Greek government. In the applications, it was alleged 
that Greece had violated the European Convention on Human Rights’ Articles 
3,5,6,7,9,10,11,13, and 14. They alleged that Greece had violated human rights through 
arbitrary detentions, torture, and use of irregular military trials and censorship of the press. 
The Commission’s finding as that Greece had violated these provisions except for article 7. 
 
The Greek government denounced the Convention before the Council of ministers could 
decide on a proper sanction.115 
 
This case is important in illustrating that international mechanism are effective only where 
the state party consents to the judgment or binds itself to the findings of the relevant body.. 
 
Depending on the nature and circumstances of each case, article 13 of the European 
Convention provides for a right to a remedy for the violation of rights in the Convention. 




111R. Murray “A Comparison between the African and the European Courts of Human rights.” (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal  195-222.  112‘Individuals’ in terms of article 34 include a person, nongovernmental organization or a group 
of individuals. 
113The application of article 33 is only limited to disputes between State Parties to the Convention.  114ResDH(70)1 15 April 1970 The Greek Case (Applications No. 3321, Denmark v. Greece ; 
No.3322/67, Norway v. Greece ; No. 3323/67, Sweden v. Greece ; No. 3344/67, Netherlands v. Greece.  




article 41. The form of satisfaction can be a costs order or compensation. The Council of 
Ministers supervises enforcement and adopts resolutions on whether a particular state has 
complied with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The African system also provides for appropriate remedies in order to enforce human rights. 
Article 27 of the Protocol on the African Court provides that if a state is found to be in 
violation of human rights, the Court, ‘shall make the appropriate orders to remedy the 
violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.’ In addition to this, the 
protocol requires states to comply with decisions in cases in which they are parties within 
the period stipulated by the Court and to guarantee execution thereof.116 
 
Judgments of such regional courts are; 
 
[a] repository of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because they 
embody what the Court has considered in the past to be good law; because respect 
for decisions given in the past makes for certainty and stability, which are of 
essence of the orderly administration of justice; and (a minor and not invariably 
accurate consideration) because judges are naturally reluctant, in the absence of 
compelling reasons to the contrary, to admit that they were previously in the 
wrong.117 
 
It has also become common practice that states found in violation of international treaties 
are punished by the imposition of sanctions.118 The use of sanctions may be seen as 
effective way of ensuring compliance, it is however generally agreed that use of sanctions 






The introduction of regional blocs, whether created as rallying points for economic growth 
or as a means for political cooperation gave birth to regional human rights systems. The 
existence of human rights systems at regional level signifies the importance of human rights 
in modern day international relations. It has been argued that supranational bodies are the 
ideal platforms for the promotion and protection of human rights, especially in respect of 
 
116See Article 30 of the Protocol on the African Court.  117H Lauterpacht The development of International Law by the International Court (1958) 14 cited by 
du Plessis and Stone, Supra note 103. 
118
 See especially Shelton’s discussion on the use of sanction (infra note 143).   




state driven violations. Supranational bodies are equipped with both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms that allow for the enforcement of human rights at international level. 
The use of monitoring and evaluation, though not free of limitations provide international 
human rights bodies with the right tool for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The use of courts solely dedicated to human rights ensures judicial enforcement of human 
rights. In addition, it has also been argued that since no state exist in isolation, the use of 
sanctions can, if properly implemented; prove to be vital in instilling a human rights culture. 
As noted above, sanctions should be applied with caution as they may end up hurting 
innocent members of the population. Adjudication of human rights disputes result in orders 
for reparations, compensation or restitution. This helps in ensuring that victims of human 




































































































































In almost all the cases that come before international courts, jurisdiction of the court 
becomes one of the main issues. It is either one of the parties is contesting the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court or the other competences. With the individual increasingly 
becoming a subject of international law, use of individual petitions (personal jurisdiction) 
has correspondingly become a subject of debate.120 This chapter will therefore explore the 
concepts that underlie the position of an individual in international human rights law. The 
broad concept of jurisdiction will be discussed; this will include a discussion on prescriptive, 
enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction. The inter-American, African and European 




The right to individual petitions in international courts and tribunals is seen as core to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 121 It is, therefore, important to discuss the 
concept of individual petitions and its relationship with jurisdiction in international human 
rights law. The concept of jurisdiction in international human rights law is complex. It is 
multifaceted and confusing. In order to have a thorough discussion of jurisdiction as applied 
in international human rights law, it is necessary to narrow it down to the issues to be 
discussed in this piece of writing. Hence, this work shall be confined to international 
organisations’ jurisdiction as far as adjudicatory, prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is 
concerned. 
 
This chapter will discuss the conceptual underpinnings of ‘jurisdiction’, which is then 




120 See for example P Lemmens and W Vandenhole Protocol No.14 and reform of the European Court of Human 
Rights 2005.   
121 See for example Lemmens and Vandenhole , above, who argue that the ‘main purpose of this petition mechanism is 
not to redress individual grievances, but to identify situations of serious violations of human rights and to mobilise 
international pressure upon states that bear responsibility with a view to bring violation to an end.’  
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law.122 It should be noted that more focus shall be placed on adjudicatory jurisdiction as it 
gives rise to several debates on individual petitions and exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
Finally, one cannot discuss individual petitions without contrasting it with interstate 
petitions hence a discussion on interstate petitions will precede the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
 




The term jurisdiction is defined as the power or competence of a court or tribunal.123 This 
definition is broad and all encompassing. It connotes all powers associated with courts that 
include powers to pronounce matters of law, receive cases, render judgements and enforce 
them. According to Colangelo, ‘jurisdiction is not a monolithic concept [it] comprises of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.’124 Walsh 
defines jurisdiction as, ‘the right by which judges exercise their power.’125 The United 
States of America’s Supreme Court has also defined jurisdiction in some of its judgements. 
 
In Ex Parte Walker, 126 the US Supreme Court defined jurisdiction as, ‘the power or 
authority to pronounce the law and pass and settle by its judgements in the rights of the 
parties touching the subject matter in controversy and enforce such sentence.’ Justice 
 
Baldwin in the case of the State of Rhode Island  V State of Massachusetts127said; 
 
the power to hear and to determine a cause is jurisdiction; it is coram judici 
whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action; if the petitioner 
states such a case in his petition that on a demurer the court would render judgement 
in his favour, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction, whether an answer denying and 
putting in issue the allegations on petition, the petitioner makes out his case, is the 
exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the filing of a petition containing all requisites 




122 Note that broader concepts of territorial or extra-territorial jurisdiction have been deliberately omitted 
as jurisdiction is dealt with only as far as it relates to international human rights law in its strictest sense.  123E T Lee “The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction” (2003) 54 Hastings Law Journal, 1613-1640 Available at 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=510384, 1614.  124A J Colangelo “What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction” (2014) 99 Cornell Law Review 1303. Accessed at:  
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol99/iss6/2.  125J W Walsh “The True Meaning of the Term "Jurisdiction.” (1901) 49 (6) The American Law Register 
(1898-1907) The University of Pennsylvania Law Review 346-356. 
126Ex Parte Walker 25 Ala. 81. 
127State of Rhode Island  V State of Massachusetts 37 U.S. 657 (1838).  




The above definition approves Pasqualucci’s view of jurisdiction. According to Pasqualucci, 
‘jurisdiction is the legal authority of a court to consider matters before it. Essentially 
jurisdiction is a condition precedent to the court’s authority to make a decision on the 
substantive legal issues in the case.’129 Hence, the exercise of jurisdiction depends on the 
powers vested in the body seeking to act upon a matter. Eno notes that, ‘any mechanism 
possesses jurisdiction over matters only to the extent granted to it by the enabling act or 
legislation. The question of whether a given mechanism has the power to determine a 
jurisdictional question is decided and determined by that mechanism.’130 
 
Gevers and Vrancken, in defining jurisdiction, place a distinction between jurisdiction as 
exercised by states and by international organisations. ‘In one sense, jurisdiction refers to 
 
‘the extent of each state’s right to regulate conduct or the consequences of events’. In 
another, it describes the competence of international institutions (such as international courts 
and quasi-judicial mechanisms) to exercise power over states (as the case of the 
 
International Criminal Court).’131 
 
It is also important to compare and contrast the jurisdiction of international organisations 
from state jurisdiction. According to Liivoja ‘in abstract terms, the jurisdiction of states and 
the jurisdiction of tribunals are both instances of the concept of the scope of the powers of a 
legal institution.’132 However, state jurisdiction is distinctively defined as the ‘power of a 
state under international law to regulate or otherwise impact upon people, property and 
circumstances.’133 It should be noted that the three forms of jurisdiction of international 
organisations are also evident in the concept of state jurisdiction. In this regard Liivoja says; 
 
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the capacity of a state ‘make its law applicable to 
the activities, relations, or status of persons in things, whether by legislation, by 
executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation or by determination of a 
court.’ Adjudicative jurisdiction encompasses the capacity of a state ‘to subject 
persons or the things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals.’ Finally, 





129JM Pasqualucci. The Practice and Procedure of The Inter-American Court Of Human Rights. (2013) 117.  130R W Eno ‘The Jurisdiction of The African Court on Human And People’s Rights’ (2002) 2 African 
Human Rights Law Journal. 
131 C Gevers and P Vrancken. In:  H Strydom  International Law (2015).  132R Liivoja “The Criminal Jurisdiction Of States; A Theoretical Primer “7 ( 2010) NoFo 




its laws or regulations whether through the courts or by use of executive, 
administrative, police or other non-judicial action.’134 
 
Nevertheless, this work is confined to the meaning of jurisdiction in as far as jurisdiction of 
international organisations is concerned. 
 
3.3 Jurisdiction of international and regional courts 
 
The scope of jurisdiction of international courts is determined by the treaty under which the 
court (or any organ) exercising that power is established. For example, a treaty may grant 
jurisdiction of a court over all ratifying parties obligatory stricto sensu. A ratifying state 
therefore subjects itself ipso facto to the court’s jurisdiction.135 Treaties may also make 
provisions for jurisdiction to be acquired on ad hoc basis, and in some cases provide for an 
optional acceptance of the jurisdiction by state parties. Martin lists seven requirements for 
the exercise of jurisdiction as a) that the respondent state must have ratified the treaty and 
any protocols recognising the competence of the Tribunal to decide the case; b) the 
respondent state must have ratified the treaty before the alleged human rights violations 
occurred; c) the complainant must allege violations of rights from which the state party has 
not derogated during a state of emergency, nor of which a state has made reservations; d) the 
complainant must have exhausted or constructively exhausted domestic remedies; e) the 
complaint has been filed within the prescribed time from the date of exhausting domestic 
remedies; and f) the subject matter of the complaint is not pending before another 
international proceeding.136 
 




The concept of jurisdiction has developed over time. States have always recognised the fact 
that sovereignty is a key element in international relations. Power to investigate, prosecute 
and punish is an essential part of state sovereignty. Classical jurisdiction was confined to 
national jurisdiction.137 This meant that only a state could exercise power over its citizens, 
and its treatment of its citizens was neither to be questioned nor a matter of international 
concern. International law did not originally interfere in the way a state exercises its 
sovereign power. Emphasis was placed on territoriality. ‘The emergency of custom on 
 
134Ibid at 29.  135J M Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2013) 117 
136Martin… et al International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Treaties Cases and Analysis (2006).  137RW Eno “the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2002) 2 African 




universal jurisdiction over piracy marked an important development, but this development 
was possible largely because the crime of piracy was committed on the high seas, beyond 
territorial control of any state.’ 138 Jurisdiction in international law started to develop 
significantly after the world wars. Inazumi notes that ‘in dealing with the crimes committed 
during the world wars, the international community came to realise the need to overcome 
the flaws of traditional jurisdictional system and consequently to adjudicate certain crimes at 
international level.’139 Human rights treaties after the world war incorporated the concept of 
jurisdiction. 
 
3.4 Types of Jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals  
 
3.4.1 Prescriptive jurisdiction  
 
 
Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power to make and apply law to persons or things that 
 
‘regulate real-world conduct.’ 140 Technically, this refers to the power to pronounce 
legislation or any relevant legislation. According to Ryngaert, ‘prescriptive jurisdiction 
refers to the jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to activities, relations, 
or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by 
executive action or order, by administrative rule or regulation or by determination by a 
court.’141 If a domestic court is applying international law, ‘it is exercising adjudicatory 
jurisdiction only, because the substantive legal rule that is being applied to the defendant’s 
conduct has been prescribed by international community as a whole.’142 Shelton143 lists six 
recognised bases for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction as i.) Territory ii.) Nationality. 
iii.) Objective territoriality iv.) Protective principle v.) Passive personality and vi.) 
Universality.144 These bases apply to the exercise of jurisdiction by States rather than by 
international bodies. However, they may be used to demystify the concept of prescriptive 





140 H M. Wasserman “Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption” 
(2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
141C Ryngaert Jurisdiction In International Law (2015). 
142Ibid . 
143D Shelton. The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013).  
144According to Shelton territory refers to the location of the conduct, nationality is the citizenship of the 
actor, objective territoriality/effects of jurisdiction refers to the location of the effects of the conduct, the 
protective principle is the protection of the state’s vital interests, passive personality is the citizenship of the 
victim of the conduct and universality being particularly the egregious conduct subject to regulation by 
international community as a whole. 
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human rights treaties apply to State Parties’ territories including occupied territories. 145 
 
Therefore, an international body acquires jurisdiction to make legal pronouncements in 
respect of those territories falling within its respective territories. 
 




Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the ‘power to induce or compel compliance or to punish 
non-compliance with its laws or regulations, whether through courts or by use of executive, 
administrative, police or other non-judicial action.’146 In Europe for example, Shelton notes 
that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice are  
‘supervisory bodies established to ensure compliance with regional obligations.147 
 
As stated before, supervisory bodies are established to ensure compliance with decisions of 
the Court. Article 32148 of the Convention149 obliges States to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court, hence, no state can denigrate on its obligations in enforcing a judgement issued 
against it.150 This is reinforced by Article 46 (1) of the Convention151 which state that, ‘the 
 
High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgement of the Court to which 
they are parties.’ The implementation of the Court’s judgements is monitored by the 





145 See for example the case of Loizoidu v Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) in which the European Court of 
Human Rights was asked to determine whether Turkey was responsible for the alleged violation of the petitioner’s 
rights under article 1 on Protocol number 1 with respect to her properties in northern Cyprus. The court held that, 
‘it follows… that the continuous denial of the applicant’s access to her properties in Northern  
Cyprus and the ensuing loss of all control of the property is a matter which falls within Turkey’s ‘jurisdiction’ 
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 and is thus imputable to Turkey.’ full document available at  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920 . For further discussion on this case see S  
Kavaldjieva ‘Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights: Exorbitance In Reverse? Can, And Should,  
An Iraqi Victim Of Human Rights Abuses Inflicted By U.K. Troops Have A Remedy In U.K.Courts Under 
The European Convention Of Human Rights? (2005- 2006) 507 Georgetown Journal Of International Law.  146 American Society of International Law “Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns,” In: 
Benchbook on International Law II .A (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), available at  
www.asil.org/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf 
147D Shelton “Boundaries Of Human Rights Jurisdiction In Europe” (2003) 13  Duke Journal Of Comparative 
and International Law  95. 
148Sections 1 and 2. 
149Ibid.  150‘Seeking to exhibit compliance with an ever-increasing number of judgments against it, Russia pays 
monetary judgments awarded by the Court in a timely fashion. At the same time, Russia violates the spirit 
and letter of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the  
“European Convention” or “Convention”) by ignoring the substance of the ECHR judgments, failing to 
implement measures that are necessary to punish wrongdoers and prevent human rights violations in the 
future, and engaging in techniques, including intimidation of human rights applicants, attorneys, and activists, 
that are designed to dissuade Russian nationals, including Chechen residents, from accessing the ECHR.’  
151European Convention on human Rights. 
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achieve the outcome sought in the [C]ourt’s judgement.’152 Depending on the circumstances of 
the case, the Court may order the respondent state to take measures in favour of the petitioner to 
put an end to violation or to effect restitutio in integrum where applicable or to prevent future 
similar violations.153 The Court has also been able to order respondents to take certain steps, for 
example, releasing prisoners.154 Miller acknowledges the role played by the Committee of 
Ministers in ensuring that judgements are enforced where he says, ‘the 
 
CM [Committee on Ministers] has always been responsible for establishing violations, 
supervising the execution of court judgements or accepting “friendly settlements.”155 
Article 46(2) specifically says that once a judgment has been made final it is transmitted to 
the Committee of Ministers for execution.156 
 
It has been previously submitted that the African human rights system carries out its 
enforcement through its monitoring and reporting mechanisms under the African Charter. In 
addition, Article 27 of the Protocol on the African Court provides that if a state is found to 
be in violation of human rights, the Court ‘shall make the appropriate orders to remedy the 
violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.’157 Therefore, it can be 
safely argued that the African Court enjoy enforcement jurisdiction in terms of Article 27. 
 
3.4.3 Adjudicative jurisdiction 
 
 
Adjudicative jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate or to receive a matter. This is defined as, 
 
‘authority to subject persons to the process of State’s court or proceeding.’ Even though this 
definition specifically refers to domestic courts, its meaning can be used in regional and 
international courts as well. In the absence of adjudicative jurisdiction, a court cannot decide 
on an issue, if it does, its decision is a nullity. The main concerns under adjudicative 
 
152V Miller ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Court of Human Rights: Issues and Reforms’  
Accessible at  
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05936/SN05936.pdf. 153Ibid. 
154 See especially the case of Assanidze v Georgia, the core issues in this case was whether the Ajarian 
Autonomous Republic (‘AAR’) was within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Georgia under Article 1  
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European Convention on 
Human Rights’, ‘ECHR’). Whether the continued detention of TengizAssanidze within the AAR, after the 
issuing of a Pardon by the President of Georgia and an acquittal in the Georgian Supreme Court, amounted to a 
violation of Assanidze’s right to liberty under Article 5(1) of the ECHR. Whether the failure of the AAR to 
comply with the judgment acquitting Assanidze had infringed his right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR and the Court held that Georgia was to secure Assanidzes’ release at the earliest possible date’ 
available at Oxford Public International Law ( http://opil.ouplaw.com); see also Ilascu v Russiaand Moldova. 
155Supra note 152, 5.  156For procedures for the implementation of judgments see Miller ibid or visit the council of Europe website  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/default_en.asp  




jurisdiction are whether the court has the power to hear a matter in respect of the subject 
matter of a lawsuit, and also the question as to whether or not the court has power to receive 
a petition from person before the court. These form what is known as subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction respectively 
 




Subject matter jurisdiction is also referred to as ratione materiae. This raises the question of 
whether the body seeking to exercise power has the authority to act upon matters of that nature 
or whether the court is competent to hear that kind of lawsuit considering the cause of action. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is derived from relevant legislation in domestic law and conventions 
or treaties in international law. For example, Articles 4 and 7 of the Protocol on the African 
Court gives the Court the power to adjudicate disputes in which it is alleged that a state party to 
the protocol has violated the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights or any other human 
rights instrument ratified by the respondent state. Article 3(1) of the Protocol specifically states 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court as, ‘all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human 
rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.’158 
In addition to this provision, Article 7 provides, ‘the Court shall apply the provisions of the  
Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the states concerned.’159 
 
In the European system, subject matter jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
is laid out in the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 32(1) of the European 
Convention set out that; the court has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the convention and any other relevant protocols. The 
European Convention is a human rights document; therefore the European Court has a 
human rights jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over any other legal instrument. 
 
The subject matter jurisdiction of both the American Commission on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights is express. The court is specifically empowered to 
hear allegations of state violations of the American Convention and other binding human 
rights instruments160 of the Organisation of American States.161 The American Convention 
 
158 Article 3 (1) of the Protocol on the African Court of Human and People’s Rights.   
159 Ibid, Art. 7   160American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, 1969; Inter-American Convention 
to Prevent and Punish Torture, 1985; Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the area of 
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is a human rights instrument that contains a number of human rights provisions.162 Thus, 
one can safely say that the Court has the power to hear allegations of human rights 
violations by state parties as contemplated in the Convention. The human rights jurisdiction 
of the inter-American Court is set out in Article 41 of the American Convention. In terms of 
Article 41, the Court has power to develop awareness of human rights, making 
recommendations to OAS Member States, preparing studies or reports, requesting 
information from OAS Member States, responding to and advising OAS Member States on 
matters relating to human rights and submitting annual reports to the OAS General 
Assembly. Article 62(3) also provides for the human rights jurisdiction of the Court; it gives 
the Court the power to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention. The Court has 
power to receive petitions and other communications as envisaged in the convention. As 
stated before, the Court only receives interstate human rights disputes, individual human 
rights petitions are only received through the Commission. 
 
The Court can receive petitions in respect of human rights matters. The Commission has the 
power to investigate and report human rights situation in any country in the region, 
including the thirty-five member states163 of the organisation of American states as well as 
Cuba even though Cuba is barred from membership.164 The Commission’s jurisdiction is 
limited to human rights matters. The human rights jurisdiction of the Commission is broader 





Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador”, 1988; Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, 1990; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, “Convention of Belém do Pará,” 1994; Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 1994; Inter-American Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, 1999. 
161See Article 62(3) of the American Convention.  
162Such as the right to juridical personality; the right to life the right to humane treatment; the right of every 
person not to be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude; the right to personal liberty; the right to a fair 
trial; Freedom from ex post facto laws; the right of every person to be compensated in accordance with the law 
in the event of having been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice; the right to privacy; 
the right to freedom of conscience and religion; Freedom of thought and expression; the right of reply; the right 
of assembly; Freedom of association; the rights of the family; the right to a name; the rights of the child; the 
right to nationality; the right to property; Freedom of movement and residence; the right to participate in 
government; the right to equal protection; the right to judicial protection; and the right to the progressive 
development of economic, social and cultural rights.  163Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, saint Vincent and 
The Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
164 L  Shaver  “The  Inter-American  Human  Rights  System:  An  Effective  Institution  for  Regional  Rights 
Protection?” (2010) 9 Washington. University Global Studies Law  Review 639 
 
38 
in the American Declaration of Rights 165 against a state that is not a party to the 
convention.166 This means that the Commission is competent to receive petitions alleging 
violation of economic, social and cultural rights even if the respondent state has not ratified 
the Additional Protocol to the Convention on human rights in the Area of Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights.167 
 
3.6 Personal jurisdiction 
 
History indicates that the individual petition system in international law is not a new 
phenomenon. It has long been established that individuals should have access to 
international courts and tribunals.168 This was, however, only limited to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection of individuals from violations by other states other their own.169 The 
Central American Court of Justice (CACJ)170 was the first international court to entertain 
petitions by ‘individuals of one state against the government of another state’ as 
contemplated in Article 2 of the Convention for the Establishment of the Central American 
Court of Justice.171 
 
The present day use of individual petitions in international human rights courts is seen as 
essential in the promotion and protection of human rights. Individual petitions in 
international law are an incident of the promotion of the individual’s right to access to 
justice by making courts accessible to all.172 Individual petitions speak to the core of the 
fundamental right to access to courts.173 Right to individual petition in international law 
 
165The American Declaration of Rights was adopted by American states in Colombia in 1948. It sets forth 
civil and political rights of citizens of American States. 
166See article 49 of the Commission Procedures. 
167The additional protocol is also known as the san Salvador protocol  168Note that there are various debates on whether the individual has a right to access to court in terms of 
international. 
169I Butler “A Comparative Analysis Of Individual Petition In Regional And Global Human Rights Protection 
Mechanisms” (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal.  170 See for example Butler ibid who says, ‘the CACJ was established in 1907 as part of a plan to create and 
maintain peace between five Central American states with a long history of violence. The CACJ was 
established to 'decide every difference or difficulty that may arise amongst them, of whatsoever nature it may 
be.’ See also Article 1 of the Convention for the Establishment of the Central American Court of Justice. 
171I Butler “A Comparative Analysis Of Individual Petition In Regional And Global Human Rights Protection 
Mechanisms” (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal  23.  172Scholars Zwaak and Cachia, are of the same view, for example referring to the use of individual petitions in 
the European Court they argue that, ‘undoubtedly, the strength and effectiveness of the European system of the 
protection of human rights lies in the right to individual petition. It is this direct access of the individual to an 
international organ competent to examine his/her complaint of a violation of one of the rights and freedoms 
recognized in the European Convention that has so far ensured a progressive development in the protection of 
fundamental rights within the domestic systems of the member states.’  173This argument supports an activist posture taken by some scholars and human rights court the right to 




refer to ‘entitlements that individuals or groups may have, under certain international 
instruments, to address an international body with respect to the alleged non-compliance of a 
State with human rights standards.’174Such a right is conferred on everyone including third 
parties whose rights have not been directly violated.175 According to Vandenhole, the term 
individual petition, ‘in its most developed form… attains a judicial connotation in so far as 
complaints can be examined and decided by an international court empowered to grant 
appropriate remedies to the applicant, if any human rights violation is established.’176 In 
Europe, Protocol No 11177 brought about a fundamental change in the human rights system 
through making the Court accessible to individuals. ‘Protocol 11 constitutes, in our opinion, 
an important reform of the control mechanism of the European Convention which could 
contribute to enhancing the role of the Court in the European system of protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.’ 178 The importance of individual petitions in the 
promotion and protection of human rights is best illustrated by Zwaak and Cachia: 
 
If one considers the applications brought by individuals and the outcome of those 
applications, not only on an individual basis, but also with regards to the effect of 
such decisions on the protection of fundamental rights within Turkey for all and not 
only for individual applicants, one cannot but conclude that this has produced a 
change towards better ensuring and affording that protection even on a domestic 
level. Due to the importance and effect of the right of individual petition, not only for 
the applicant but also for the domestic position, it would be a great pity if the 
European system changed in such a way so as to undermine or restrict the greater 
benefits of direct access of the individual to the Court simply to do away with the 
backlog that has been created.179 
 
Nevertheless, as will be shown later, even though individual petition systems are far from 
being perfect, they signify a move towards recognition of the individual in international 
 
 
174W Vandenhole Protocol No. 14 and the Reform of the European Court of Human Rights  (2005) 46. 
175 Ibid.  
176 Ibid, 47.   
177See for example J Costa “The European Court of Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law” (2003) 38 Texas 
International Law Journal 455 who notes that Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, which entered into force at 
the end of 1998, represents an important step toward strengthening the judicial character of the Convention 
machinery. In a few words, the new system has consisted of abolishing the European Commission of Human 
Rights and the quasi-judicial role of the Committee of Ministers, while transforming the Court into a 
permanent, full-time judicial body, merging the secretariat of the former Commission and the Registry of the 
.“old.” Court.’ 
178Editorial Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1994) 119  179L F Zwaak and T Cachia. "The European Court of Human Rights: A Success Story?" 2004 3 Human Rights 
Brief 11 32-35, 54. 
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law.180 As Butler would point it out, ‘although the individual petition mechanisms of the 
modern human rights systems suffer from short comings, their difference from historical 
examples and their continued growth confirms the individual as a rights bearing subject of 
international law.’181 This will be discussed in detail in the following chapters in relation to 
the SADC Tribunal and the East African Court of Justice. 
 






The inter-American Commission on Human Rights has the power to receive individual 
petitions alleging a violation of the American Convention or any relevant protocol of the 
Organisation of American States. 182 The Convention has an express individual petitions 
provision. In terms of Article 44, ‘any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental 
entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge 
petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this 
 
Convention by a State party.’183 This is, however, subject to requirements set out under 
Article 46. The requirements set out in Article 46 are; i). That the remedies under domestic 
law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of 
international law; ii). That the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six 
months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the 
final judgment; iii). That the subject of the petition or communication is not pending in 
another international proceeding for settlement; and iv). That, in the case of Article 44, the 
petition contains the name, nationality, profession, domicile, and signature of the person or 
persons or of the legal representative of the entity lodging the petition. 
 
The general rule is that individual petitions can only be brought against a State party to the 
convention. 184 However, in terms of Article 49 of the Commission Procedures the 






 Ibid.   
181 I Butler ‘A Comparative Analysis of Individual Petition In Regional and Global Human Rights Protection   
Mechanisms’ (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal.  
182 L  Shaver  ‘The  Inter-American  Human  Rights  System:  An  Effective  Institution  for  Regional  Rights   
Protection?’ (2010) 9 Washington  University  Global Studies Law Review, 639.  
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states that have not ratified the Convention.185 Thomas Buergenthal, former president of the 
Inter-American Court quoted by Weston explains this position that; 
 
As a [an O.A.S.]Charter organ, the Commission has jurisdiction over all O.A.S. 
Member States, whether or not they have ratified the Convention; as a Convention 
organ, its jurisdiction extends only to the States Parties to the Convention. Here its 
jurisdiction is more specific and its powers more extensive. The powers of the 
Commission as Charter organ lack precision, which is just as well, for the 
ambiguities about the scope of its powers gave it greater flexibility to deal 
imaginatively with gross violations of human rights prior to the entry into force of the 
Convention. It retains that flexibility in dealing with states that have not ratified it 
and in responding to emergency situations involving large-scale human rights abuses 
in the region.186 
 
The Commission determines admissibility of individual petitions in terms of Articles 46 and 
47 of the Convention. The key admissibility requirement is that the Commission has 
jurisdiction in respect of both the individual petitions and subject matter jurisdiction and that 
the petitioner has exhausted domestic remedies in terms of Article 46 (1) (a).187 
 
The Commission can only forward a petition to the Court if no friendly settlement188 could 
be reached between the parties.189 
 






185 L  Shaver  ‘The  Inter-American  Human  Rights  System:  An  Effective  Institution  for   Regional  Rights 
Protection?’ (2010) 9 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 650.  186Weston … et al ’Regional Human Rights; Comparison and Appraisal’ (1987) 20 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law.  187The wording of the convention is that, ‘Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication 
lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a) the remedies 
under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principle of 
international law.’ See a detailed discussion on the rule below.  
188See for example  http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/friendly_settlements/docs/Report-Friendly-Settlement.pdf 
where the OAS acknowledges that ‘While the individual petition system establishes a procedure to determine 
whether the international responsibility of a State has been engaged by a human rights violation, it also 
provides the possibility of reaching a friendly settlement on the matter, based on observance of the human 
rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, and other regional human rights instruments, at any stage during the examination of a petition 
or case. Although a friendly settlement is not a decision on the merits of the case before the Commission, this 
voluntary agreement reached by the parties may include public recognition and acceptance of responsibility 
by the State, as has occurred in numerous cases.’ In addition ‘The friendly settlement mechanism opens a 
venue for dialogue between petitioner and State, where both sides can reach agreements on reparation 
measures for the alleged victims and often for the society as a whole.’  




The contentious jurisdiction of the Court does not include individual petitions and is only 
limited to State Parties to the American Convention and the American Commission.190 The 
Court can only receive petitions in terms of Article 61 provided requirements set out in 
Articles 48 and 50 are met.191 This however, does not mean that the Court cannot hear 
matters involving individuals as petitions are filed to the Court by the Commission on behalf 
of the individual. 192 Butler sums up individual petitions in the inter-American court as 
follows; ‘claimants must have their cases decided by the American Commission before 
being able to proceed to the Court. Changes to the Commission's Rules of Procedure mean 
that cases where the state is found in violation will almost always proceed to the Court.’193 
 
Even though cases ‘almost always reach the Court,’ it cannot accept direct individual 
petitions.194 In addition to this, individual petitions in the American system are also limited 
by the status of the respondent state. Butler concedes; 
 
…the power to adjudicate individual claims in respect of OAS member states not 
party to the American Convention was not expressly granted by the OAS, and 
although initially contested by some states, appears now to have been accepted. 
Access to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (the American Court) is 
limited to those claiming against state parties to the American Convention who have 
expressly accepted the Court's jurisdiction.195 
 
The Inter-American system has not been free of problem in dealing with the growing 
number of individual petitions.196 Shelton attributes the rise in individual petitions to the 
fact that most countries have transitioned from repressive regimes to democratic 
governance, in addition to the growth of civil society and international human rights 
systems.197 Shelton notes that these, 
 
 
190 Ibid, Article 61.  191Articles 48 and 50 essentially outlines that when the Commission receives a petition, if it considers it 
admissible, it requests information on the alleged violation from the respondent state within a reasonable 
period. The Commission is also empowered by this provision to declare the petition ‘out of order’ on the basis 
of information received; if admissible the Commission examines and verifies facts. The Commission will 
attempt to reach a friendly settlement. If not reached the Commission draws its report. The Commission has 
authority to make proposals and recommendations in its report.  192Note that the commission can file individual petitions only if it has exhausted its internal procedures which 
include an attempt at reaching a friendly settlement.  193I Butler “A Comparative Analysis Of Individual Petition In Regional And Global Human Rights Protection 
Mechanisms” (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal 27-28 
194Compare with the European Court of Human Rights. 
195
 Supra note 193.   
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197 D Shelton “Boundaries Of Human Rights Jurisdiction In Europe” (2003) 13 Duke Journal Of Comparative and 




have resulted in growing expectations of victims and their representatives that the 
Inter-American system can address all individual and systemic violations of human 
rights, including police violence, disappearances, violence against women and sexual 
minorities, restitution and demarcation of indigenous ancestral lands, discrimination, 
lack of due process and independence in judicial bodies, attacks on human rights 
defenders and the media, and other widespread intractable problems in the 
Hemisphere.198 
 
Consequently, ‘the result is a steady growth in the number of petitions brought to the 
 
IACHR, creating an ever-increasing backlog of petitions to be processed, long delays, and 
repeated if not always successful efforts to reform case management.’199 
 




Unlike in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, individuals have direct access to the 
Court. The term individual is used to refer to any natural persons or juristic persons and it 
also includes any non-governmental organisations or a group of persons regardless of the 
number of individuals who form membership of that group.200 This direct access to the 
Court is a result of the coming into effect of Protocol no. 11201 which effectively dissolved 
the European Commission on Human rights in 1998. 202 Before the Protocol no. 11, 
 
‘recognition of the right of individual application was, however, optional and it could 
therefore be exercised only against those states which had accepted it.’203 Complaints were 
first examined by the Commission to determine admissibility. The Commission would seek 
to reach a friendly settlement failure of which the case would be referred to the Court for a 
final and binding decision. The Court is now competent to receive petitions from individuals 
 
198Ibid. 
199D Shelton “The Rules and the Reality of Petition Procedures In The Inter-American Human Rights System” 
The George Washington University Law School “The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System” 
Working Paper #2 May 2014.  200Protocol no 11 article 34 sets the jurisdiction of the Court as the power to, ‘receive applications from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.’  201According to Zwaak and Cachia, Supra note 181, the Protocol was adopted as a result of a lengthy debate 
on the need to reform the convention’s supervisory machinery by simplifying the structure and shortening the 
process and cementing the judicial character of the mechanism.  202 See for example Zwaak and Cachia, ibid, who notes that, ‘under Protocol No. 11 to the Convention the 
existing, part-time Court and Commission were replaced by a single, full-time Court. The acceptance of 
individual petition and the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction became compulsory. With respect to 
individual petitions the Committee of Ministers did not play a role any longer. Responsibility for supervising 
the execution of judgments lies with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.’  




who claim violation of any of their Convention rights by a State Party. This right is 
exercised regardless nationality, place of residence or civil status.204 The Court is peculiar 
in that it has a grand chamber which acts as an appeal ‘bench’ which is made up of 
seventeen judges.205 Individuals have a right to access this Court if the cases raises, ‘a 
serious question affecting the interpretation of or application of the Convention or protocols 
thereto, or serious issue of general importance.’206 
 




The personal jurisdiction of the African court is divided into two. There is a compulsory and 
an optional jurisdiction. Article 5 provides for compulsory jurisdiction in respect of petitions 
brought by the African Commission, member states, and intergovernmental organisations. 
The optional jurisdiction is set out in articles 5(3) and 34 (6) of the Protocol on the African 
Court. This jurisdiction is exercised on either the discretion of the Court or that of the 
respondent state. The state must have made an express declaration allowing the Court to 
receive individual petition from its citizens. The Court has discretion to accept or deny the 
access.207 
 




Individuals are often called upon to exhaust domestic remedies before they can approach an 
international court or tribunal. The rationale behind this requirement in international human 
rights law is that ‘before proceedings are brought to an international body the state must 
have had the opportunity to remedy matters through its own legal system.’ 208 The 
International Court of Justice in the Interhandel case noted that ‘the rule that local remedies 
must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established 
rule of customary international law …. Before resort may be had to an international court … 
it has been considered necessary that the state where the violation occurred should have an 
opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal 
 
204The only requisite being that violation must have been perpetrated by or within the jurisdiction of the 
state concerned.  205D Shelton ‘Boundaries Of Human Rights Jurisdiction In Europe’ (2003) 13 Duke Journal Of 
Comparative and International Law. 
206See Shelton ibid; Article 43 of Protocol no. 11.  207RW Eno “Jurisdiction Of The African Court” (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 230. 
208D'Ascoli, Silvia and Scherr, Kathrin Maria, The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the 




system.’209 The question that often arises is whether this requirement is a substantial or a 
procedural requirement. This raises another question on whether it is a requirement that calls 
for strict compliance or not. 
 
History shows that this requirement is traditionally entrenched in interstate diplomatic 
practice. Amerasinghe asserts that, ‘the rule that such remedies must be exhausted owes its 
origins to the diplomatic protection of aliens in which area it was first applied.’210 The rule 
of exhaustion of domestic remedies can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia.211 This 
constituted what has been referred to as a ‘landmark in the origins and formation of modern 
international law, the time from which state practice in the modern sense of the term would 
begin to develop.’ 212 Westphalia provides examples of reprisals; thus a treaty of 1664 
between Spain and Netherlands provided for prior resort to domestic courts and procedures. 
 
In addition, ‘states further agreed that in the future reprisals case of manifest denial of 
justice after communicating the matter to the minister of the country concerned, so that in a 
period of four months he could ensure that local justice was accomplished.’213 Trindade 
notes that ‘the practice of the United Kingdom is illustrative of the observance of the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies prior to the exercise of diplomatic 
protection.’214 There have been developments particularly in the twentieth century that saw 
the rule being extended from its original area of application namely; diplomatic protection 
of nationals abroad, to the protection of human rights, even though this has been done by 
means of express incorporation in agreements between states.’215 
 




The history discussed above has shown that, ‘the principle was an essential and absolute 
condition for the determination of an international wrongful act.’216 As a substantive rule, 
 
209Martin et al, Infra note 218;  Interhandel case (Switz v U.S.), [1959] I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar 21). 
210C F Amerasinghe Local Remedies In International Law 2004 2nd ed 3.  211A series of treaties signed in 1648 which brought to an end the eight years war between the Spanish and 
the Dutch. 
212 A.A. Cançado Trindade “Origin and Historical Development of The Rule Of Exhaustion Of Local  




214Ibid, 514.  215C F Amerasinghe Local Remedies In International Law 2004 2 nd edition; D'Ascoli, Silvia and Scherr, 
Kathrin Maria, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the International Law Doctrine and 
its Application in the Specific Context of Human Rights Protection” (February 2007).  




exhaustion of domestic remedies entails ‘prior necessity for the individual to employ all the 
remedies available under internal law.’217 This essentially means that if local remedies have 
not been exhausted, a state’s action cannot amount to a wrongful act in international law. 
This serves to illustrate the substantive nature of the rule. In this vein, violation of a right 
becomes an international wrongful act if the local remedies have failed to provide the 
necessary satisfaction. D’Ascoli and Scherr sum this as ‘…the claim that the rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies is of substantive character implies that no international 
responsibility can arise until the claim has been rejected by the local courts or authorities.’ 
218 In addition, the inter-American Commission, in the case of Velasquez v Rodriguez 
maintained that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be decided jointly with 
the merits of that case, rather than in the preliminary phase. This argument speaks to the 
substantive nature of the rule. In this case, the Commission further argued that, ‘prior 
exhaustion of remedies is a requirement for the admissibility of petitions presented to the 




The procedural nature of the rule is premised on the argument that ‘where there has been an 
original wrong on the part of the state followed by a failure to redress it amounting to denial 
of justice, the denial may be a necessary condition of intervention, but it is not on the ground 
of it.’ 220 D’Ascoli and Scherr cite Permanent Court of International Justice 221 decision in 
France v Italy (Phosphates in Morocco case) where the Court confirmed the procedural 
nature of the rule that ‘…the alleged denial of justice … exercises no influence either on the 
accomplishment of the act or on the responsibility ensuing from it.’222 
 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies is a requirement in international law as a result of the need 
to respect state sovereignty which is a factor in international dispute settlement and it also 
attributes a certain order to international procedures as such.223 The United Nations lists the 





218Ibid, 4.  219Martin… et al International Human Rights And Humanitarian Law: Treaties Cases And Analysis (2006) 
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redress.224 D’Ascoli and Scherr make reference to the European Court of Human Rights 
case of Akdivar v Turkey225 where the judge noted that ‘… the rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies …obliges those seeking to bring their case against the state before an international 
judicial or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the legal system… the rule is 
based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the convention that there is an effective 
remedy available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system whether or not the 
provisions of the convention are incorporated in national law. In this way it is an important 
aspect of protection established by the convention is subsidiary to the national systems 
safeguarding human rights.’226 
 
From the above statement, it can be gathered that the remedy should be available and it 
should also be effective.227 ‘A remedy is considered available if it can be pursued by the 
applicant without difficulties or impediments.’228 Consequently, it is considered effective 
 
‘when it actually exists within the domestic legal system and when it offers a reasonable 
prospect of success.’229 In addition, ‘… [if] the exhaustion of a particular remedy is futile 
and not helpful, then such a remedy need not be exhausted.’230 Rogue states usually try to 
frustrate the process. Hence there are exceptions to the rule. The exceptions to the rule of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies are that the victim has shown that the domestic remedies 
are ineffective, unavailable or that they are unreasonably delayed.231 Martin notes that; 
 
when remedies are denied for trivial reasons or without examination on the merits, or 
there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered or tolerated by 







224International Norms and Standards Relating To Disability Part II. International Human Rights System. 2/11 
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remedies that would normally be available to others, resort to such remedies becomes 
a senseless formality.232 
 
This rule stems from generally accepted principle of international human rights law that 
states bear the primary burden of protecting human rights. The reasoning behind this is that 
domestic remedies are more effective because they are easily accessible, and proceed more 
quickly than in an international body.233 
 




While individual petitions play a crucial role in the promotion and protection of fundamental 
human rights, interstate petitions are best suited for resolving political disputes. All 
international human rights systems discussed in this study provide for interstate 
petitions.234This is particularly because states are primarily responsible for the enforcement 
of human rights and abiding by their international obligations in terms of the laws of 
treaties. 235 In interstate procedures the petitioner alleges that the respondent state has 
violated any of its obligations under a relevant international law. However, states are 
generally reluctant to file petitions against other states.236 Pasqualucci contends that, ‘even 
when a state is concerned about human rights violations, political reality often inhibits it 
from making accusations about another state for fear of jeopardizing its economic interests 
or having its own practices evaluated.’237 
 
States enjoy the privilege of having direct access to the courts. Some courts were initially 
set up as interstate disputes adjudication bodies and individual petitions restricted to 
commissions. 238 This was seen as a limitation on the individual right to access to 
international courts and thus extended jurisdictions to include individual petitions. Scholars 
agree that restricting courts and tribunals to individual petitions places substantial limits on 
individual human rights. Hence, some courts now entertain both individual and interstate 
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petitions. In practice, however, in interstate disputes, international courts exercise advisory 
jurisdiction. 
 
3.8.1 The American system 
 
 
The  American  system  provides  for  State  Parties’  direct  access  to  the  Court.  The 
 
Commission also enjoy competence to receive interstate complaints. 239 The American 
Convention provides that state parties may file communications alleging human rights 
abuses against other state parties.240 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has 
authority to consider inter-state complaints only if both of the States Parties, in addition to 
ratifying the Convention, have formally recognized the competence of the Commission to 
receive and review such complaints.241 According to Judge Buergenthal,242 ‘before one 
state party may bring such charges against another state party, both states must have made 
separate declarations recognising “the competence of the commission to receive and 
examine” interstate complaints.’243 
 
If the respondent state has not formally accepted jurisdiction of the Commission in interstate 
complaints, the respondent state will have the option to accept the Commission’s 
competence, if it so wishes. The Court on the other hand, also has competence to receive 
interstate petitions. Article 61 (1) explicitly spells out that the Court can only receive cases 
from state parties and the Commission subject to procedural requirements set in articles 48 
and 50.244 
 




In the European system even though the convention provides for interstate petitions, there 
has been a general hesitance by states to use this provision. Costa points out that ‘there have 
been a few interstate cases, but in spite of their legal and political importance, they have 
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represented a very small percentage of the overall case laws.’ Scholars believe that in the 
 
European system states are not quick to litigate against each other as this is seen as having 
the potential to jeopardise diplomatic relations as well as trade. Keller submits that ‘the 
contracting states are reluctant to expose each other to a procedure that is by its nature 
undiplomatic and might impair relations with another country.’ 245 Of the few interstate 
petitions received by either the Commission or the Court, most of them have been resolved 
by means of friendly settlements. This serves to illustrate how the interstate petition system 
is not ideal for the protection of human rights. This is so particularly because when there is a 
human rights violation, it is the individual or group of individuals who suffer. It is important 
to mention, however, that interstate applications are important in placing substantial political 
pressure on the respondent state. Keller notes that ‘while long terms effects of lodging such 
a complaint may be hard to predict the political and economic pressures produced by an 
interstate application can yield substantial immediate results.’246 Admirable as it may 
sound; interstate dispute resolutions have little or no benefit to the individual as a subject of 
international law. 
 




African human rights system provides for direct access to both the Court and the 
Commission in respect of interstate applications. In respect of interstate application, there is 
no need for exhaustion of domestic remedies. Article 5 of the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples Rights provides direct access under its compulsory jurisdiction to; 
 
the African Commission; the state party which has lodged a complaint to the African 
Commission; the state party against whom the complaint has been lodged at the 
African Commission; the state party whose citizen is a victim of a human rights 
violation; and African intergovernmental organisations.247 
 
However, states rarely litigate against each other. Therefore, the interstate procedure is not 
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The concept of jurisdiction is broad; it could however, be deduced from various definitions 
that jurisdiction refers to power or authority. This power is further narrowed down to refer to 
power to adjudicate, prescribe and to enforce the law. In addition to this, in order for a court 
or tribunal to have competence in a case it has to have a subject matter and a personal 
jurisdiction. Most human rights instruments have an express human rights jurisdiction save 
for a few sub-regional courts such as the East African Court of Justice and the SADC 
Tribunal whose human rights jurisdiction is not express as will be shown in the following 
chapters. The exercise of jurisdiction in by regional courts is dependent on the interpretation 
of the relevant empowering instrument. The role of the individual in international law is 
increasingly becoming important. Individual petition system forms the core of the 
individual’s position at the international level. It was shown that individual petition system, 
in its most developed form attains a judicial connotation in so far as complaints can be 
examined and decided by an international court empowered by granting appropriate 
remedies to the applicant if any human rights violation is established. The European 
individual petition system is more developed, and in the American Court, individuals can 
only access the Court through the Commission. It was however, shown that in order for an 
individual to access international courts and tribunal, he or she has to first comply with the 
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. This requirement exists in all the human 
rights system used to demonstrate its operation in this chapter. In some cases exhausting 



































































































THE HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL: THE CAMPBELL  






Sub-regional human rights mechanisms are a uniquely African judicial mechanism 
established by political or economic blocs at the sub regional level establish them. In Africa, 
there exist more than four sub-regional groupings with at least one legal instrument relating 
to human rights.248 However, human rights reference in some of these instruments is not 
clear and their interpretations are a subject of legal debate. It is argued that the emergence of 
regional and sub-regional organisations and their respective courts and tribunals illustrate 
the development of regional human rights and increasing role of the individual as a subject 
of international law.249 Some sub-regional courts were established as human rights courts, 
whilst others were established for the sole purpose of economic integration and corporation. 
250 It is a settled principle of international law that states bear the primary responsibility for 
the protection of individuals. 251 However, the exercise of this responsibility is only primary 
and is not exercised to the exclusion of all other actors, hence sub-regional human rights 
bodies. 
 
The inclusion of provisions for individual petitions in various human rights instruments is a 
manifestation of the importance of the right to individual petitions and demonstrates the 
undeniable fact there exist the right to access to justice at international law. Mindful of the 
 
248
 For example The East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, southern African 
Development Community, Economic Community of West African States and others.   
249 ‘The evolution and progressive development of the international legal system in the twentieth century, and particularly 
after World War II, has caused a considerable increase in the importance of humanitarian values in the process of creation 
of international legal rules. The protection of both individuals and groups from any kind of violence, guaranteeing their 
freedom and dignity, has become one of the essential concerns of the international community.’ A Orakhelashvili “The 
Position of the Individual in International Law” 31 (2000),   
No. 2, 10 California Western International Law Journal.  
250Regional systems established for the sole purpose of integration and corporation also have human rights as   
their cardinal principles thereby extending their various mandates to include human rights. See for example 
O C Ruppel who points out that ‘In general terms, regional integration can be described as a path towards 
gradually liberalising the trade of developing countries and integrating them into the world economy. At first 
glance it appears that the promotion and protection of human rights is not within the RECs’ focal range… 
human-rights-related matters play a vital role within the RECs’ legal framework as well as in their daily 
practice, as many have implemented certain provisions in their mandate that have an impact on human rights 
and good governance.’ O C Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities And Human Rights In East And  
Southern Africa” available at  
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/9_Ruppel.pdf (accessed on 
09 September 2015).  




fact that States have the primary responsibility to promote, respect and protect the rights of 
individuals, international law guards against abuse of the right to petition international court 
by placing a procedural requirement of the need to exhaust domestic remedies by 
individuals before invoking international procedures. 
 
Recent developments in the SADC Tribunal indicate that whereas the general trend in 
international law indicates emphasis on the individual as right bearing in the eyes of 
international law worth the right to access international courts, the Tribunal is in the process 
of diminishing this right.252 Needless, be it mentioned that, such a retrogressive effort 
cannot be condoned, whether by means of reason or morality. 
 
A careful retracing of the path through which the SADC Tribunal developed will help one 
make a detailed analysis of where the Tribunal is now and where it is going and the 
prospects for human rights in the region. One of the fundamental points of discussion in this 
chapter is the precarious position that the Tribunal finds itself in because of its interpretation 
of its human rights jurisdiction in the case of Mike Campbell Private ltd v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Campbell).253 The events that led to the suspension of the SADC Tribunal and 
the subsequent enactment of the New Protocol (2014 Protocol)254 will be analysed. The 
case of Campbell 255 brought the Tribunal under the wrath of the heads of state and 
government and this warrants a detailed scrutiny of the consequences associated therewith. 
The legality of the suspension that ensued Campbell then the subsequent adoption of a New 
Protocol will be put into perspective. It will be argued that the suspension of the Tribunal 
was a violation of the SADC Treaty since it does not provide for the suspension of the 
Tribunal and the New Protocol is illegal for the reason that it is a product of an illegal 
process. 
 





The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 as a direct 
replacement of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)256 
 
252See for example A Orakhelashvili, Supra 248, at 240, who note that ‘there is no longer any doubt that the 
rights of the individual exist outside the domestic jurisdiction of States and that these rights concern the 
whole international community.’ 
253Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007. 
2542014 Protocol on The Tribunal In The Southern African Development Community. 
255Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007.  
256The predecessor of the Southern African Development Community. 
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after the signing of the SADC Treaty257 in Windhoek, Namibia. The SADCC had been 
created in the 1980 after the majority of Southern African countries had attained 
independence from colonial rule. It was formed in Lusaka, Zambia. The aim of the SADCC 
was to pursue policies to facilitate the economic development and independence of these 
countries from Apartheid South Africa and to achieve an integrated development of the 
region.258 After the signing of the 1992 Treaty, SADC Tribunal and other SADC organs 
became an integral part of the sub-regional system. The Treaty provided for the 
establishment of the SADC Tribunal, an adjudicatory institution that was tasked with 
dispute resolution in the region under Article 9 (1) (f). 259 The SADC Tribunal was 
established with a view to ensure that every country in the region respects and conforms to 
the objectives and principles contained in the SADC Treaty.260 
 
Article 6 ‘General Undertakings’ say that member states will, ‘adopt measures to promote 
the achievement of the objectives of the community and will refrain from anything likely to 
jeopardise the achievement of these objectives or implementation of the treaty 
provisions.’261 These objectives include to; 1..a) achieve development and growth, alleviate 
poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and 
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; b) evolve common political 
values, systems and institutions; c) promote and defend peace and security; d) promote self-
sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and interdependence of 
member states; e) achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes; f) promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources 
of the region; g) achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection 
of the environment; h) strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and 
cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.262 Article 16263 gives effect to 
Article 9 (1) (f) and it provides, inter alia, that the decisions of the Tribunal shall be 
 
 
257Treaty of the Southern African Development Community.  258 R H. Thomas ‘Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-Mozambique-Namibia-Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-
Zimbabwe:Treaty Of The Southern African Development Community’ (1993) 32, 1 International Legal 
Materials 116-135.   
259 Article 9 establishes all SADC institutions.  260Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007. 
261 RH   Thomas   ‘Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-Malawi-Mozambique-Namibia-Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-  
Zimbabwe:Treaty Of The Southern African Development Community’ (1993) 32, 1 International Legal 
Materials pp. 116-135; see also Article 6 (1) of the SADC Treaty. 
262Article 5 of the SADC Treaty.  263Article 9 establishes the Tribunal and five other institutions namely the summit of heads of state or 
government, council of ministers, commissions, the standing committee of officials and the secretariat. 
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binding.264 Article 6(5) provides for the uniform application of the Treaty.265 The Preamble 
of the SADC Treaty observes that there is a ‘need to involve the people of the region 
centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee 
of democratic rights, observance of human rights and rule of law.’266 
 
A Protocol on Tribunal was adopted in the year 2000 pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 
and 16 of the SADC Treaty. The SADC Tribunal became operational in 2005 after a heads 
of state and government summit convened in Gaborone, Botswana in the same year.267 
 
Members of the Tribunal were accordingly appointed in terms of Article 4 of the Protocol 
on Tribunal.268 The SADC Tribunal was established with ‘the duty to ensure adherence to 
and proper interpretation of the Treaty and its subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate 
disputes referred to it.’269 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was set out in Article 14 of the 
Protocol on Tribunal and Procedures Thereof as; ‘jurisdiction over all disputes and all 
applications referred to it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: (a) 
the interpretation and application of the Treaty; (b) the interpretation, application or validity 
of the Protocols, all subsidiary instruments adopted within the framework of the 
Community, and acts of the institutions of the Community; (c) all matters specifically 
provided for in any other agreements that States may conclude among themselves or within 
 
 
264In terms of this provision, the Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation 
of the provision of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate matters referred to it. It 
also provides for a Protocol on Tribunal to be adopted at a summit of heads of states or government. 
265This complements the  Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties’ Article 3. 
266 The preamble SADC Treaty.   
267 See for example the 2005 SADC Summit Communique; para 40 states that ‘ In operationalising the SADC Tribunal in 
terms of the Protocol on Tribunal, Summit approved the appointment of the following ten (10) members of the Tribunal: 
Dr. Roberto Kambovo of Angola; Dr.Onkemetse B. Tshosa of Botswana; Hon. Justice Isaac Jamu Mtambo of Malawi; 
Chief Justice Ariranga Govindasamy Pillay of Mauritius; Hon. Dr. Luis Antonio Mondlane of Mozambique; Hon. Justice 
Petrus T. Damaseb of Namibia; Hon. Justice Stanley B. Maphalala of Swaziland; Hon. Justice Frederick B. Werema of 
Tanzania; Hon. Justice F. M. Chomba of   
Zambia; and Hon. Justice Antonia Guvava of Zimbabwe.’ And para 41 ‘Summit also designated the initial five 
regular Members of the Tribunal as follows:Dr. Roberto Kambovo of Angola; Dr. Onkemetse B. Tshosa of 
Botswana; Hon. Justice Isaac Jamu Mtambo of Malawi; Chief Justice Ariranga Govindasamy Pillay of   
Mauritius; Hon. Dr. Luis Antonio Mondlane of Mozambique.’  
268In terms of this provision; ‘1. Each State may nominate one candidate having the qualifications prescribed in   
Article 3 of this Protocol. 2. Due consideration shall be given to fair gender representation in the nomination 
and appointment process. 3. The Members shall be selected by the Council from the list of candidates so 
nominated by States. Nominations for the first appointment shall be called within three (3) months, and the 
selection shall be held within six (6) months, of the date of entry into force of this Protocol. 4. The Members 
shall be appointed by the Summit upon recommendation of the Council. 5. Where a Member is appointed to 
replace a Member whose terms of office has not expired, the Member so appointed shall serve for the 
remainder of his or her predecessor's term. 6. Any appointment to fill a vacancy referred to in paragraph 5 shall 
be conducted within three (3) months of the vacancy occurring. The procedure referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis.’ For the names of members appointed, ibid. 
269N Murungi ‘Revisiting The Role Of Sub-Regional Courts In The Protection Of Human Rights In Africa’ 
(2009); Treaty of the Southern African Development Community Article 16 (1). 
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the community and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.270 This provision does not 
give the Tribunal a clear human rights mandate. Human rights jurisdiction of the Court was 
clarified in the case of Mike Campbell Pvt ltd.271 
 




On 11 October, 2000, Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and William Michael Campbell filed an 
application with the Tribunal in which they challenged the acquisition by the Zimbabwe 
Government of immovable property, known as Mount Carmell farm in Zimbabwe. 
Simultaneously, they filed an application in terms of Article 28 272 of the Protocol on 
Tribunal (the Protocol), as read with Rule 61 (2) - (5) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
SADC Tribunal, for an interim measure restraining the respondent from expropriating the 
applicants’ land, pending a final order. On 13 December 2007, the interim relief sought was 
granted. The Court held that; 
 
the Tribunal grants the application pending the determination of the main case and orders 
that the Republic of Zimbabwe shall take no steps, or permit no steps to be taken, directly or 
indirectly, whether by its agents or by orders, to evict from or interfere with the peaceful 
residence on, and beneficial use of, the farm known as Mount Carmell of Railway 19, 
measuring 1200.6484 hectares held under Deed of Transfer No. 10301/99, in the District of 
Chegutu in the Republic of Zimbabwe, by Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and William 
Michael Campbell, their employees and the families of such employees and of William 
Michael Campbell.273 
 
Seventy-seven other persons applied for the same order and were granted the interim relief 
sought. 
 




On the turn of the 21st Century, Zimbabwe embarked on a land reform process. This land 





270 2000 Protocol on Tribunal and Procedures Thereof. 
271Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007.  272This provision states that ‘the Tribunal or the President may, on good cause, order the suspension of an 




government after the later had backtracked on its Lancaster House commitments.274 The 
terms of the Lancaster House Agreement were that Zimbabwe was to carry out a British-
funded land reform exercise in order to address the colonial legacy of land ownership 
imbalances.275 As a result, Zimbabwe proclaimed a Constitutional276 Amendment Act 17. 
The relevant provision of the amendment is Section 16(B) 2 and it says; 
 
(a) all agricultural land - (i) that was identified on or before the 8th July, 2005, in 
the Gazette or Gazette Extraordinary under section 5 (1) of the Land Acquisition 
Act [Chapter 20:10], and which is itemized in Schedule 7, being agricultural 
land required for resettlement purposes; or (ii) that is identified after the 5th 
July, 2005, but before the appointed day (i.e. 16th September, 2005), in the 
Gazette or Gazette Extraordinary under section 5 (1) of the Land Acquisition 
Act [Chapter 20:10], being agricultural land required for resettlement purposes; 
or that is identified in terms of this section by the acquiring authority after the 
appointed day in the Gazette or Gazette Extraordinary for whatever purposes, 
including, but not limited to A. settlement for agricultural or other purposes; or 
B. the purposes of land reorganization, forestry, environmental conservation or 
the utilization of wild life or other natural resources; or C. the relocation of 
persons dispossessed in consequence of the utilization of land for a purpose 
referred to in subparagraph A or B; is acquired by and vested in the State with 
full title therein with effect from the appointed day or, in the case of land 
referred to in subparagraph (Hi), with effect from the date it is identified in the 
manner specified in that paragraph; and (b) no compensation shall be payable for 
land referred to in paragraph (a) except for any improvements effected on such 
land before it was acquired.(3) The provisions of any law referred to in section 
16 (1) regulating the compulsory acquisition of land that is in force on the 
appointed day, and the provisions of section 18 (1) and (9), shall not apply in 
relation to land referred to in subsection (2) (a) except for the purpose of 
 
274The British Government led by Margaret Thatcher invited Zimbabwe’s political parties to a constitutional 
conference in Lancaster, UK in 1979. The British government agreed to provide the resources that would be 
required to purchase the land for redistribution. The American Government also undertook to help fund the 
land redistribution process. However, when the Labor Party took over the reins in Britain they informed 
Zimbabwe about the election of a Labor government “without links to former colonial interests” which 
meant Britain no longer had any “special responsibility to meet the cost of land purchases.”  
275See for example M. G Chinamasa ‘The Human Right To Land In Zimbabwe: The Legal And Extra-Legal 
Resettlement Processes’ who notes that by 1905, under this new land allocation policy, there were about 60 Native 
Reserves (NRs), occupying about 22% of the country. Nearly half of the indigenous black population of 700 000 
now lived in reserves. They had by then lost approximately 16 million hectares to the white settlers. By 1920, the 
native reserves constituted an area of 8,7 million hectares, while the number of white settler farms 
(Company/freehold) reached 2 500, encompassing an acreage of approximately 15 million hectares.’ 276This was an 




determining any question related to the payment of compensation referred to in 
subsection (2) (b), that is to say, a person having any right or interest in the land 
- (a) shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the 
State, and no court shall entertain any such challenge; (b) may, in accordance 
with the provisions of any law referred to in section 16 (1) regulating the 
compulsory acquisition of land that is in force on the appointed day, challenge 
the amount of compensation payable for any improvements effected on the land 
before it was acquired.277 
 
This provision legitimised expropriation of land without compensation and barred domestic 
courts from entertaining litigation in respect of expropriated land. Campbell and others took 
the case to the SADC Tribunal and resulted in the Mike Campbell Private Ltd and others 
case.278 
 





After the interim judgement was handed down, litigation continued on the merits in 2008. On 
the merits, the Zimbabwe Government (the respondents) argued that the Tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction in the matter because ‘the SADC Treaty did not spell out benchmarks against which 
member states’ conduct could be assessed and that if the Tribunal were to borrow these 
benchmarks from other treaties, it would be legislating on behalf of member states.’279 
 
The Respondents also contended that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and ‘in the 
absence of a regional protocol on human rights and agrarian reform, the objectives and 
principles of the Treaty were not binding on member states.’280 The Court thus had to 
determine the preliminary issues of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the matter and 
whether the requirement that domestic remedies should be exhausted before approaching the 
court was complied with. On these issues the Court held that it had jurisdiction in terms of 
Articles 14(a) and 15 of the Protocol on Tribunal. 
 
On the question of whether the Tribunal had a human rights jurisdiction, the respondents 
submitted that the listed principles and objectives of the SADC Treaty were non-binding in 
the absence of a separate protocol on human rights and land reform. The Tribunal reasoned 
 
277Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (Act 17); Mike Campbell Private Ltd V Republic 
Of ZimbabweSADC (T) Case No. 2/2007. 
278Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of ZimbabweSADC (T) Case No. 03/2009. 
279Ibid.  280 A Moyo ‘Defending Human Rights And The Rule Of Law By The SADC Tribunal: Campbell 




that it had power to develop its own jurisprudence in terms of Article 21(b) of the Protocol 
281 having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international 
law, which are sources of law for the Tribunal.282 Thus, it held that it clearly had 
jurisdiction in respect of ‘any dispute concerning human rights, democracy and rule of 
law.’283 It is this decision that irked the Zimbabwe government leading to the subsequent 
demise of the Tribunal. 
 





The Tribunal exercises four kinds of jurisdiction. These are the jurisdiction under Article 
14284 of the Protocol on Tribunal, the preliminary rulings jurisdiction under Article 16285 of 
the Protocol on Tribunal, advisory jurisdiction under Article 16.4 of the SADC Treaty as 
read with Article 20286 of the Protocol and the appellate jurisdiction under Article 20A.287 
None of these provisions specifically pronounce the human rights mandate of the Court. 
 
The  human  rights  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunal  became  a  subject  of  debate  soon  after 
 
Campbell. Ruppel argues that it is, ‘no doubt, that the SADC Tribunal is expected to serve 
as a key actor in the SADC legal and institutional integration process. The European Union 
 
281Article 21 (b) 2000 Protocol On Tribunal.  282 A Moyo ‘Defending Human Rights And The Rule Of Law By The SADC Tribunal: Campbell 
And Beyond’ (2009) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, 590-614. 
283Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 02/2007.  284Article 14 says ‘the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: (a) the interpretation and application of the 
Treaty; (b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary instruments  
adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of the institutions of the Community; (c) all matters 
specifically provided for in any other agreements that States may conclude among themselves or within the 
community and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.’  285 Article 16 says ‘1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, the Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in proceedings of any kind and between any parties before the courts or 
tribunals of States. 2. The Tribunal shall not have original jurisdiction but may rule on a question of 
interpretation, application or validity of the provisions in issue if the question is referred to it by a court or 
tribunal of a State for a preliminary ruling in accordance with this Protocol.’  286Article 20 says ‘The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, which may be requested by 
the Summit or by the Council in terms of paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Treaty.’  
287Article 20A (Agreement amending the Protocol) 1. ‘The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in any dispute 
relating to the legal findings and conclusions of a panel under a protocol referred to it by a party to the dispute. 
2. Only a party to a dispute may appeal a panel report. Third parties which have notified the registrar of a 
substantial interest in the matter pursuant to the rules may make written submission to, and be given an 
opportunity to be heard by, the Tribunal. 3 The Tribunal may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions of the panel. 4. In cases of urgency, parties to a dispute and the Tribunal shall make every effort to 
accelerate the proceedings to the greatest extent possible. 5. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered 
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. 6. The Tribunal may call an expert to 
address them during oral hearings on any matter for the Tribunal’s benefit.7. Disputes relating to the legal 
findings and conclusions of a panel established under the Protocol on Trade referred to the Tribunal for 




experience has demonstrated that such dispute settlement bodies can indeed play a significant 
role in regional integration. However, in order to develop the current SADC dispute settlement 
system into an ideal model, improvements may have to be considered.’288 
 
This speaks to the fact that respect for human rights are indeed critical to the integration 
process for which the sub-regional bodies are created. As previously argued, human rights 
are cardinal to the integration process. In addition to this, Ruppel attributes the Tribunal’s 
human rights jurisdiction to ‘… [the] pressing reality that a century of change has tied the 
people of the earth in unprecedented intimacy of contact, interdependence of welfare and 
vulnerability.’ 289 This means that in a global village, respect for human rights at 
supranational level is inevitable. 
 
Article 16 (1) of the SADC Treaty would be an ideal starting point for the interpretation of 
the relevant jurisdictional clauses in the Treaty itself. Article 16 (1) says that ‘the Tribunal 
shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of 
this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be 
referred to it.’290 Thus in Campbell, the Tribunal held that it clearly had ‘jurisdiction in 
respect of any dispute concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law…’291 The 
judges correctly afforded the Tribunal a mandate to promote and protect human rights. 
 
The Tribunal’s ruling was not well received, particularly by the Zimbabwe government; 
 
Ruppel correctly attributes the collapse of the Tribunal to this ruling. He points out that 
 
‘….[the Tribunal ruled that] it has jurisdiction to hear human rights complaints, but its 
exercise of this competence led to a SADC-ordered review of the Tribunal’s role and 
functions in 2010, resulting in the suspension of its activities.’292 
 
In addition to its human rights jurisdiction, the Tribunal had ‘jurisdiction over all matters 
provided for in any other agreements that member states may conclude among themselves or 
within the community and that confer jurisdiction to the Tribunal.’293 The Tribunal was also 
competent to receive interstate disputes and disputes between individuals and states in 
addition to its ‘exclusive jurisdiction in disputes between organs of the community or 
 
288O C Ruppel and  F X. Bangamwabo ‘The SADC Tribunal: a legal analysis of its mandate and role 
in regional integration’ in Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2008). 
289Ibid. 
290Article 16 (1) of the SADC Treaty. 
291 Supra note 279. 
292O C Ruppel and  F X. Bangamwabo ‘The SADC Tribunal: a legal analysis of its mandate and role 




between community personnel and the community.’294 It is on this latter ground that the 
Tribunal heard the case of Ernest Francis Mtangwi v. SADC Secretariat.295 
 
The 2000 Protocol on Tribunal outlines the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal as; 
 
… jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in accordance with the 
Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: i) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
ii) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols and subsidiary instruments 
adopted within the SADC, and acts of institutions of the community ;and iii) all matters 
specifically provided for in any other agreements that States may conclude among 
themselves or within the community and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
296 
 
Critics of the approach used by the Tribunal in Campbell to extend the jurisdiction to human 
rights argued that a new human rights Protocol was needed in order for the Court to have a 
human rights jurisdiction.297 Moyo counters this argument where he says, ‘given that the 
principles of ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ are codified under article 4(c) of 
the Treaty, held the Tribunal, it was unnecessary to have a separate Protocol on human 
rights in order to give effect to these principles.’298 
 
The general practice in international law is that a regional human rights court exercises 
jurisdiction over human rights cases once the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies. As 
shown in previous chapters, this requirement is entrenched in international law. Almost all 
regional human rights systems have this provision as a procedural requirement.299 The 
rationale for this principle is that before a state can be summoned before an international 
tribunal it must be given an opportunity to remedy any wrong it may have committed 
through its domestic procedures.300 This requirement is meant to guard against overloading 
the regional courts with matters that could be dealt with at domestic level and also to 
preserve and recognise the independence of member states judicial systems. There are, 
however, situations where strict compliance with this rule may have negative implications 
 
 
294Ibid; Article 18 of the 2000 protocol on the SADC Tribunal and Rules Thereof.  295B Chagara “Southern African Development Community Land Issues; Towards A Sustainable Land 
Relations Policy” 2012. 
296 Article 14 of the 2000 Protocol on Tribunal. 
297This was Zimbabwe’s position on the matter. 
298 A Moyo “Defending Human Rights And The Rule Of Law By The SADC Tribunal: Campbell And 
Beyond” (2009) 2  African Human Rights Law Journal, 590-614.  299See for example the International Court of Justice case of Interhandel case (Switz v U.S.), [1959] I.C.J. 6, 
27 (Mar 21).  300F Zenda ‘The Sadc Tribunal And The Judicial Settlement Of International Disputes’ (unpublished 




on the integrity of the regional or international human rights systems. Moyo cites Ankumah 
who argues that ‘it is not necessary to comply with the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies if the complainant has been denied access to them, or if the domestic laws impede 
due access to legal procedures.’301 In applying this principle, ‘the Tribunal will, of course, 
need to take into account of the existing jurisprudence emanating from other international 
courts or tribunals...’302 The Zimbabwe government had enacted a statute (Amendment 17) 
with a provision that, ‘a person having any right or interest in the land shall not apply to a 
court to challenge the acquisition of land by state and no court shall entertain any such 
challenge.’303 This provision illustrates that there were no domestic remedies available for 
the applicants and the Tribunal correctly enabled the applicants to proceed before the 
Tribunal. According to Moyo, ‘the Tribunal has competence to exempt parties from proving 
that they have exhausted local remedies if they show that they were unable to proceed under 
domestic jurisdiction.’ 304 This also includes undue delay or the unavailability or 
ineffectiveness of local remedies. In the case of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and 
the Institute for Human Rights and Development, 305 that was heard before the African 
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission had to consider the question as to what 
constitutes an unduly prolonged process under Article 56(5) of the African Charter. The 
Commission noted that there are no standard criteria that can be used to determine when the 
process is said to be unduly prolonged, and each case has to be treated on its own merits.306 
Unduly prolonged may mean that there is no justification for the delay. 
 




In the case of Gramara Pvt Ltd and Others V Republic of Zimbabwe,307 the Zimbabwe High 
Court refused to register the decisions of the Tribunal in the domestic courts as required by 
Article 32 (1) of the Protocol on Tribunal. 308 According to Hansungule, ‘Patel J, who 
 
 
301 A Moyo ‘Defending Human Rights And The Rule Of Law By The SADC Tribunal: Campbell And 
Beyond’ (2009) 2  African Human Rights Law Journal, 590-614. 
302 Supra note 299, at 66. 
303Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005. 
304 Supra note 300.   
305 294/04 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development   
306 F Zenda The Sadc Tribunal And The Judicial Settlement Of International Disputes (unpublished thesis,   
University of South Africa, 2010).  
307Gramara Pvt Ltd and Others V Republic Of Zimbabwe HC 33/09.  
308Article 32(1) says ‘The law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign   





dismissed attempts to register the SADC Tribunal judgment, had the following words to say 
in support of his decision: 
 
This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent 
with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
The obvious implications of the supremacy of the Constitution are two-fold. First, to 
the extent that the common law is invoked to enforce a foreign judgment, the common 
law must be construed and applied so as to conform with the Constitution and any 
feature of the judgment that conflicts with the Constitution cannot, as a matter of 
public policy, be recognised or enforced in Zimbabwe. The notion of public policy 
cannot be deployed and insinuated under cover of the common law to circumvent or 
subvert the fundamental law of the land. Secondly, I consider it to be patently contrary 
to the public policy of any country, including Zimbabwe, to require its government to 




It is interesting to note that, even though the Zimbabwe High Court refused to enforce the 
decision of the Tribunal in 2010, in the same year the South African High Court arrived at a 
different conclusion in Fick case. 
 
4.4.1 Fick Cases (SADC Tribunal, North Gauteng High Court, Supreme Court of 




Fick first made an application to the SADC Tribunal (before it was suspended). In this case 
the Applicants wanted the Tribunal to ask the Summit (of Heads of State or Government) to 
take appropriate measures in terms of Article 32 (5)310 which deals with recalcitrant parties 
on the basis that Zimbabwe had failed to comply with the Tribunal’s decision in the 2007 
and 2009 Campbell cases. Zimbabwe had refused to comply through its Minister of Justice 
who is on the record of having said; 
 
We hereby advise that, henceforth, we will not appear before the Tribunal and neither 
will we respond to any action or suit that may be instituted or be pending in against 
 
309 M  Hansungule “The Suspension Of The SADC Tribunal” 35  1 Strategic Review for Southern Africa.  
310Article 32of the Protocol on Tribunal addresses the issue of enforcement. According to Zenda (2010) ‘it 
provides that the Tribunal’s judgments are enforceable in the national courts in the same way as the foreign 
judgements may be enforced. States are also directed to take measures to ensure execution of decisions of the 
Tribunal. In the case of states, if there is a failure to comply with a decision of the Tribunal, the matter must be 
referred back to the Tribunal, if the Tribunal establishes a failure then the matter will be referred to highest 




the Republic of Zimbabwe before the Tribunal. For the same reasons, any decisions 
that the Tribunal may have made or may make in the future against the republic of 
Zimbabwe are null and void.311 
 
The above statement illustrates the hostility exhibited by the Harare government towards the 
Tribunal following Campbell. 
 
In light of this, the SADC Tribunal, in Fick, held that, 
 
It is evident that the respondent has not complied with the decision of the Tribunal. 
We therefore hold that the existence of further acts of non-compliance with the 
decision of the Tribunal has been established after the Tribunal’s decision of June 5, 
 
2009 under which earliest acts of noncompliance have already been reported to the 




After this judgment, Fick and others made an application in the North Gauteng High Court 
of South Africa in which they sought enforcement of the costs order. In this application, 
they successfully asked the Court to grant an order to facilitate execution against 
 
Zimbabwe’s property in South Africa.313 An application to serve summons by means of an 
edictal citation was also granted. Zimbabwe responded through its notice of intention to 
defend and subsequently withdrew citing its own sovereignty and immunity from the 
jurisdiction of South African courts. 
 
Zimbabwe appealed in the Supreme Court of South Africa where it contended that it had 
immunity in South African courts in terms of the Foreign States Immunities Act.314 The 
judge held that by ‘expressly submitting itself to the SADC Treaty and Protocol [on 
tribunal] Zimbabwe waived its immunity.’ 315 These and other issues were subsequently 
dealt with in the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
 
In the Constitutional Court of South  Africa, 316  the main issue was ‘whether the South 
 
African courts have jurisdiction to register and thus facilitate the enforcement of the costs 
order made by the Tribunal against Zimbabwe.’ Zimbabwe argued that the Tribunal did not 
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have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute that led to the costs order. In other words, the 
Zimbabwe government argued that the costs order made by the Tribunal was invalid. 
Zimbabwe also submitted that the High Court of South Africa lacked the jurisdiction to 
order the registration of the costs order made by the Tribunal. In deciding that South African 
courts had jurisdiction in this case, the Constitutional Court had to rely on the principles of 
the common law and held that; 
 
It is not in dispute that the costs order is final and that it was not obtained 
fraudulently, it does not involve enforcement of revenue law of Zimbabwe and its 
enforcement is not precluded by the Protection of Business Act the enforcement of 




The Court did not dispute the fact that South African statutory law318 does not give the 
court’s jurisdiction in such cases hence its resort to the common law.319 
 
The South African Constitutional Court decision in Fick signifies a big step in human rights 
jurisprudence. De Wet notes that ‘it was the first time since its inception that the 
 
Constitutional Court was confronted with the status of a binding international decision 
within the domestic legal order.’320 In addition to this, de Wet concurs with the findings of 
the Court in Fick where she argues that ‘in accordance with article 32 (3) of the Protocol on 
the SADC Tribunal, the decisions of the Tribunal are binding upon the parties to the dispute 
in respect of that particular case and enforceable ‘within the territories of states concerned.’ 





317Paragraph 39 Fick V Republic Of Zimbabwe CCT 101/12 [2013] ZACC 22.  318The Enforcement Act Section (2) 1 provides that ‘This Act shall apply in respect of judgments given in any 
country outside the Republic which the Minister has for the purposes of this Act designated by notice in the 
Gazette.’ It is therefore important to note that this provision could not be applied in this case since designation 
in the gazette was made by the relevant minister.  
319 See for example Genevieve Jenkins in an article titled ‘Was South Africa Vote For the 2014 Tribunal 
Protocol Unconstitutional?’ who submits that South African Constitutional Court developed the common law 
to ensure that a decision of the SADC Tribunal is enforceable in South Africa. Fick also provided that “it is 
settled law that the rule of law embraces the fundamental right of access to courts”. The Court read this right, 
enshrined in section 34 of the South Africa’s Constitution in conjunction with section 233 of the Constitution, 
which directs courts to choose a reasonable interpretation of legislation consistent with international law over 
one that is inconsistent. It concluded that the right of access to justice included a right of access to the Tribunal 
and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions by domestic courts.’ Available at http://africanlegalcentre.org/c-
genevieve-jenkins-was-south-africas-vote-for-the-2014-sadc-tribunal-protocol-unconstitutional/  320E de Wet “The Case Of Government Of The Republic Of Zimbabwe V Louis Karel Fick: A First Step 
Towards Developing A Doctrine On The Status Of International Judgments Within The Domestic Legal  
Order” (2014) 17, 1  Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 554-565. 
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other SADC member states have a role to play in its enforcement.’ 321 This provision 
therefore made it possible for a decision of the SADC Tribunal to be enforced in any other 
country in situations where the respondent government has refused to comply with a costs 
order. It remains to be seen, however, what would happen in situations where the respondent 
government does not own substantial asserts in a country willing to enforce the order.322 
 





Campbell Pvt ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe and the events that followed signalled the demise 
of the SADC Tribunal as it was eventually suspended in 2010. On 17 August 2012 in 
Maputo, Mozambique, the SADC Summit addressed the issue of the suspended SADC 
Tribunal. The Tribunal was suspended after ‘representations by Zimbabwe that the Tribunal 
was not properly established and, as such, could not be legally recognised as an institution 
of SADC.’323 The SADC Summit resolved that a New Tribunal should be negotiated and 
that its mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols 
relating to disputes between Member States.’324 Clearly, the intention here was to do reduce 
the jurisdiction of the court to interstate petitions only. 
 
The suspension of the Tribunal was a direct response to Campbell. The Campbell case 
raised a number of fundamental questions such as, whether the SADC Tribunal has 
jurisdiction to hear such human rights cases, and whether the plaintiffs had been denied 
access to domestic courts in violation of the SADC Treaty. Other issues in the case were 
whether the applicants were entitled to compensation and whether the Zimbabwe 
government had discriminated the plaintiffs on the basis of race.325 The aftermath Campbell 
placed into question the issue of the status of the decisions of the Tribunal in municipal 
courts. The case of Etheredge v The Minister of State for National Security Responsible for 
Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and Another,326 dealt with Zimbabwe’s position with 
regards to the status of the SADC Tribunal in domestic courts. The respondents contended 
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322S Tembo ‘An Analysis Of The SADC Tribunal And The East African Court Of Justice; A Human Rights 
Perspective’ 2nd issue University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Students Law Review 113-129. 
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The Minister of National Security responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement and he Attorney-
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that, ‘that the applicant was not entitled to the remedies he was seeking as he and other 
farmers had a similar matter before the SADC Tribunal. In essence, the second respondent 
contended that by virtue of the principle of lis pendens, ‘the High Court of Zimbabwe could 
not be seized of the matter.’ On this point the Zimbabwe High Court held ‘that the SADC 
 
Tribunal Protocol does not establish the Tribunal as a court of superior jurisdiction in the 
territories of the SADC member states.’ 327 This position was later confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in 2010; 
 
The SADC Tribunal has not been domesticated by any municipal [law] and therefore 
enjoys no legal status in Zimbabwe. I believe the same obtains in all SADC states, 
that is, there is no right of appeal from the South African Constitutional Court, the 
Zambian Supreme Court [now the Constitution Court] and the supreme courts of 
other SADC countries to the SADC Tribunal.328 
 
Ebobrah notes that according to the judge, ‘Zimbabwean Constitution, which is the supreme 
law in Zimbabwe, establishes the High Court as a court of superior jurisdiction with inherent 
jurisdiction over all people and all matters. This jurisdiction had not, according to the judge, 
been ousted by the SADC Tribunal Protocol or any other statute.’329 He adds that the 
decision in Etheredge ‘[raises] the question of the nature of the relation between 
international courts (in this case the SADC Tribunal) and municipal courts (in this case the 
Zimbabwe High Court) in terms of hierarchy, precedence, and effect of decisions.’330 
 
In Mike Campbell Private Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe 331 the Tribunal unanimously 
decided that Article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty332 was violated and a majority also found for 
the applicants in that there existed a violation of Article 6 (2).333 The Tribunal found that ‘it 
is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law that those who are affected by the law be 
heard before they were deprived of a right, interest or legitimate expectation. It stated that it 
is settled law that the concept of rule of law embraced at least two fundamental rights, 
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namely the right of access to courts and the right to a fair hearing before an individual is 
deprived of a right.’334 The reasoning of the Tribunal was that land reform programme had 
breached the SADC Treaty on the basis that the applicants had been denied a right to access 
to domestic remedies, that the applicants had been racially discriminated coupled with the 
state’s failure to pay compensation.335 Naldi describes the land reform as violent, arbitrary, 
capricious and vindictive.336 
 
The decision in Campbell was supposed to dawn a new era of sub-regional human rights 
protection in Southern Africa. As Chagara notes ‘the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Mike 
Campbell Private Ltd and others shows the young tribunal’s readiness to hold states 
accountable for breaching their obligations to recognise, promote and protect human rights 
of individuals on their territories – the foremost tool in the UN’s normative architecture for 
ensuring international peace and security.’337 The decision had given the citizens of the 
SADC hope that the sub-regional organisation may have taken a path that pursue human and 
regional security by putting individual security ahead of state security. 
 





The Tribunal was suspended after the Zimbabwe government failed to implement decisions 
relating to its land reform programme in the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others. 
 
The argument made for the suspension of the Tribunal was that Zimbabwe had made 
representations that the ‘the Tribunal was not properly established and, as such, could not be 
legally recognised as an institution of SADC.’ This argument was later discredited by the 
WTIA’s findings thatthe Tribunal was properly established and that its protocol entered into 
force in accordance with international law.338 As such, the SADC summit mandated the 
SADC secretariat to drive a review process. The Secretariat tasked the World Trade Institute 
Advisors (WTIA) to assess the role, functions and terms of reference of the SADC Tribunal. 
The WTIA submitted its report for review by the SADC Ministers of Justice who in turn 
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made recommendations to the SADC extra-ordinary summit in Namibia, May 2011. The 
summit did not accept the recommendations. Instead, it tasked the ministers of justice to 
continue with the review process until August 2012. A Summit was held in Mozambique in 
2012 where ministers of justice recommended that the Tribunal be reinstated, albeit without 
a human rights mandate.339 The summit agreed to negotiate a new Protocol on Tribunal and 
that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should be limited to interpretation of the SADC Treaty 
and protocols relating to disputes between member states.340 As Makonese correctly points 
out, ‘the proposed new tribunal will be an interstate court. Individuals and juristic persons 
will not have access to the Tribunal, thereby denying SADC citizens access to justice and 
effective remedies as provided for in international law.’341 
 
The decision to suspend the SADC Tribunal prompted the Pan African Lawyers Union and 
the Southern African Litigation Centre to make a request for an advisory opinion in the 
African Court on Human Rights. The request was made in terms of Article 4 of the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of the African 
 
Court on Human and Peoples Rights which entitles recognised entities to request opinions 
from the Court on ‘any legal matter relating to [the African] Charter [on Human and Peoples 
Rights] or any other relevant human rights instruments.’342 The applicants alleged that the 
decision to suspend the Tribunal violates judicial independence, access to justice and the 
right to effective remedies and the rule of law. The issue placed before the African Court 
was whether ‘the decision by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government to 
suspend the Tribunal and not to reappoint or replace members of the Tribunal whose terms 
had expired is consistent with the African Charter, the SADC Treaty and the Tribunal 
Protocol and general principles of rule of law.’343 In addition, whether ‘the decisions of the 
 
SADC summits of August 2010 and May 2011 violate institutional independence of the 
Tribunal and the personal independence of the judges as provided for in the African Charter 
and the United Nations principles on independence of the judiciary. Further, whether 
 
 
339Final Communiqué of The 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State And Government Maputo, Mozambique 
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‘SADC’s 18 August 2012 decision violates the right of access to justice and effective 
remedies as guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol and the United Nations General Principles and Guidelines on the right to a 
remedy and reparations for victims of gross violation of international human rights law and 
serious violation of international humanitarian law,’344 and finally, whether ‘the decision 
making process undertaken in the review of the SADC Tribunal jurisdiction are in 
compliance with the SADC Treaty.’345 
 
The Applicants submitted that the opinion would be ‘necessary to in order to provide 
direction to the SADC summit and other interested parties on the issue of suspension of the 
Tribunal as the issue has dragged for too long without indication on whether the issue will 
ever be settled.’346 The African Court rejected the request for an advisory opinion because a 
similar matter was being considered by the African Commission. 
 





Having concluded that the SADC Tribunal was illegally suspended, the legality of the New 
Protocol is also put under scrutiny, particularly because it is a direct result of the suspension. 
It has been argued by various civil society organisations, human rights activists and lawyers 
in the SADC region that the New Protocol lacks legality for the reason that the 2000 
Protocol did not allow suspension. In addition to this, the suspension and eventual adoption 
of the New Protocol disregard separation of powers, the rule of law and human rights. 
 
The New SADC Protocol on Tribunal was adopted by the Summit in Victoria Falls, 
Zimbabwe in 2014. In 2012, the Summit had announced that a protocol for a new tribunal 
would be negotiated and its jurisdiction would be limited to the adjudication of disputes 
between states.347 In Victoria Falls, the regional bloc noted that ‘the summit received a 
report from the committee of ministers of justice and attorneys-general relating to progress 
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Tribunal; Pan African Lawyers And Southern African Litigation Centre 26 November 2012 accessed at  
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2012/11/26/press-release-african-human-rights-court-asked-to-  
 rule-on-legality-of-sadc-tribunals-suspension/ on 09 September 
2015. 345Ibid.  346 M Makonese"The SADC Tribunal Conundrum - Lawyers Look To The African Court For Direction." DR, 
Jan/Feb 2013:24 [2013] DEREBUS 13.  
347Resolution 24 of the 32nd SADC Summit Communique. 
 
72 
SADC Tribunal.’348 The eventual adoption of the New Protocol signalled the demise of the 
Tribunal. To date the New Protocol has not yet been ratified by the required minimum of 10 
SADC member states for it to come into force. The presidents of South Africa, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Lesotho, Zambia and 
 
Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe signed the protocol in Victoria Falls.349 Botswana has not yet 
signed the New Protocol despite the fact that it was represented at the Victoria Falls 
Summit. Some have attributed Botswana’s actions to its pro human rights stance. 
 
Civil society organisations did not take the adoption of the New Protocol lightly. The Nyasa 
Times reported that the Coalition for an effective SADC Tribunal held a parallel summit in 
Botswana on the 14th of August 2015 where it issued a statement on the Tribunal. The 
Coalition stated that; 
 
In August 2014, contrary to the SADC Treaty, of which article 23 provides that 
decisions concerning the community and any affected persons or citizens, must be 
made in consultation with them. The SADC heads of state adopted a new protocol 




In addition to this, it has been contended that, ‘ 
 
… the process of abolishing the defunct tribunal and subsequent negotiation and 
adoption of the new protocol lacked transparency and excluded the citizen’s voice 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the SADC treaty, which commits to ensure 
maximum involvement of the people and the key stakeholders in the process of 
regional integration. Only leaders should not worship impunity but rather embrace rule 
of law which is a basic feature of a democratic society.351 
 
The SADC Summit did not only violate its own law but also the principles of good 
governance and rule of law. The coalition further stated that ‘the disbandment of the old 
tribunal and the adoption of the new protocol effectively disregard the independence of the 
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rights and business confidence across the region.’352 Some scholars have argued that the 
development ‘typifies the proverbial greediness of slaughtering the goose that lays golden 
eggs.’ 
 





The Preamble of the New Protocol specifies that it is a result of ‘a review of the role, 
responsibilities and terms of reference of the Southern African Development Community 
 
(SADC) Tribunal.’353 Of particular importance is Article 33 of the New Protocol which 
ousts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in relation to individual petitions. Article 33 of the 
 
Protocol states that, ‘the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC 
 
Treaty and protocols relating to disputes between member states.’354 Commenting on this 
provision, Chenga says, ‘under international law, the Tribunal was considered an 
international court just like the European Court of Justice or the East African Court of 
 
Justice.’355 He adds on that ‘the [C]ourt was [initially] created to consider disputes between 
member states, individuals, organisations or institutions, staff of SADC Secretariat and the 
community and SADC.’356 The omission of individual petitions in Article 33 has several 
human rights implications. 
 





The decision to suspend the Tribunal and subsequent adoption of a New Protocol on 
Tribunal has several implications. It has been described by Ben Freeth of the SADC 
 
Tribunal Rights Watch as a ‘devastating blow to the rule of law in the region because it 
denies individual people access to justice when they have no legal recourse in their own 
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countries.’357 This means that citizens of Southern Africa will not be able to hold their 
leaders accountable for human rights violations in a sub- regional court. The Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre contends that leaders are known to abuse their power.358 Abuse of 
power can translate into human rights violation. In addition, domestic courts are not always 
independent and impartial. In the same vein, courts are sometimes too scared to take up 
cases against governments for fear of several repercussions. Furthermore, the SADC 
 
Tribunal ‘[provided] an extra layer of protection of human rights’ and the New Protocol will 
deprive people of a competent sub-regional Tribunal for ‘an effective remedy for attaining 
an effective remedy against the violation of their rights when national courts are unwilling 
or unable to help.’359 
 
Alienation of the right to individual petitions dealt a serious blow to prospects for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in Southern Africa. De Vos points out that; 
 
The rule of law can be protected only if individuals have access to an independent 
body, such as a court of law, if their governments infringe their rights. Following the 
example of the European Union, the SADC Tribunal was established not only to 
adjudicate disputes concerning economic integration and the relations between states 
inter se and other actors within the SADC, but also claims brought by individuals 
alleging violations of the rule of law and human rights by states.
360 
 
Thus, the move to suspend and eventually remove individuals’ access to the courts is seen 
as retrogressive361. Instead of improving the right to individual petitions or right to access 
to courts, the Tribunal is moving in a backward motion.362 
 
South Africa, has not been spared of the criticism for signing the New Protocol. The plan by 
the South African government to ratify the New Protocol has been met with criticism from 
the civil society.363 The Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) expressed its displeasure, 
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‘Pretoria [South African government] are unconstitutional and it has asked the High Court to 
declare as invalid the actions by President Jacob Zuma and the ministers of justice and of 
international relations, to support, vote for and sign documents related to the planned new 
tribunal.’364 Rickard adds on that ‘essentially the problem with the planned court, according 
to the LSSA, is that it replaces a tribunal which accepted matters from both states and 
individuals. By precluding citizens from accessing the New Court, the Protocol reduces the 
rights of citizens as guaranteed in the constitution — and this without any public 
consultation.’365 The need for a court that allows individuals access is illustrated by the fact 
that before its suspension, the Court had received 30 individual petitions and 24 of them 
were finalised before suspension.366 In his founding affidavit, the Law Society of South 
 
Africa’s Chairperson alleged that the suspension of the Tribunal, failure to appoint judges 
and a the voting and signing and attempt to ratify the 2014 Protocol is unconstitutional on 
the basis that it deprives the right of South African citizens to access the Tribunal in terms of 
the SADC Treaty.367 The LSSA contended that South Africa action, the president in 
particular, by signing the protocol that excludes individual petitions, is a violation of the 
right to access to courts. 
 
On the 18th of August 2014, the SADC Lawyers Association (SADCLA) wrote to the 
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Chairperson of the SADC President Robert 
Mugabe expressing its concerns over the dissolution of the Tribunal and the signing of the 
 
2014 Protocol and the fact that it ‘bars SADC citizens from accessing the court.’ In this 







tribunal-protocol-unconstitutional/ (Accessed 10 October 2015). See also the case Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others CCT 48/10 [2011] ZACC 6; section 231 of the Constitution of south 
Africa, 1996.  
364 Carmel Rickard ‘Mooted SADC court slammed as 'unconstitutional' Outcry over SA’s attempts to join other 
governments in establishing a new regional court that 'disregards individual citizens' Rand Daily Mail 05 May 2015.   
365 See for example the Law Society of South Africa founding affidavit available at  
http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20Founding%20Affidavit%20by%20Max%20Boqwana%20re%20SAD   
 C%20Tribunal.pdf and LSSA launches court bid against the President and ministers to stop ratification of 
2014 SADC Protocol on SADC Tribunal De Rebus 1st June 2015 Available at  http://www.derebus.org.za/lssa- 
launches-court-bid-against-the-president-and-ministers-to-stop-ratification-of-2014-sadc-protocol-on-sadc- 
tribunal/ accessed on 24 August 2015.   
366 Statement Of The Participants In A Round Table On The Restoration Of The SADC Tribunal Held At Centre For 
Human Rights, Faculty Of Law, University Of Pretoria 28 and 29 AUGUST 2014 available at  
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38707-1522-2-30.pdf?140922094447 accessed on 31 August 2015 p1   
367 Paragraph 11 of the Applicants’ founding affidavit in Re The Law Society of South Africa V President of the Republic 
of South Africa And Others in High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division).  
 
76 
was adopted such as lack of consultation with critical stakeholders including civil society. 
 
The University of Cape Town echoes the same concerns; 
 
By this measure, SADC has blocked a potentially effective mechanism for the 
protection of human rights, because it has removed the last opportunity which 
individuals in the region had to protect themselves against abuse by their own 
governments. It has also limited the possibility of linking sub-regional economic 
integration, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in a judicial context. This 
decision rejects the global movement towards increased accountability for 
governments, ignores the advice of a review panel which SADC itself commissioned, 
undermines the value system of the SADC treaty, and shows a disgraceful contempt 
towards the citizens of the SADC region.
368 
 
Clearly, a number of concerns surrounding the adoption of the New Protocol have been 
made. It remains, however, to be seen whether the heads of state are going to take heed of 
these calls and reinstate the Tribunal in its old form, if not better. 
 




No reasons, legal or political, for the suspension of the Tribunal and the adoption of the 
 
New Protocol were brought to the public’s attention. This places substantive difficulties in 
attempts to determine whether the alienation of the right to individual petitions in the SADC 
Tribunal was a necessary evil. It is crystal clear that many criticisms have been levelled 
against the decision to adopt a new protocol, hence the need to discuss the circumstances 
surrounding the same. 
 
The point of departure would be setting the record straight that the SADC Summit is a 
political organ and its decisions are influenced by politics. Scholars have noted, with 
concern that ‘[often] no reasons are given for the decisions that the summit takes…’ The 
likelihood, therefore, is that the decision to adopt a new protocol was reached as a matter of 
policy as opposed to legal reasoning that, logically, could have applied. A Regional 
colloquium held in Pretoria in March 2013, ‘looked at the reasons that may have led to the 
suspension of the Tribunal…’ The colloquium decided that there were several reasons that 
led to the demise of the Tribunal. It was concluded that; 
 
368Pierre De Vos ‘UCT Faculty Of Law Statement On Suspension Of The Tribunal’ September 19th 2012 
Constitutionally Speaking available at  http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/2012/09/19/. 
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 The Tribunal’s mandate was presumably a threat to the regimes in power. 

 There was a belief that the SADC tribunal jeopardized the sovereignty of member states 

 There was a clash between the socio-political dynamics and the legal obligations of various 
countries 

 There was a dichotomous understanding of the purpose of the Tribunal between political 
leaders and citizens of the SADC region 

 The fact that the orders of the Tribunal were not effectively enforced 

 The procedures of the Tribunal itself were complicated and unclear 

 The Tribunal’s decisions have not been tested in any domestic jurisdiction in terms of 
enforcement at national level 

 The lack of funding as a threat to the efficient administrative function of the Tribunal 

 The lack of strong political will to have an effective tribunal 

 Adverse political interference in the Tribunal’s operations 

 Member states undermining the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.369 
 
It has been mentioned before that the principle of state sovereignty always present itself as a 
challenge when it comes to international human rights. More often, states bind themselves 
to international human instruments and only backtrack by raising state sovereignty when a 
judgment is passed against them.370 Muchabaiwa concurs with this assertion; 
 
If member states do not want Sadc to intervene when negative developments happen 
in their countries, they will simply put forward the argument of sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, abuse of the principle of sovereignty tends to negate regionalism. The 
challenge, looking ahead, is to strike a balance between sovereignty and regionalism 
lest member states choose to ignore, undermine or act contrary to regional 
commitments. In view of the potential and already apparent negative impacts, it is 
about time Sadc member states start an honest dialogue on the challenges of 




Zimbabwe can be singled out as the main culprit in the case of the Tribunal and the resultant 
suspension. Natham notes that ‘the most dramatic manifestations of the sovereignty problem 
 
 
369Report on  “Whither the SADC Tribunal”  Regional Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal held at Protea 
Parktonian Hotel  From 12 to 13 March 2013; Johannesburg.  
370M Mutua ‘Standard Setting In Human Rights; Critique And Prognosis’ 29 (2007) African Human Rights 
Journal 547-630.  
371  ‘Regionalism,  sovereignty  threaten  SADC’  Newsday  Zimbabwe 29  June  2010  accessed  at  




have been Harare’s notorious defiance of the SADC Tribunal…’372 The fact that the Summit 
also tolerated that defiance shows that member states were simply being cautious of setting a 
precedence of regional justice prevailing over state sovereignty. The 2000 Protocol’s provisions 
on enforcement and execution of the judgments show that the member states had subordinated 
their sovereignty to the Tribunal.373 Natham further argues that ‘serving as the judicial arm of 
the organization, it [the Tribunal] has [had] potential to function like the ECJ as a supranational 
mechanism and override national sovereignty.’ 374 The summit was therefore not prepared to let 
the Tribunal assume such a powerful role in the region. This is evidenced by how President 
Mugabe ridiculed the Tribunal on 23 August 2010 when he said 
 
‘we [the heads of state] are the creators of this monster and we said we thought we had 
created an animal which was proper but no, we created a monster.’ There is no way the 
Tribunal could have survived in its original state in an environment where heads of state are 
at loggerheads with it. 
 
Looking at the creation and history of the Tribunal one realizes that there long existed lack 
of sincerity amongst the founding members. It took more than a decade for the Tribunal to 
be properly constituted and start functioning. Others argue that delays are not uncommon in 
the establishment of supranational bodies. However, in the case of the SADC the delay was 
a result of fear of diminished state sovereignty in the wake of principles of good governance 
and rule of law for which the Tribunal is founded. Borzel and Hullen submit that ‘the SADC 
executive established the Tribunal mainly in order to maintain SADC’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of international donors and investors, especially the EU.’375 It can be depicted that the 
Tribunal was created for an ulterior motive hence it was bound to fail at one point or the 
other. 
 
In addition to this, the Tribunal appears to represent compromised interests of the donors, 
the EU in particular, who pushed for human rights as evidenced by the inclusion of 
individual petitions in the 2000 Protocol and the sovereignty preserving interests of member 
states as evidence by unclear enforcement provisions. 376 Borzel and Hullen make an 
interesting observation that when the Tribunal was created, the Summit did not perceive it 
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as a threat to sovereignty because ‘its jurisdiction in the realm of human rights, democracy, 
and rule of law had not yet been explicitly established.’377 
 
The other challenges faced by the Tribunal that may have led to its suspension are the fact that 
the judges were not permanent employees of the Tribunal and that it lacked adequate 
funding.When terms of office of other judges expired, no appointments were made. This meant 
the Tribunal could not sit or receive any cases because it lacked quorum. Since the court was not 
initially created as a human rights court, extending to include human rights would be 
burdensome since it had insufficient resources. For them (the Summit), individual petitions 
would have strained the already scarce resources at the court’s disposal. 378 It should be noted 
here that since its operations between 2007 and 2010 the court received thirty individual 
petitions,379 and may have been too big a load for the Tribunal such that the Summit found it 
necessary to reduce it to an interstate court. Just like in any other regional system, states rarely 
litigate against each other; this essentially means the court’s operation 
 
(if reinstated) will be next to zero.380 
 
From the Summit’s point of view, the SADC Tribunal’s human rights jurisdiction was an 
unnecessary duplication of the work of the African Court of Human Rights. In the absence 
of the Tribunal, the SADC citizens could still petition the African Court. If this argument is 
anything to go by, the SADC Heads of States overlooked the issues to do with the 
accessibility of the African Court. This is the same reason why other sub-regional courts are 
flourishing as human rights courts because they appreciate the accessibility issues associated 







The SADC Tribunal is an indispensable institution in the SADC region. It is important for 
both the purpose for which it was established, that is, as an institution cardinal in the 
integration process and the mandate it adopted in the preservation of rule of law and good 
 
377Ibid.  378See for example the problems associated with the growing number of individual petitions in the European 
Court of Human Rights.  
379 Statement Of The Participants In A Round Table On The Restoration Of The SADC Tribunal Held At Centre For 
Human Rights, Faculty Of Law, University Of Pretoria 28 and 29 AUGUST 2014 available at  
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38707-1522-2-30.pdf?140922094447 accessed on 31 August 2015 1.   
380 See for example Genevieve Jenkins, supra note, who supports this assertion by saying ‘because states already have channels by which 
to resolve interstate concerns, many commentators believe it is unlikely that the Tribunal will receive any cases if it does not receive cases 




governance. The Tribunal had the liberty to develop its own jurisprudence, and did so by 
interpreting the SADC Treaty and various other protocols thereby affording itself a human 
rights jurisdiction. It is the exercise of this liberty that was met with resistance by Zimbabwe 
leading to the suspension and eventual adoption of the New Protocol. 
 
The demise of the Tribunal is directly linked to the decision in Campbell in which the 
Tribunal ruled that it had a human rights jurisdiction and that there was no need for a 
separate protocol on human rights in the region. The status of decisions of international 
courts and tribunals was put to test both in Zimbabwe and the neighbouring South Africa. In 
Zimbabwe, failed attempts were made to have the decision in Campbell registered in the 
domestic courts, and in South Africa, Fick successfully applied for a writ of execution 
against Zimbabwe in respect of the cost order in Campbell. The latter case was, perhaps, the 
closest we can get to enforcement of the Tribunal decisions in domestic courts given the 
hostile relationship between SADC member states and the Tribunal. The decision to strip the 
Tribunal of its human rights jurisdiction and reduce it to an interstate dispute adjudication 
body, as contemplated in the 2014 Protocol on Tribunal, is a manifestation of the hostility 
that exists towards the Tribunal. It has been shown that with the adoption of the New 
Protocol, the individual is left in a very precarious position and prospects for human rights 
are diminishing unless drastic measures are taken to save the Tribunal. The only hope of 
saving the Tribunal currently lies in the hands of the member states that have not yet signed 
the protocol and this only remains a hope because none of the member states have yet 
furnished reasons as to why they have not signed the protocol and chances are that they can 
decide to sign it any time. The duty therefore lies with human rights activists and civil 
society organisations continue lobbying against the signing and ratification of the New 
Protocol. The Law Society of South Africa, the South African Litigation Centre has been at 
the forefront of campaign against the signing of the New Protocol. 
 
It has been argued that the new Protocol is a product of an illegitimate process, and 
therefore should be rejected in its entirety. Save for the obvious fact that the summit accused 
the Tribunal of overstepping its mandate; no justification whatsoever was provided for the 
suspension and adoption of the new protocol hence one cannot substantively examine the 
legal or policy arguments for this action. 
 
Ironically, many of the states and commentators who called for the suspension and removal 
of individual petitions in the Tribunal are the ones calling for the establishment of an 
 
81 
African ICC.381 Surely, if resources were a factor that led to the demise of the Tribunal, 
why would they need to create a new court? President Mugabe of Zimbabwe called for 
Africa’s own International Criminal Court after Zimbabwe fellow SADC member country, 
South Africa, foiled attempts to have Al Omar Bashir arrested in that country in 2015.382 
These are some of the clear indicators of how solidarity amongst African states men has 






















































 For more information on the African International Criminal Court see Ademola Abass, ‘The Proposed International 
Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some Problematic Aspects’ (2013) Netherlands International Law Review. 
See also Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.   





















































































The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is a sub-regional court similar to the SADC Tribunal. 
A number of factors make the EACJ, together with the SADC Tribunal, fundamentally unique. 
Just like the SADC Tribunal the EACJ is a relatively new Court and is still evolving and 
developing its jurisprudence. As a result, the interpretation of its jurisdiction in human rights 
cases has not been easy. However, as compared to the SADC Tribunal, the EACJ has not faced 
major resistance from the political organs of the East African Community. The East African 
Court of Justice was established without a human rights jurisdiction. As a normative principle in 
the ‘new regionalism’,383 human rights are cardinal to the integration agenda. 384 The East 
African Court acknowledged this by its interpretation of the EAC Treaty in such a manner that it 
derived its human rights competence from the principles of rule of law, good governance and 
democracy. This interpretation draws to the debate as to whether in the absence of a protocol 
extending the jurisdiction of the Court as contemplated in the EAC Treaty; the Court has a 
human rights jurisdiction? In this chapter, it will be argued that the Court was correct in 
affording itself a human rights competence. The importance of having an express human rights 
jurisdiction through the adoption of a protocol extending the jurisdiction385 will be 
acknowledged. In the same vain, it will be argued that even though it is always difficult for the 




383New regionalism Is characterized by ‘the revival of old international organizations, the formation of new 
ones and the deepening of the existing ones.’ (Lesley Blaauw “Transcending State-Centrism: New 
Regionalism and the Future of Southern African Regional Integration” Phd Thesis, Rhodes University (2007) 
1. see also M Lee “Regionalism In Africa : A Part Of Problem Or A Part Of Solution” (2002 ) 9 (special issue) 
Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. (Canadian Journal Of Political Science)  
384 Regional integration in the East African community was premised around the idea of formation of a 
political federation. As Booth et al would put it “Since the East African Community (EAC) Treaty of 1999 and 
the formal launching of the new Community in 2001, the pace has been quickening. A process creating a free 
trade area and customs union between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was begun in January 2005, and 
negotiations are now starting to establish a full common market between the three countries plus Rwanda and  
Burundi by 2010. Meanwhile, discussions are under way with a view to ‘fast tracking’ the final component of 
the integration process, political federation.” Booth et al ‘East African integration: How can it contribute to 
East African development?” 2007 Briefing available at  http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi- 
assets/publications-opinion-files/126.pdf (Accessed 02 December 2015).  




Charter affords it an avenue to adjudicate on specific violations of human rights without 
facing the hurdle of interpreting the fundamental principles of the EAC Treaty. 
Consequently, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction in the East African region has made 
interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction difficult. Finally, it will be argued that the EAC 
member states’ fear of a powerful court, which may interfere with their sovereignty, has 
made the interpretation of human rights difficult as evidenced by the delay in extending the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
5.2 The East African Court of Justice: A Brief Background 
 
 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was established as a disputes resolution body of 
the East African Community in 1999. 386 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed the East 
African Community Treaty which established the East African Community in 1999. This 
was not the first time the East African region created a regional community. In the early 
1900s the region had an East African Community, established by the former colonial 
powers, of course, for reasons different from the present regional system. The colonial EAC 
collapsed in 1977.387 Just like the present day EAC, the colonial EAC had its own Court of 
Appeal for the East African Community established in 1909.388 During the colonial period 
the Court was originally called ‘His Britannic Majesty’ Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
when it was established in 1902 by the Order in Council.389 The Court had both criminal 
and civil competence and exercised territorial jurisdiction over Aden, Kenya, Somalia, 
Seychelles, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar. 390 The post-colonial East African 
Community (EAC) was formed as an implementation of regional integration agenda. 
 
Oluoch notes that ‘… it is only through economic and political co-operation that the small 
 
 
386See LG Francesch The African Human Rights Judicial System; Streamlining Structures And Domestication 
Mechanisms Viewed From The Foreign Affairs Power Perspective (2014) 187. 
387B Walsh “Human Security In East Africa: The EAC's Illusive Quest For Inclusive Citizenship.” (2015) 37.  
(1) Strategic Review for Southern Africa. See also O. C Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities And 
Human Rights In East And Southern Africa”. 306 Accessed at 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/9_Ruppel.pdf. 
388Overview of The East African Court of Justice By Justice Harold R. Nsekela President, East African 
Court Of Justice; Paper for Presentation During the Sensitisation Workshop on the Role of the EACJ in the 
EAC Integration, Imperial Royale Hotel, Kampala, Uganda, 1st – 2nd November, 2011.  389A Possi “The East African Court of Justice; Towards Effective Protection of Human Rights In The 
East African Community”. (2013) 17 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 173-195, See Also B 
Oibhawo. Imperial Justice; Africans In Empire’s Court (2013).  
390A Possi “The East African Court of Justice; Towards Effective Protection of Human Rights In The East 
African Community”. (2013) 17 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law; see also OVERVIEW OF The 
East African Court of Justice By Justice Harold R. Nsekela President, East African Court of Justice Paper for 
Presentation During the Sensitisation Workshop on the Role of the EACJ in the EAC Integration, Imperial 




under developed economies of African countries have a chance to survive in the rough 
waters of globalization.’391 It is for this reason that the EAC was formed. Human rights 
were from the onset not part of the regional integration agenda. Welch cited by Ebobrah 
notes that ‘human rights issue was too political and could be used as a ‘pretext for 
intervening in their countries’ internal affairs hence it was argued that the treatment of 
human rights more appropriately belonged in another international fora.’ 392 As will be 
shown later, human rights turned out to be an integral part of the integration process at 
regional and sub-regional level. 
 
The 1999 Treaty established the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the Summit, the 
Council, Coordinating Committee, Sectoral Committees, the East African Community 
Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the Secretariat. 393 The Court was established as an 
adjudication body with perhaps a much broader jurisdiction than that of the SADC Tribunal 
discussed previously. The Court is divided into two, the court of first instance and the 
appellate division. The mandate of the Court is to ‘ensure adherence to the law in the 
interpretation and application of and compliance with the treaty.’ 394 The Court became 
operational on November 30 2001 and received its first case in December 2005. 
 
5.3 Human Rights Jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice 
 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the EACJ is its competence in human rights matters. 
Technically, the Court was established without a human rights mandate. The court’s 
jurisdiction’s is confined to the interpretation of the treaty. The first instance court has an 
original jurisdiction and its decisions can be appealed against in the appellate division.395 
 
The Court is competent to receive disputes between the community and its employees 
arising out of the terms and conditions of their employment and or the application and 
interpretation of the community’s rules and regulations or terms and conditions of 
service.396 The Court may also have jurisdiction under arbitration clauses in contracts or 
agreements between parties to a dispute. For instance the ‘Court may hear and determine 
any matter arising from an arbitration clause contained in any contract or agreement which 
 
391L O W Oluoch “Legitimacy of the East African Community”.(2009) 53 (2) Journal of African Law. 194-
221 392 S T. Ebobrah “Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts In Africa: Prospects And 
Challenges”. (2009) 17 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 79-101. 
393Article 9(1) of the EAC Treaty 1999. 
394 See article 23 of the EAC Treaty 1999.   
395 Initially the Court had had one division; the jurisdiction was subsequently extended only to include an  
appellate jurisdiction.  
396Article 31 of the EAC Treaty 1999. 
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confers jurisdiction on it, where either the community or any of its institutions is a party.’397 
 
The Court also has jurisdiction over disputes arising between Partner States where a Partner 
State has submitted a dispute to it under a special agreement. 398 The Court exercises 
advisory jurisdiction to the Summit, Council or Partner States on any question of law arising 
from the treaty which affect the community.399 
 
The question of whether the Court has a substantive human rights jurisdiction has always 
been contentious. There has not been consensus amongst scholars on this issue. Whilst 
Ruppel argues that the court lacks a human rights jurisdiction,400 Viljoen argues that there is 
an implied human rights jurisdiction from the reference to human rights in the Treaty and 
that the court has already exercised competence in human rights cases.401 Viljoen further 
argues that, the ‘current EAC law does not foreclose individual referrals on the basis of 
human rights of the residents.’ 402 It should be noted that the protocol to extend the 
jurisdiction of the court to human rights has not yet been adopted and operationalized. In 
terms of the EAC Treaty, ‘the court shall have such other original, appellate human rights 
and other jurisdiction as will be determined ... at a suitable subsequent date.’403 Ebobrah 
adds on that, ‘it has been argued that the court has no jurisdiction where infringements that 
occur relate for example to human rights or other individual rights of the residents.’404 As a 
result, the East African Community awaits to see substantive progress to this end. Even 
though the human rights jurisdiction of the court is not as clear and broad as that of the 
 
Economic Community of West African States’ Community Court405 the EACJ ‘has a very 





397 In terms of Art 32 Arbitration Clauses and Special Agreements The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any matter: (a) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract or agreement which 
confers such jurisdiction to which the Community or any of its institutions is a party; or (b) arising from a 
dispute between the Partner States regarding this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special 
agreement between the Partner States concerned; or (c) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a  
commercial contract or agreement in which the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the 
Court. 398See Article 32 of the EAC Treaty. 
399Article 36(1) of the EAC Treaty. 
400 OC Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities And Human Rights In East And Southern Africa”. 306  
Available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/9_Ruppel.pdf 
(accessed on 30 September 2015). 
401F Viljoen International Human Rights Law In Africa (2007).  
402 F  Viljoen  2007  cited  by  Ebobrah  “Litigating  Human  Rights  Before  Sub-Regional Courts  In  Africa: 
Prospects And Challenges”. (2009) 17 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law. 81 
403Article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty.  
404  S  T  Ebobrah  “Litigating  Human  Rights  Before  Sub-Regional  Courts  In  Africa: Prospects  And 
Challenges”. (2009) 17 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 81. 
405K J Alter et al “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice’’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 738. 
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General  of  the  EAC. 406  Explicit  human  rights  jurisdiction  of  the  [EACJ]  has  been 
 
‘courageous enough to ensure that basic rights of individuals under the treaty are 
respected.’407 The East African Court however broke a new ground in the case of Katabazi 
which afforded the Court an implied human rights mandate using a similar approach as that 
of Campbell in the SADC Tribunal. 
 




The dictum in Katabazi signalled the Court’s and the Community’s commitment to human 
rights in the absence of express mandate in the Treaty. The facts in Katabazi were simple. 
Fourteen applicants were detained on treason charges in 2004. On 16 November 2006, the 
High Court of Uganda granted them bail. However, state security details prevented the 
applicants from leaving the court. On 24 November 2006, the applicants were convicted by 
a General Court Martial on additional charges of unlawful possession of firearms and 
terrorism. Despite the fact that the Ugandan Constitutional Court ruled that the security 
personnel’s interference was unconstitutional, the Ugandan government allowed the 
applicants to remain in jail. The applicants complained to the EACJ that the Ugandan 
government and the EAC were violating the rule of law, thus violating the EAC Treaty. The 
applicants argued the invasion of the High Court premises by armed men to prevent the 
enforcement of the Court’s decision granting bail, and their re-arrest and incarceration 
constitute an infringement of the Treaty, and that the Secretary General of the East African 
Community was required to have investigated this violation.408 What is interesting is that 
 
Katabazi was clearly a case of human rights for which the literal interpretation of the EAC 
Treaty did not provide for the Court to receive. 
 
On that note, the Court demonstrated boldness and creativity; it construed Article 27(1) in 
such a manner that affords it a human rights jurisdiction. The Court accepted that the 






406Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (2007) AHRLR 119 (EAC 2007).  407 The SADC Tribunal Keynote Address By His Excellency Justice Ariranga Govindasamy Pillay President 
Of The Sadc Tribunal On The Occasion Of The Book Launch On “Monitoring Regional Integration In  
Southern Africa Year Book Volume 8, 2008” 20th April, 2009- Kalahari Sands Hotel, Moringa Room, 
Windhoek Namibia  http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16846-1522-1-30.pdf?090619125513 (Accessed: 02 
December 2015).  




rights. The Court conceded that it does not have an express human rights mandate but it was 
equally competent to decide on matters that fall under Article 27(1).409 Gathii notes 
 
... the EACJ exemplifies a new trend in African regional human rights enforcement. Rather 
than serving as a tribunal to resolve trade disputes, as envisaged by its original designers, the 
court has evolved into one that seeks to hold member governments accountable for 
violations of human rights and to promote good governance and the rule of law.410 
 
This aided to the raging debate on whether Regional Economic Community (REC) courts 
were competent to hear human rights issues in the absence of express provisions in their 
respective protocols. The EACJ has thus demonstrated that this is possible. Gathii 
acknowledges the increasing role that is being played by the EACJ in human rights where he 
says; 
 
The EACJ’s growing human rights case law is part of a new form of rights-based legal 
mobilization that must be seen in the shifting normative context in which trade agreements 
include human rights in their preambles. This mobilization by lawyers, legal groups, and 
political actors has allowed courts to become new forums for political struggle and the 
vindication of rights claims.411 
 
Just like their Southern African counterparts, the EAC member states view the move by the 
Court to interpret the Treaty in a manner that affords it human rights jurisdiction as 
overstepping its mandate and a ‘subversion of their sovereignty.’412 Further, 
 
They believe that the [C]ourt’s human rights decisions are creating new 
understandings of legality to which the states do not subscribe at home. These states 
are resisting allowing the court to conform their domestic affairs to international 
understandings of legality. In short, EAC states did not sign EAC Treaties as 
evidence of their commitments to respect human rights; the EACJ is dragging them 







409S Tembo “An Analysis Of The SADC Tribunal And The East African Court Of Justice; A Human Rights 
Perspective” 2nd issue University Of KwaZulu Natal Students Law Review 113-129. 
410J Gathii “Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice's Human Rights 
Strategy” (2014) Forthcoming 24th  Duke Journal of  International  Comparative  Law. 
411Ibid. 
412Ibid at 251.  




The Court exercised what Ebobrah describes as a ‘derivative human rights competence’ 
under the EAC Treaty.414 Therefore, it can be said that the Court in Katabazi took an 
activist posture in acquiring a human rights competence. The Court explicitly stated that 
‘even though it would not assume jurisdiction on human rights disputes it would also not 
abdicate from its jurisdiction of interpretation under article 27(1) merely because the 
reference includes allegations of human rights violation.’415 The East African Court 
continues to receive and decide on human rights cases despite the fact that the legal 
framework extending the jurisdiction of the Court has not yet been adopted. This strategy 
taken by the Court was however not free of criticism. Ebobrah submits that even the Court’s 
decision may be interpreted as judicial activism which translates into judicial writing ‘this 
decision provides the platform for future litigation of human rights before the court…’416 
Ultimately, human rights cases are admissible before the EACJ if it is shown that the 
respondent’s conduct violating human rights also violate the EAC Treaty. Gathii contends 
that the Court now plays a crucial role as a human rights court than it is a customs union or 
common market adjudication body.417 
 
Summarily, it can be said that the Katabazi decision in respect of human rights jurisdiction 
is now settled law. As will be shown later, the member states neither suspended nor 
reviewed the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither did they openly condemn the decision.418 
This stands in sharp contrast to what transpired in the SADC Tribunal.419 
 
5.4.1 Personal jurisdiction of the court. 
 
 
It has been submitted in previous chapters that the right to individual petitions goes to the 
core of international human rights protection. The East African Community allows for 
individual direct access to the Court. As envisaged in Article 30, ‘any person who is 
 
414S.T. Ebobrah “Litigating Human Rights before Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Prospects and Challenges” 
(2009) 17 RADIC  82.  415The Role Of National Courts And Regional Courts In Protecting Human Rights And Developing 
Human Rights Jurisprudence Paper For Presentation By Hon. Justice Harold R. Nsekela Justice of Appeal, 
Court of Appeal, Tanzania and President East African Court of Justice; A Paper for Presentation during the 
EAMJA Annual Conference and General Meeting, 17th - 22nd May 2010, at Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge, 
Arusha, Tanzania 7. 
416 S T Ebobrah “Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts In Africa:  Prospects And Challenges”. 
(2009)  17 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law  82. 
417Supra note 409 at 252-253.  418Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and 
Consequences.”  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6140&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 13 
October 2015).  




resident in a partner state may refer for determination by the Court the legality of any Act, 
regulation, directive, decision or action of a partner state or an institution of the community 
on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an 
infringement of the provisions of the Treaty. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the 
EACJ is that the Treaty is silent on the need for individuals to exhaust domestic remedies 
before approaching the Court. The only procedural requirement that litigants have to comply 
with is that the petition be filed with the Court within two months of the decision or action 
complained of.420 The absence of the domestic remedies requirement makes the Court 
easily accessible and has a direct bearing on giving effect to the right to individual petitions 
and human rights. Be that as it may, individual access coupled with an express human rights 
competence will take the EACJ to greater heights in as far as human rights protection is 
concerned. 
 
5.5 Human Rights Legal Framework; Pertinent Issues 
 
 
Article 27(2) of the Treaty indicates that the member states of the community intended to 
develop its jurisdiction in phases.421 Substantive human rights jurisdiction is one of the 
features that the community sought to add on to the mandate of the EACJ. The drafters of 
the treaty would not have included article 27(2) had they intended the provision to remain 
inoperative. Surely, they were aware that the principle of governance and rule of law would 
only be effective if the Court had a human rights jurisdiction. Thus the decision of extending 
the jurisdiction of the Court to include appellate and human rights jurisdiction was taken in 
November 2004.422 The slow pace at which the extension of the jurisdiction is happening 
 
‘denies the Court opportunity to play a very important role in addressing the violations of 
human rights in East Africa at regional level.’423 The EACJ is on the record of having 
expressed its concern over the slow adoption of a legal framework extending the 
jurisdiction. The Court said, 
 
…it has taken over six years since the consultative process on the draft protocol began after 
adoption of the draft but the outcome of that process is yet to be made manifest 
 
420Article 30 (2).  421 The court was operate without a human rights jurisdiction initially then in terms of Article 27 (2) the 
human rights jurisdiction ‘would’ be conferred on a future date as be determined by the member states.  422The East African Court of Justice: Ten Years Of Operation (Achievements And Challenges) Dr. John Eudes 
Ruhangisa Registrar, East African Court of Justice A Paper for Presentation During the Sensitisation 
Workshop on the Role of the EACJ in the EAC Integration, Imperial Royale Hotel, Kampala, Uganda, 1st – 
2nd November, 2011 26.  




notwithstanding acknowledgment by sectoral council way back in 2004 that in the view of 
the growing scope of the community’s integration process, the jurisdiction of the EACJ 
ought to be extended … the delay of the council of ministers has a negative effect on good 
governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights in East Africa.424 
 
On the 26th of June 2012 the EAC Council of Ministers held its 25th extraordinary meeting 
where discussions on the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court topped the agenda. A 
communique issued by the EAC communications office stated that; 
 
The move to extend the EACJ’s jurisdiction follows a directive by the 10th Extraordinary 
Meeting of the EAC Summit of Heads of State held in Arusha 28 April 2012 that noted the 
need to look into the matter of extending this jurisdiction to cover, among others, crimes 
against humanity. At their April meeting, the EAC Heads of State welcomed a Resolution by 
the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) for expediting amendment of the EAC 
Treaty to extend jurisdiction of the EACJ or the conclusion of the protocol on this matter and 
consequently directed the Council of Ministers to see to its implementation and to report to 
an extraordinary Summit that would be convened thereafter. The Council is therefore 
expected to propose amendments to Article 27(2) of the Treaty to grant the Court original 
and appellate human rights jurisdiction and jurisdiction over crimes against humanity 
covering both state and individual responsibility.425 
 
The present state is worrisome to human rights practitioners and other stakeholders who 
have been advocating for the adoption of the protocol extending the jurisdiction to human 
rights. 
 
5.6 Other Human Rights Developments 
 
 
Even though there has been slow progress in the adoption of a human rights framework in 
the region, all hope is not lost; the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) passed a new 
Human Rights Bill in 2012.426 ‘The passing of the EAC human rights bill in 2012 renewed 
the optimism of expanding the EACJ’s jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights disputes in 
the near future. The bill intends to protect human and people’s rights in the region and 
makes reference to various international instruments such as the African Charter and the 
 
 
424Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC and Others REFERENCE No. 1 OF 2010  425Communication available at  
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1038:council-of-ministers-to-discuss- 
extended-jurisdiction-for-eacj&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194 (accessed on 21 September 2015). 
426The bill was passed by the EAC Legislative Assembly in April 2012 and it is waiting to be assented to 
by the EAC Summit. 
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United Nations Charter as normative standards for the protection of human rights.’427 When 
the bill is finally passed in the EAC, it is likely to create a human rights standard for the 
region. Possi submits that, if the bill is finally endorsed, it will be a step towards the 
extension of the mandate of the EACJ with a human rights jurisdiction. It should be noted 
that even though it may be necessary for the region to have a codified human rights 
instrument, particularly one that confers human rights jurisdiction on the Court, the very 
nature of the norms and standards set in the EAC Treaty is that which seeks to promote and 




On a similar note, recent developments indicate that it may also be possible to litigate 
human rights in the EACJ using the provisions of the African Charter. In the case of 
 
Democratic Party v Secretary General of the East African Community and Others429, the 
court was faced with a question of ‘whether the signing of the protocol to the African 
 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of the Court on Human and 
People’s Rights creates an obligation on the states to sign the special declaration found in 
article 5 (3) and article 34 (6) of the Protocol on African Court that allows individuals and 
 
NGOs with observer status direct access to the African Court.’430 The Appellate Division of 
the EACJ found that whilst it was able to consider potential violations of the African Charter 
and the African Court Protocol under the premise of the East African Community 
 
Treaty (“EAC Treaty”), the wording of Article 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the African Court 
 
Protocol contain no requirement on a member state who has signed the Protocol to also sign 
the Special Declaration. The significance of this decision is that it shows that the EACJ is 
competent to interpret the provisions of the Charter under the premise of the EAC Treaty. 
This provides litigants with another avenue to take human rights cases to the Court by 
alleging violation of provisions of the African Charter. This case was an appeal against the 
findings of the Court of first instance. The appellants disputed the findings of the Court a 
quo that ‘[EACJ] had no jurisdiction to interpret African Charter, African Court Protocol 
and other relevant international instruments which the member states were party to.’ 431 
Thus, the appellate division overruled the decision of the Court a quo thereby clarifying that 
 
427A Possi “The East African Court of Justice; Towards Effective Protection of Human Rights In The East 
African Community”.  (2013) 17  Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law. 
428Ibid. 
429 APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2014; read also Reference No. 2 of 2012. 






it had jurisdiction to interpret the African Charter. The Appellant’s submission was that the 
member states are signatories to the African Charter and the EAC Treaty, the EAC Treaty 
has several provisions that create obligations on member states to protect human rights 
according to the African Charter. Therefore, the First Instance Division erred in deciding it 
had jurisdiction to consider application of the EAC Treaty but not provisions of the African 
Charter. The Appellants further based their argument on the findings in Katabazi that the 
Court had jurisdiction over principles of rule of law and human rights.432 
 
The Court stated that in view of Articles 23, 27 and 30 of the EAC Treaty, if a matter 
involves the interpretation and application of the provision of the EAC Treaty, it clearly falls 
within the jurisdiction of the EACJ. The Court thus found that the failure or delay in 
depositing the special declaration was not only an infringement of the Charter but also of the 
EAC Treaty. The findings in the Democratic Party case therefore serve as both a new 
avenue for a human rights jurisdiction and a reinforcement of the interpretation in Katabazi. 
 
5.7 Jurisdictional Relationship with Other Judicial Institutions  
 




The multiplicity of dispute settlement mechanisms in the region is likely to be problematic 
for the Court in the near future especially in dealing with human rights cases. The East 
African Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction with other courts including national 
courts. This is a result of the surge in the number of international and regional tribunals. 
Sometimes the jurisdictions are not only concurrent, but also competing and conflicting. 
Human rights issues have been at the centre of jurisdiction the East Africa hence the need to 
analyse the concurrent jurisdictions that exist in the region. Ruppel warns that ‘the issue of 
conflicting jurisdiction of the courts on the African continent will become a prominent one 
with specific importance in cases involving violations of human rights…’433 Having several 
courts with a concurrent jurisdiction creates room for forum shopping. ‘A brief examination 
of these treaties… clearly indicate the existence of a rich zone of overlap, potential 
competition and possible complementarity.’ 434 In addition, ‘presents rich possibilities of 
 
432Katabazi v Secretary General of the East African Community (2007) AHRLR 119 (EAC 2007). 
433OC Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities And Human Rights In East And Southern Africa”. 306  
Available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/9_Ruppel.pdf 
(accessed on 30 September 2015)  434Odinkulu (year) cited by T F Yerima “Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of African Regional 
Human Rights Courts”. (2011) 4 (2) Journal of Politics and Law. 
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forum shopping in the enforcement of human rights standards in Africa.’435 Petitioners may 
choose which court to submit their cases and in so doing they choose a court in which they 
are likely to get a favourable decision. It should be noted that there is no rule in international 
law that compels courts to decline a case on the basis that another forum has competence in 
the same case.436 
 
The issue of concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts in the EAC is a critical one. Article 
33(2) appears to envisage that, a national court, in determining a case before it may interpret 
and apply the provisions of the EAC Treaty. In Peter Anyang’ Nyongo and 10 others and the 
Attorney General of Kenya and 2 others and Abdirahim Haitha Abdi and 11 others437 the 
Court argued that ‘such envisaged interpretation… can only be incidental.’438 
 
The Court in the case of The East African Law Society and 4 Others V The Attorney 
General of Kenya and 3 Others439 observed that ‘[b]y the provisions under Articles 23, 
33(2) and 34, the Treaty established the principle of overall supremacy of the Court over the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty, to ensure harmony and certainly (sic).’ Nsekela 
however argues that; 
 
[t]he new (a) proviso to Article 27; and (b) paragraph (3) of Article 30, [h]ave the effect of 
compromising that principle and/or of contradicting the main provision. It should be 
appreciated that the question of what “the Treaty reserves for an institution of a Partner 
 
State” is a provision of the Treaty and a matter that ought to be determined harmoniously 
and with certainly (sic). If left as amended the provisions are likely to lead to conflicting 
interpretations of the Treaty by national courts of the Partner States.440 
 
The Court in Peter Anyang’ Nyongo and 10 others and the Attorney General of Kenya and 2 
others and Abdirahim Haitha Abdi and 11 others highlighted that ‘the purpose of these 










435Ibid at 124.  436OC Ruppel “Regional Economic Communities And Human Rights In East And Southern Africa”. 283 
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(accessed on 30 September 2015) 
437 Reference No. 1 of 2006  
438 Ibid  





uncertainty in the interpretation of the same provisions of the treaty.’ Nsekela’s argument in 
this regard is that the Treaty provisions should be made clearer to avoid uncertainty.441 
 
Harold Nsekela notes the existence of concurrent jurisdiction in the East African region.442 
 
Dispute resolution mechanisms such as article 41(9) and ‘other parallel dispute resolution 
mechanisms (national courts and quasi-judicial bodies) are being established. For instance, 
Article 41(2) of the EAC Customs Union Protocol that deals with dispute settlement 
establishes committees to handle disputes arising out of the Protocol and gives these 
committees finality in determining the disputes.’443 The Treaty gives the Court the power to 
interpret the Treaty and community laws. Ruhangisa is of the view that existence of such 
concurrent, parallel and overlapping jurisdiction may ‘limit the Court’s action.’ Judicial and 
semi judicial bodies established by the African Union whose members include those states 
that are members of the EAC are notable examples of those bodies with concurrent 
jurisdiction with the EACJ. Having concurrent jurisdictions may result in forum 
shopping.444 It also has the effect of causing duplication or multiplication of proceedings 
before different forums. An illustration of this forum shopping may be that of when 
 
‘Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  instituted  almost  at  the  same  time  a  suit  against  the 
 




The East African Court of Justice, just like any other sub-regional court, has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the African Court of Human Rights. Komakech notes that ‘reference to the 
 
African Charter by RECs in their constitutive documents is indicative of their willingness to 
apply the Charter’s provisions as the standards guiding aspects of human rights in the 
integration process…’446 The concurrent jurisdiction with the African Court is in respect of 
both individual and interstate cases. This is because the EACJ, just like the African Court 
has provisions for both individual and interstate petitions. Some, however, argue that the 
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which rests on declaration by a state under article 34 (6) of the protocol to the African Court 
to allow individual access. 
 
Conversely, the African Court and African Commission themselves are established in a way 
that allows for forum shopping. Komakech cites Murungi and Gallinet who ‘advance the 
view that since the African Commission is silent on admissibility of matters pending before 
 
RECs courts, it allows for ‘forum shopping’ a situation making it possible to have cases 
before the RECs and African Commission or the African Court concurrently.’447 They add 
on that ‘if unsuccessful litigants at RECs (sub regional) fora allowed seizing the African 
 
Court, it would amount to establishing the African Court as an appellate institution of sorts 
contrary to its mandate.’448 
 
It should be stressed that there are a number of advantages that existence of concurrent 
jurisdictions offer to human rights litigants. Among others, concurrent jurisdiction helps in 
the ‘development of international legal norms and enhanced access to justice for individuals, 
states and other entities.’449 
 
5.8 The Draft Protocol Extending Jurisdiction of the Court 
 
Despite concerns over the slow progress in the adoption of the protocol extending the 
jurisdiction of the Court, scholars have noted that the draft protocol, if adopted as it is, will 
go a long way in the promotion and protection of human rights. 450 The draft protocol 
expressly indicates that the Court will have a human rights mandate and if adopted, it will 
put an end to the raging debates on the human rights jurisdiction of the Court. With regards 
to personal jurisdiction the protocol makes provision for individual access to the Court. It 
specifies that states undertake not to interfere with this right and it also recognises the access 
of all parties recognised by the EAC Treaty. 
 
The draft protocol has already been subject to litigation. The secretary general of the East 
African Community has been taken to court over the slow progress in the adoption of the 
protocol extending the jurisdiction of the Court. The case of Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary 
General451 in the first instance division dealt with the claimant’s argument that the council’s 
 
447Ibid at 34. 
448Ibid. 
449“Issues of Concurrent Jurisdiction” Report of the 2012 Brandeis Institute for International Judges  450See for example S Bossa Protocol Towards a Protocol Extending the Jurisdiction of the East African Court 





failure to extend the jurisdiction of the Court since 2004, was a violation of the article 6 , 
article 7(2) and article 8(1)( c ) of the EAC treaty. ‘...the Applicant’s main complaint was 
that, although Article 27(2) of the Treaty provides for conferment on the EACJ, such other 
original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council 
at a suitable subsequent date, none of those additional limbs of jurisdiction had been 
conferred on the EACJ by the Council yet.’452 As such, the applicant held a legitimate 
expectation in respect of this provision. 
 
The claimant further alleged that Uganda had failed to make comments on the draft 
protocol and that such failure was a clear violation of the treaty. In respect of the first 
argument, the Court held that the delay in extending the jurisdiction of the EACJ not only 
holds back and frustrates the conclusion of the Protocol but also jeopardizes the 
achievement of the objectives and implementation of the Treaty and amounts to an 
infringement of Article 8 (1) (c) and contravenes the principles of good governance as 
stipulated by Article 6 of the Treaty.’453 
 
The Draft Protocol was subsequently adopted after the Court had ruled that ‘… a quick 
action should be taken by the East African Community in order to operationalise the 
extended jurisdiction of the East African Court Justice.’454 The operationalised protocol on 
extended jurisdiction however human rights jurisdiction was excluded therefrom and only 
dealt with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
5.8 Post Katabazi Developments 
 
 
It should be stated from the outset that as a result of its judicial activism, the EACJ faced a 
number of challenges and particularly opposition from states especially in respect of human 
rights cases. Gathii notes that ‘the EAC member states however, perceive the EACJ’s self-
proclaimed human rights jurisdiction as a subversion of their sovereignty. They believe that 
the Court’s human rights decisions are creating new understandings of legality to which 
states do not subscribe at home.’455 In Africa, human rights decisions by courts have often 
been faced with utter contempt from member states. More often, states that oppose human 
rights cases in international courts and tribunals either contest the human rights jurisdiction 
 
452Sitenda Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC and Others REFERENCE No. 1 OF 2010 at para 5 
453Ibid at para 56. 
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of the court or claim that the excise of jurisdiction trammels upon their sovereignty. And 
this has developed into a culture. As Gathii notes, ‘these states are resisting allowing the 
court to conform their domestic affairs to international understandings of legality.’456 
 
The EACJ should however be credited for standing strong with its decision in Katabazi. 
What is notable is the fact that after Katabazi was handed down, the Court continued to 
receive human rights cases and it has not abdicated from the duty it assumed in Katabazi. 
The Court had the opportunity to reiterate its duty to interpret the relevant provisions of the 
treaty particularly those that oblige states to adhere to the principles of good governance, 
rule of law and human rights in the case of Rugumba V Secretary General of The East 
African Community.457 The applicant had been held ‘incommunicado’ without trial for five 
years in Rwanda. In this case, the Rwandan government contested the jurisdiction of the 
 
Court. The Court held that, ‘to not determine whether Rwanda had violated the Articles 6(d) 
and 7(2) of the treaty would be a dereliction of its duty under article 27(1) of the treaty.458 
In addition to this, the Kenyan government also contested jurisdiction of the Court in the 
case of Independent Medical Legal Unit V Attorney General of Kenya. In rejecting the 
challenge, the Court held that, ‘…as long as allegations brought before the Court involve an 
interpretation of the treaty, their relation to violations of human rights does not preclude 
jurisdiction.’459 
 
Another landmark case in the EAC that caused unprecedented outrage amongst member 
states in the region is that of Nyong’o.460 In this case the Kenyan government and the 
council argued that the EACJ had overstepped its mandate. The events that followed 
 
Nyong’o prompted the 2006 amendments which were later contested in the case of East 
African Law Society. The amendments limited the jurisdiction of the Court ‘so as not to 
apply to ‘jurisdiction conferred by the treaty on organs of the partner states.’461 This shows 
that there exists a profound mistrust between the Court and the Partner States. The Partner 
States have taken a cautious approach to their dealing with the Court and have always feared 
that a minor slip up would see the Court threatening their sovereignty. 
 
456 J Gathii “Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice's Human 
Rights Strategy” (2014) Forthcoming 24th Duke Journal of International Comparative Law 251-252.  457 Ref. No. 8 of 2010 available at http://eacj.huriweb. org/wp-
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Despite various acts by member states that could threaten the independence and even the 
existence of the Court, the judges have asserted themselves as courageous. This signifies 
institutional independence and resilience in the face of political pressure. This will be 
further discussed in comparison to the SADC /tribunal in the following chapter. 
 
The East African Court of Justice received another human rights claim in the case of 
 
Arivizia and Another v the Attorney General of Kenya and others.462 The issue in this case 
was whether the referendum and adoption of a new constitution in Kenya violated the EAC 
Treaty. The claimants cited violation of Articles 5(1), 6(c) and (d), 7(2), 8(1)(c), 27(1) and 
29 of the East African Treaty in addition to allegations of a violation of Articles 1, 3, 7(1) of 
the African Charter. In this case, Kenya again challenged the Court’s competence to receive 
this case. Kenya contended that the subject matter was not within the scope of the power 
conferred to the Court by Article 27(1) of the EAC Treaty. The court rejected this 
contention, arguing that it could ‘hear a claim brought by residents of the East African 




The significance of this case is that even though the claim was brought on the basis of the 
African Charter, the Court claimed jurisdiction regardless of the fact that the EAC Treaty 
confers no express human rights mandate on the Court. According to Ebobrah, ‘a 
fundamental question that the Court would have to face is whether under its present 
statement of competence, it can exercise jurisdiction over such African Charter based 
claims.’463 
 
5.9 Enforcement of Decisions In The EACJ 
 
 
Just like any other regional or sub-regional human rights system, the EAC does not have 
enforcement mechanisms of its own. This makes enforcement of these supranational judicial 
bodies problematic. This is, particularly, so because enforcement entirely rests on the co-
operation of the states. In most cases states that happen to be the judgment debtors are called 
upon to enforce decisions held against them. This factor, coupled with the notion of state 
sovereignty, has made enforcement at international level difficult. Political organs of the 
RECs therefore have a duty to exert political pressure where enforcement is met with 
 
462Peter Anyang’ Nyongo and 10 others and the Attorney General of Kenya and 2 others and Abdirahim 
Haitha Abdi and 11 others Reference No. 1 of 2006. 
463 S T Ebobrah “Human Rights Developments In African Sub-Regional Economic Communities During 




resistance by a state party. ‘EAC Treaty saddles its partner states with the duty of 
implementing the judgments of the Court.’464 The EACJ’s judgment of a pecuniary nature 
is governed by the rules of civil procedure of the state in which it is to be executed.465 Other 
regional courts apply the same rule. The American Convention provides that, ‘part of the 
judgement that stipulates partly compensatory damages may be executed in accordance with 
domestic procedures governing execution of judgments against the state.’466 There has not 
been an issue to do with non-compliance, so far states have complied with decisions of the 
Court, starting with the Nyong’o467 case. 
 
However, lack of an enforcement mechanism in the EAC presents itself as an institutional 
fault line which can be exploited any time. The continuous presence of article 27(2) will 
make it even worse to enforce human rights decisions of the EACJ as the state parties may 





The East African Court of Justice has a broad jurisdiction. It is clear that the drafters of the 
EAC treaty intended to establish a court with a jurisdiction in human rights matters. It can 
be said that the founding fathers of the EAC treaty did not want to prematurely confer 
human rights jurisdiction on the Court. However, the slow progress made in the extension of 
the jurisdiction to human rights brings the sincerity and commitment of member states to 
human rights realisation into question. It has been observed that more often that note the 
respondent governments aver human rights jurisdiction competence of the in their pleadings. 
This indicates the fact that states are still unwilling to have a court with broader human 
rights jurisdiction as they view such a jurisdiction as likely to trammel on their sovereignty. 
These and others are signs of resistance that continue to haunt regional human rights 
aspirations. However, the EAC has made much progress in the area of human rights as 
compared to the SADC Tribunal. Even though states are not always happy with the human 
rights jurisprudence of the region, they have not done much to threaten its continued 
existence. For comparative purposes with other sub-regional courts, the reactions of the 
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partner states to some of the landmark decisions of the Court involving human rights will be 
discussed in the following chapter. In this regard, it will be submitted that the judges’ 



















































































































































The previous chapters have shown that the human rights decisions taken by the two sub-
regional courts were not always welcome. The varied responses to these decisions need to 
be examined and a reasonable explanation to the variation be offered. As some scholars 
would put it, the idea of human rights realisation at sub-regional level is still new, it is only 
natural that it faces resistance.468 In an attempt to critically analyse the implications of the 
conferment of human rights jurisdiction, by courts, on the East African Court of Justice and 
the SADC Tribunal, it is important to stress the fact that such jurisdiction is indispensable in 
REC courts. It will be argued that even though both of these courts were established without 
a human rights mandate, conferment of this jurisdiction was rationally connected to the 
broad mandate of both courts. Further, even though the two courts delivered judgments that 
extended their jurisdiction in a similar fashion, they faced different reactions in their 
respective regions. Whereas the decision in the SADC Tribunal was met with resistance 
from the respondent government, the EACJ decision was not openly resisted.469 This gives 
rise to the need to examine the political backgrounds of each case and determine whether the 
judges could have foreseen the member states’ reaction and could have avoided it. Alter et 
al argues that rationalists would expect the judges to have anticipated and avoided negative 
political responses.470 They add on that ‘the judges… could readily anticipate that their 
rulings would provoke a heated governmental reaction. Yet they issued their controversial 
rulings even when it was clear that governments stood ready to respond with court curbing 
plans.’ In this regard, it recommended that tactical adjudication could have worked in favour 
of the SADC Tribunal. A broader perspective on human rights and political reactions 
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will be given using an example from ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ).471  
Conclusions and recommendation will made. 
 




It is acknowledged that, unlike the African Court of Human Rights, European Court of 
Human Rights, Inter- American Court and ECOWAS Court,472 the SADC Tribunal and 
EACJ are not originally human rights courts. 473 The courts were created as disputes 
adjudication forums in pursuit of the economic integration agenda. Helfer concurs with this 
point in that ‘the sub-regional courts in West, East and Southern Africa, share a number of 
similarities, they were not created to hear cases alleging violations of international human 
rights law.’474 Adding that, ‘instead they were tasked with improving the enforcement of 
each integration project’s founding legal instruments.’475 Murungi states that RECs have 
introduced a new regime of human rights protection. However, she is sceptical of their 
commitment to human rights since they are more focused on economic integration.476 
 
It has been argued elsewhere in this study that human rights protection became an incident 
of the integration agenda.477 On this note, Ebobrah submits that ‘human rights presence at 
all integration levels cannot be ignored.’478 Sub-regional economic communities’ texts refer 
to human rights, in some instances tacitly.479 Musungu notes that ‘at the textual level, it is 
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rights as conceptualised in the African Charter.’480 Ali also attributes the ‘derived’ human 
rights jurisdiction to the regional integration system by stating that ‘RECs serve as the 
building blocks for economic integration of Africa. Whilst pursuing these goals, they 
recognise the enhanced role of human rights, inter alia, as a means to their economic 
development.’481 It is without doubt that the founding fathers of these regional systems 
deliberately excluded human rights at the time, opting, instead, in the case of the EACJ, to 
include human rights at a suitable future date.482 The reason for the omission of the human 
rights jurisdiction was the fear that the issue was too political.483 Perhaps this was a good 
decision at the time given that Africa was coming out of a multitude of civil wars and the 
general political instability at the time would have made economic integration difficult. 
 
However, this exclusion did not stop the respective courts from broadly interpreting the 
provisions of their original instruments. Helfer notes that ‘for the EACJ and SADC 
 
Tribunal, the shift to human rights occurred via expansive interpretations of the integration 
treaties, principles and objectives clauses adopted by the sub-regional judges in response to 
advocacy by law societies and private litigants.’484 As a result, the EACJ and the SADC 
Tribunal became competent to receive human rights cases 
 
Having concluded that human rights protection and promotion is an indispensable feature of 
regionalism and economic integration, it is necessary to discuss the different reactions of the 
member states in the two regions. This can be done by means of looking at both legal and 
political factors that were at play in both regions. Whilst in the SADC region, the decision in 







480Ibid at 93. 
481A J Ali “The Admissibility Of Sub-regional Courts’ Decisions Before The African Commission Or African 
Court” (2012)  6 (2) Mizan Law Review 242. 
482Article 27 (2) of the EAC Treaty. 
483Ecowas Community Court was established in terms of articles 5 and 15 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty.  
Other Community laws applicable to the Court are ‘Protocol A/P1/7/91 of 6 July 1991, Supplementary 
Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 of 19 January 2005, Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of 14 June 2006, 
Regulation of 3 June 2002, and Supplementary Regulation C/REG.2/06/06 of 13 June 2006.’ See  
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=5. 
484L R. Helfer “Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Freedom of Movement” (2015)  
32 iCourts Working Paper Series 4.  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6208&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 30 
October 2015). 
485Mike Campbell Private  Ltd V Republic Of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007.  




lead to any serious backlashes against the Court. The only notable backlash against the 
EACJ was a result of the Nyongo487 case and was not linked to human rights jurisdiction. 
 
Before Katabazi488 was heard, the EACJ decision in Nyongo489 had caused problems for 
the Court and had threatened its continued existence. Even though Nyongo was not a human 
rights case, the reaction of Kenya to the decision is worth noting. The Court showed 
resilience as the judges stood strong in the face of a significant backlash. This probably 
explains why the Court was bold enough to deliver the judgment in Katabazi barely two 
years after Nyongo. 490 Kenya was infuriated by the decision in Nyongo (interim) as it 
viewed it as an ‘unwelcome interference in a sensitive domestic political dispute, and, even 
worse taking the opposition’s side.’491 In addition to that, the Court’s ruling was viewed as 
undermining the country’s sovereignty. In its campaign against the Court, Kenya went so far 
as to try and recall two Kenyan judges from the EACJ bench. Scholars have noted that ‘by 
removing the judges from the Nyongo case, the government hoped to avoid an adverse 
ruling on the merits that would solidify the opposition’s influence in the EALA.’492 Even 
though Kenya was not successful in its criticism of the Court, it managed to force important 
amendments to the EAC Treaty which included the establishment of the appellate division 
and setting up the two month time limit for natural and legal persons who wish to register 
their complaints with the Court challenging states on the basis of any violation of the EAC 
Treaty. There is a striking similarity between Kenya’s actions and that of member states in 
the SADC. They both sought to place limitations of the operation of individual petitions. 
SADC ultimately scratched the individual petitions system. Both actions in the EAC and 
 










487Peter Anyang’ Nyongo and 10 others and the Attorney General of Kenya and 2 others and 
Abdirahim Haitha Abdi and 11 others Reference No. 1 of 2006. 
488 AHRLR 119 (EAC) 2007. 
489Reference No. 1 of 2006. 
490 Ibid.   
491 L R. Helfer “Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Freedom of Movement” (2015)   
32 iCourts Working Paper Series 4.  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6208&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 30   
October 2015).  
492Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and   
Consequences” 13.  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6140&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 13 




of state approved revisions of ICs founding treaties have expanded the Courts’ jurisdiction 
and access rules rather than overturning disfavoured decisions or sanctioning judges.’493 
 
The fact that Katabazi was decided after the Court had already started developing its 
jurisprudence and that it had already been tried and tested possibly explains its bold 
character when it delivered the judgment. The judgment in Katabazi has been described by 
scholars as ‘a strikingly bold conclusion given the treaty’s explicit statement that the 
member states would confer such jurisdiction via a yet to be concluded protocol.’ In 
contrast, the SADC Tribunal received the Campbell case as one of its first few cases. At that 
time the Tribunal had not developed its jurisprudence in such a manner that it could skilfully 
navigate through the extra-legal implications of its decision. 
 




The different reactions in the two cases are attributed to the timing, and the subject matter. 
The EACJ received the case of Katabazi at a time when it had already started developing its 
jurisprudence and having previously handed down some landmark decisions in the cases of 
 
Nyong’o. The SADC Tribunal on the other hand was faced with Campbell when it was still 
to find legitimacy within the political structures of the SADC since it had no precedence of a 
decision of such a magnitude. Oppong notes that ‘in Mike Campbell, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal was confronted for the first time with a 
challenge to a major and controversial national policy: Zimbabwe’s agricultural reform.’494 
 
Therefore, it suffices to say that, whilst still in its infancy, the Tribunal was faced with a big 
case that it could not have dealt with without evoking emotions. As a result the Tribunal’s 
decision did not gunner the support of the political organ of the SADC. As will be shown 
below, courts are more likely to face political opposition if they decide politically sensitive 





493Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and  
Consequences.” 13.  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6140&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 13 
October 2015)  
494 F Oppong “Enforcing Judgments of the SADC Tribunal in Domestic Courts” 2010 Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 115.  495On the whole, the failure by SADC leaders to intervene in Zimbabwe can be attributed to, according to 
Palloti infra note 497, ‘…the history of political antagonism among Southern African governments and 
by SADC’s inability to draw a distinction between respect for human rights and the promotion of 




backlash from the international community, especially the west, the civil society and human 
rights organisations. 
 
The different reactions may also be explained by the nature of the subject matter in both 
cases. To begin with, the litigation in Campbell drew the world’s attention to the SADC 
 
Tribunal and the land reform process in Zimbabwe. One of the key issues was whether the 
land reform was racially discriminatory. An affirmative decision on this issue was likely to 
evoke emotions in the Zimbabwean political circles with the most influential opposition 
party and human rights groups likely to support the decision and the ruling Zanu Pf party 
contesting it.496 The issue of land holds a significant ideological importance in the Southern 
African region. 497 Given the facts and the background of the land reform discussed in 
previous chapters, as well as the political situation in Zimbabwe at the time, it was obvious 
that the Zimbabwe government was not going to accept nothing short of victory in this case 
as anything to the contrary would be seen as a reversal of the land reform and a sign of a 
politically weakening Zanu Pf regime. In Zimbabwe, the land reform is viewed as one of the 
gains of the liberation struggle and a symbol of sovereignty that should be guarded 
jealously. Given that the land reform had earned Zimbabwe economic sanctions and 
international isolation, the Zimbabwe government was not prepared to back track on its land 
policy. For this reason national pride was at stake. 
 
In addition to that, the issue of land is politically sensitive in most SADC countries; hence 
no member state was prepared to openly support the Tribunal’s decision in Campbell.498  
Palloti notes that ‘[t]his outcome has often been explained in the academic literature as a 
 
 
496 Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe openly rejected the SADC Tribunal's judgment and authority. At an 85th 
birthday rally, he was quoted saying, "Land distribution will continue. It will not stop. The few remaining white 
farmers should quickly vacate their farms as they have no place there. ... Our land issues are not subject to the 
SADC tribunal." See  http://www.pbs.org/pov/mugabe/campbell_zimbabwe_case_documents.php  
497Hulse notes that in South Africa ‘at the end of apartheid in 1994, white South Africans owned 87 percent 
of the land despite representing less that 10percent of the population.’ And according to Hulse this explains 
why South Africa’s ANC Government did not denounce Zimbabwe’s land reform and ‘… condemnation of 
Mugabe’s land reform programme, however illegal under the principles of international law, might provide a 
match that ignites the sea of oil and results in the conservative leadership of the ANC being unseated by the 
youthful, radical element of the party which has professed support for the Zimbabwe- style fast tracking of 
the land reform programme.’ (M Hulse “Silencing A Supranational Court; The Rise And Fall Of The SADC 
Tribunal” (2012) (accessed ;30 November 2015) )  http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/silencing-a-
supranational- court-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-sadc-tribunal/ 
498“Political divisions among the SADC governments (Angola, in particular, that had militarily intervened with  
Zimbabwe and Namibia in the DRC, backed Mugabe within SADC, while Botswana criticised the FTLRP for 
its negative effects on the entire region), the sensitivity of the land issue across Southern Africa, and Mugabe's 
determination to avoid any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe made the search for a 
solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe a very difficult and sensitive issue for SADC.” A Pallotti “Human Rights  
And Regional Cooperation In Africa: SADC And The Crisis In Zimbabwe” (2013) 35 (1) Strategic Review for 




consequence of African leaders' reluctance to openly criticise their fellow heads of state and 
set a dangerous precedent that could later backfire on them.’499 Given South Africa’s status 
as a regional economic force, it could have exerted pressure on Zimbabwe to enforce the 
judgment or simply defend the Tribunal. It would be logical to say that South Africa did not 
want to evoke emotions at home by supporting a judgment that may be interpreted to have 
been against expropriation of land. South Africa’s direct involvement in the whole 
enforcement of the Tribunal’s decision saga was through its judicial arm, in Fick, for which 
no blame can be imputed on its political arms. 
 
On the other hand the EACJ did not face any significant backlashes owing to the nature of 
the subject matter in Katabazi. Katabazi was a case of unlawful detention for which the 
domestic courts had already ruled in favour of the detainees. There were no issues of 
national policy involved but outright human rights violations. The issue in this case involved 
violation of first generation rights with no far reaching consequences on national policy. 
 
There is therefore a need to determine whether the Tribunal could have avoided the 
backlash. Faced with such a politically sensitive case the Tribunal could have survived by 
adjudicating in the matter tactfully. 
 




Another sub-regional court, strikingly similar to the SADC Tribunal and the EACJ was also 
not spared any backlashes in its region. The ECOWAS community adopted a supplementary 
protocol in 2005 to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to human rights cases.500 Since then, 
the Court has been receiving human rights cases. Articles 3 and 4 of the Protocol provide for 
direct access by individuals and that there is no need to exhaust domestic remedies. 501 
 
499A Pallotti “Human Rights And Regional Cooperation In Africa: SADC And The Crisis In Zimbabwe” 
(2013) 35 (1)  Strategic Review for Southern Africa 18.  
500It should be noted that the ECOWAS Court’s adoption of a human rights jurisdiction stands in sharp 
contrast to the other regional courts. Helfer et al, Supra note 473, 3 notes that ‘the ECCJ‘s transformation 
illustrates how an existing international institution can be redeployed for new purposes. One interesting aspect 
of this transformation is how the judges themselves contributed to the expansion of their mandate. Most 
scholars expect international courts to engage in expansive judicial law making to increase their power and the 
reach of international law. ECCJ judges did not follow this strategy, rejecting an opportunity to expand their 
jurisdiction and access rules. Instead, they embarked on an extra-judicial campaign to redesign the Court. 
They travelled across West Africa on outreach missions and speaking engagements to build support among 
local bar associations, human rights groups, and government officials. This strategy culminated in the 
adoption of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol, a treaty that endorsed the redeployment of the ECCJ as a 
human rights tribunal.’  501See Helfer, Supra note 473, who notes that the court ‘gave private litigants direct access to the court, 




However, these provisions are not free of controversy. As is now the ‘norm’, states have 
always contested this jurisdiction and also raised state sovereignty to oust the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 502 Ebobrah acknowledges that following the principle of sovereignty 
international law recognises that states are at liberty to act and exercise power widely in so 
far as such is within the ambits of international law.’503 In the ECOWAS the Gambia has 
been at the fore front as it contested two cases against it in 2008 and 2009. As such, Gambia 
in both cases unleashed severe backlashes against the Court. Given the nature of 
international law in sub-regional communities in Africa, one has to ask the question as to 
 
‘whether those institutions are competent to exercise powers in the realm of human 
rights.’504 Bearing in mind that the intention is to explore how the Court avoided being 
affected by these backlashes, the two cases involving Gambia and its responses to both of 
them shall be discussed. 
 




The first case that attracted the wrath of Gambia and became a subject of much debate in the 
ECOWAS was that of Manneh v the Gambia.505 In this case the applicant was a Gambian 
journalist who had been arrested, detained and tortured for publishing news articles critical of 
the Gambian government.506 According to Ali, Gambian officials did not give reasons for his 












502See F Viljoen International Human Rights Law In Africa (2012) 499 , who observes that ‘ in all three 
RECs under discussion, a state at the receiving end of an unfavorable decision responded by questioning the 
legitimacy of the court, and advocated for institutional reform to weaken the fledging human rights system. 
503 S T. Ebobrah “Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights Realisation Through Regional Economic 
Communities In Africa: The Case Of The Economic Community Of West African States” (2009) University of  
Pretoria LLD Thesis 
30. 504 Ibid at 32.  505Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008)/ Manneh v the Gambia, Unreported Suit 
No ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07. 
506 Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and  
Consequences.”  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6140&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 13 
October 2015)  507J Ali “The Admissibility Of Sub-regional Courts’ Decisions Before The African Commission Or 
African Court” (2012) 6 (2) Mizan Law Review 246. 
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and 7 of the African Charter.’ 508 The Gambia ignored numerous calls for it to file its 
appearance to defend or to appear in court.509 The plaintiff sought; 
 
(a) A declaration that his arrest by the National Intelligence Agency of The Gambia at the 
premises of The Daily Observer in Banjul on 11 July, 2006, is illegal and unlawful as it 
violates article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which guarantees his 
human right to personal liberty.  
 
(b) A declaration that his detention on 11 July 2006, and his continual detention since then 
without trial is unlawful and a violation of his right as guaranteed by articles 4, 5 and 7 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
 
(c) An order mandating the defendant and/or its agents to immediately release the plaintiff 
from custody.  
 
(d) US$ 5 000 000 (five million United States dollars) being compensation for the violation  
 
of the applicant’s human rights to dignity, liberty and fair hearing.510 
 
In 2008, the Court found Gambia responsible for torture and other human rights abuses 
thereby ordering the government to release Manneh from detention and was also ordered to 
pay him $100 000.511 The Gambia was put under pressure by international organisations 
and other governments that demanded its full compliance with the Court’s judgment. 512 
According to Alter et al, ‘officials announced that the Gambia was “aggrieved” by the 
 
Manneh judgment and would “set the political process in motion to take the matter to the 
next level and the decision set aside.”’513 Gambia’s failure to respond to the allegations and 
to defend itself was a clear demonstration of its unwillingness to be bound by the Court’s 
decision or subjecting itself to the Court’s processes. By this conduct, it hoped to 
delegitimize any decision made by the Court in this respect. 
 
 
508A J Ali “The Admissibility Of Sub-regional Courts’ Decisions Before The African Commission Or 
African Court” (2012) 6 (2) Mizan Law Review 246 ; Manneh v the Gambia, supra note 504.  509 In this case the Gambia failed to respond to numerous calls to make its defence pleadings after being 
served through its high commissioner in Nigeria. (See Manneh v the Gambia, supra note para 4; See also 
Viljoen,2012. 499. 
510Manneh v the Gambia para 3 
511Ibid. 
512 Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and  
Consequences.” 5  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6140&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed; 13 
October 2015) 
513Alter et al. “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and  
Consequences.” 6  











The second case, Musa Sadyikhan v The Gambia514 involved another journalist who was 
detained and tortured by the Gambian government who launched his suit from exile. This 
time, the Gambia responded and challenged the jurisdiction of the Court and also raised 
sovereignty as its defence.515 In June 2009 a judgment in favour of the applicant was 
handed down. The Gambia reacted swiftly to this decision in September 2009 by requesting 
a revision of the 2005 protocol. In addition, it drafted a supplementary protocol effectively 
altering the jurisdiction of the Court’s access rules.516 Gambia also ‘sought an amendment 
to the “Revised ECOWAS Treaty” to create an appeals procedure for all decisions of the 
Community Court.” 517 A consortium of 11 civil society organisations denounced these 
recommendations and member states also unanimously rejected the Gambian challenge. 
Following this, ‘… the ECOWAS Court has continued to develop its human rights 
jurisprudence, albeit in manner suggesting that it is aware of the political limits of its 
authority and serious challenges of securing compliance with its judgments.’518 Therefore 
the backlashes by Gambia did ‘not yield any concrete results.’519 
 
Whereas other sub-regional courts have succumbed to the pressure exerted by some sects to 
either limit the individual access or restrict human rights jurisdiction, the ECOWAS Court 
emerged stronger from the backlash directed against it by Gambia. Alter et al notes that 
 
‘…West African governments have responded to plausible critiques of the ECCJ by 
strengthening the court’s independence.’ These scholars single out the establishment of the 
 
 
514Musa Sadyikhan v The Gambia Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07 judgment ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/10 in this case 
the plaintiff sought relief for ‘violation of his human right to personal liberty and dignity of his person and fair 
hearing guaranteed by Articles 1, 5, 6 and 7 of the African Charter On Human And Peoples Rights (ACHPR).’ 
Para 2.  515The Gambian government’s defense was a complete denial of the plaintiff’s averments. It tendered 
complete ignorance of the facts in question and knowledge whatsoever of any coup plot against it as published 
by the plaintiff’s newspaper.  
516Some of the key adjustments made by Gambia in this respect as noted by Alter, Supra note 512, were ‘(a) 
that with respect to human rights cases, the Court should only have jurisdiction in respect of international 
instruments ratified by the respondent country; (b) also in human rights cases, the ECOWAS Court’s 
jurisdiction should be made subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies; (c) cases should only be 
admissible if instituted not later than 12 months after the exhaustion of local remedies; (d) cases should not 
be anonymous; and (e) the court should not hear cases that are before other international mechanisms of 
settlement.’ 
517Supra note 512, 7. 
518Ibid.  
519 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law In Africa (2012) 499. 
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ECOWAS Judicial Council520 which depoliticizes the appointment of judges as one of the 
direct results of the Gambian backlash.521 In addition they point to the fact the ECOWAS 
community rejected Gambia’s initiative to restrict the Court’s human rights jurisdiction.522 
 
6.5 Avoiding Backlashes 
 
 
Given the reality that sub-regional courts in Africa usually suffer setbacks whenever they 
deliver politically sensitive decisions, it is necessary to turn to recommend a theory of 
adjudication that may help avoid similar backlashes in the future. Often, these sub-regional 
courts, when they pass human rights judgments, find themselves unpopular in political 
circles, which pose a serious threat to their institutional security.523 Some may attribute the 
backlashes discussed to a number of factors inter alia; the general fear amongst States that 
human rights may be used as a pretext for interfering with their political sovereignty. There 
is, however, need to look at ways in which the courts found themselves imposing a threat to 
national politics in their adjudication processes of politically sensitive matters. The 
argument made here is that the backlashes against the courts especially in the SADC region 
as a result of the judgment in Campbell could have been avoided by means of tactical 
adjudication. One may be quick to question the applicability of tactical adjudication in 
international courts; hence, it is necessary to turn to a comprehensive discussion of the 
theory of tactical adjudication. 
 




Theunis Roux refers to the strategies adopted by South African Constitutional Court in its 
pursuit of the ‘overriding goal of ensuring the establishment of constitutional democracy’ as 
tactical adjudication. 524 Roux submits that the strategies have enabled South African 
 
Constitution Court to stay in ‘business long enough to give meaningful effect to 
constitutional rights.’525 It should be noted that Roux clearly puts it on record that tactical 
 
520The ECOWAS Judicial Council is responsible for the recruitment of judges and is also responsible for 
the restructuring of the court. 
521 Alter et al “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice” (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 4. 
522 Ibid at 4.   
523 According to Roux “institutional security, ” is understood … to mean the CCSA’s capacity to survive political 
attacks on its independence.’ (T Roux “ Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of   
South Africa” (2009) 7 (1) International Journal of Constitutional Law. 4.  
524T Roux ‘Tactical adjudication: How the Constitutional Court of South Africa survived its first decade’   
 http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/Tactical%20Adjudication.pdf (accessed 14 March 2013) 




adjudication is ‘not meant to exclude consideration of more detailed techniques of legal 
reasoning such as deduction from clear rules, distinguishing cases on their facts, policy 
reasoning, and so on.’526 Therefore, the same speaks of its application in international 
courts and tribunals. 
 
Tactical adjudication involves the use of five strategies. These are a) the use of doctrinally 
redundant language to set the tone of a judgment, b) a preference of formulaic tests over 
substantive moral reasoning, c) the conversion of conceptual tests into discretionary 
standards, d) interpreting the constitutional text so as to ensure pragmatic outcomes and e) 
framing certain issues as political questions to avoid deciding them.527 
 




For purposes here, two strategies will be discussed in detail. The use of doctrinally 
redundant language to set the tone of a judgment and framing certain issues as political 
questions to avoid deciding them can be directly applied in regional and sub-regional human 
rights courts. The remaining three strategies will be discussed briefly to illustrate the 
relevance of tactical adjudication. 
 
The use of doctrinally redundant language is explained by Roux as meant to draw ‘an 
artificial distinction between strictly legal language (everything to do with the articulation of 
the rule) and other scene setting language that courts use to frame their decisions.’528 In 
such a scenario the tone and register of the judgment is used to justify the outcome.529 It 
should be noted that this can be a time consuming exercise that is mostly appropriate for 
courts with a relatively small case load. Thus Roux uses examples from the jurisprudence of 
the South African Constitutional Court. This scholar notes that one of the reasons why the 
South African Constitutional Court uses this strategy is because it is still in the stage of 
democratic consolidation and that the Court understands its institutional role in this.530 The 






528Ibid at 13. 
529Ibid at 13.  530It has been argued that the SADC Tribunal met its death prematurely at a time when it was supposed to 
begin to play its active role in fostering a culture of human rights, democracy and rule of law in the region. 
Given the civil unrests and disputed election outcomes, one cannot be entirely proud of the region’s 
human rights record, therefore the Tribunal was meant to consolidate the principles of democracy. 
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delicacy of its position.531 One of the key features of this strategy is manifest in the Court’s 
‘...repeated attempts to align itself with the political branches’ transformation efforts.’532 
 
According to Roux this is done by starting off a judgment by endorsing the policies being 
pursued but still go on to find against the State; 
 
The CCSA [Constitutional Court of South Africa] will, for example, quite often begin a 
judgment in which it ultimately finds against the state by indicating its general agreement 
with the policy being pursued. In other cases, when finding in favour of the state, it will 
resoundingly endorse the policy in question, often going quite far beyond what is necessary 
for purposes of making its decision.533 
 
This is done by using ‘rhetoric craftsmanship’ which is ‘the careful unpacking of a decision 
so as to make it more palatable to those who must obey it.’534 This strategy, according to 
Roux, was used by the South African Constitutional Court in Minister of Health and others 
v Treatment Action Campaign and others (TAC) case.535 The Court in this case laid out a 
redundant passage in its opening paragraph. 536 Roux observes that even though this 
paragraph does not carry any legal meaning, it was strategically necessary.537 It can also be 
added that these redundant passages are used as means of navigation into deep political 
matters through structured reasoning. These may also be used to lighten up the atmosphere 
and diffuse the tension that is likely to emanate from the judgment. 
 
The other strategy that South African courts have adopted is ‘framing certain issues as 
political questions to avoid deciding them.’ Roux discusses this strategy extensively. This 




531The South African Constitutional Court has often been caught in situations where it has to protect minority 
rights which makes it unpopular with the majority for example in cases such as S v Makwanyane and Another 
(CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 
(6 June 1995) where the court ruled against the death penalty despite the fact that the majority in South Africa 
supported the death penalty. 
532Supra note 528, 13. 
533Ibid. 
534Ibid at 14.  535Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (No 2) (CCT8/02) [2002] 
ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002)  
536See Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
para 1. ‘The HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa has been described as ‘an incomprehensible calamity’ and 
‘the most important challenge facing South Africa since the birth of our new democracy’ and government’s 
fight against ‘this scourge’ as ‘a top priority’. It has claimed millions of lives, inflicting pain and grief, causing 
fear and uncertainty, and threatening the economy’. These are not the words of alarmists but are taken from a 
Department of Health publication in 2000 and a ministerial foreword to an earlier publication.’  537T Roux “ Tactical Adjudication: How the Constitutional Court of South Africa Survived its First 
Decade”  http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/Tactical%20Adjudication.pdf. 14 
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Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union538 (SARFU) adopted this strategy 
in determination of the matter before it. In SARFU, the Court held that ‘one of its functions 
was to exercise exclusive jurisdiction ‘in a number of crucial political areas … in respect of 
issues which would inevitably have important political consequences.’ 539 However, the 
Court has been tactful in its discharge of this exclusive mandate. For example, the Court in 
 
Ferreira v Levin NO 540 held that ‘Whether or not there should be regulation and 
redistribution is essentially a political question which falls within the domain of the 
 
Legislature and not the Court.’ 541 This decision highlights the court’s awareness of its 
precarious position hence sifting through those that do not fall within its ambit and treating 
them as such. In the same vein, the Court refused to adjudicate in the case of UDM V 
President of RSA542 by stressing that the political question was of no concern to the Court. 
Therefore, by using this strategy, the Court finds itself adjudicating in some political matters 
and declining to do in others so as to ensure its institutional security by avoiding direct 
conflicts with political branches. 
 
As a result of these and other strategies, the South African Constitutional Court, ‘though 
lacking in public support, … today [it] finds itself in a position of relative institutional 
security.’543 More often, the Court find itself adjudicating in politically sensitive matters 
and still decide against the State despite the possible threats it is likely to face from state 
institutions. For example, Roux notes that ‘…the African National Congress (ANC) has 
periodically criticized the judiciary but it has not, as yet, threatened to close the CCSA down 
despite several significant policy reversals.’544 Russell sums up Roux’s discussion; 
 
[T]he CCSA is best positioned to rule independently and provide legally legitimate reasons 
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it was able to make unpopular decisions with no threat to its institutional independence, in 
part because it had support from ANC elites, for example on the death penalty.545 
 
Sub-regional courts often find themselves in a similar precarious position. On the one hand, 
they are created by States, for which they serve; on the other they have a duty to ensure 
good governance which means they are more likely to come into conflict with the very 
states that established them. This is the same situation that the South African Constitutional 
Court finds itself in which makes it an ideal candidate for illustrating the application of 
tactical adjudication. It has been shown above that almost all the sub-regional courts with a 
human rights mandate have at least once come into conflict with the political organs or 
branches. The backlashes discussed above are a clear indication of the fact that sub-regional 
courts need to entrench their institutional security. In some instances, the backlashes did not 
yield any significant results but in others they did. 
 
The preference for formulaic tests over substantive moral reasoning has also been used by 
the CCSA as one of its tactical adjudication strategies. Roux submits that ‘in case after case, 
faced with the duty to give meaning to a hitherto unelaborated constitutional right- to fit the 
right into the grand constitutional design- the CCSA has eschewed substantive moral 
reasoning in favour of casuistry or articulation of formulaic tests.’546 In addition to that, the 
Court also uses the ‘conversion of conceptual tests into discretionary standards.’ This 
strategy allows the Court to ‘consider all possible challenges… without… pre-committing it 
to any particular position on the range of controversial questions that could potentially come 
before it.’547 Finally, tactical adjudication entails interpreting the constitutional text as to 
ensure pragmatic outcomes. This is when a court refuses to give a moral reading of the law, 
but rather interprets it in a way that ensures pragmatic outcomes.548 
 




In the SADC Tribunal, Zimbabwe’s reaction to the decision in Campbell resulted in its 
suspension followed by adoption of a New Protocol. It has been shown above that the issues 
 
 
545Roux cited by K Russell “Political and Constitutional Futures for Land Reform in South Africa”  
http://www.landdivided2013.org.za/sites/default/files/March%202013%20PLAAS%20Conference%20Paper%  
20Kevin%20Russell.pdf (Accessed; 20 October 2015).  546 T Roux “ Tactical Adjudication: How the Constitutional Court of South Africa Survived its First 
Decade”  http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/Tactical%20Adjudication.pdf 17. 
547 Ibid.   
548 T Roux “ Tactical Adjudication: How the Constitutional Court of South Africa Survived its First Decade”  




in Campbell were politically sensitive and were likely to yield political responses in almost 
all SADC countries. Rationalists would argue the judges should have foreseen this 
possibility. This is not to say the decision in Campbell was flawed or that the court should 
have decided otherwise. Had the Court, in Campbell used tactical adjudication, the political 
response would have been different. For example, the Court could have done much better by 
looking at the rationale behind the land reform, or it could have supported the land reform 
itself and go on to denounce the manner in which Zimbabwe had carried out its processes. 
 
The SADC Tribunal’s position was similar to that of the South African Constitutional Court 
in its early stages. Just like the Tribunal, the CCSA was faced with the task of ushering in a 
new constitutional order but in so doing it had to make sure it deals with political matters in 
such a manner that stays in ‘business long enough to give meaningful effect to constitutional 
rights. It is apparent that the Tribunal, new as it was, its position was precarious; it received 
 
Campbell whilst it was still establishing itself as a regional judicial body. It had a duty to 
adjudicate in a manner that ensures that it stays in business long enough to give meaningful 
effect to the provisions of the SADC Treaty. The SADC Tribunal could have devised a way 
to avoid confronting political branches and whilst at the same time protecting the human 
rights as contemplated in the SADC Treaty. The judges could have been masterful, drawing 
from the CCSA, they could have used doctrinal redundancy in such a way that no one 
disagrees with any party of the judgment thereof. This could have been achieved by 
reiterating the importance of human rights in the region, the importance of the sub-regional 
judicial organ and tying up the heads of the state and government to their own words during 
the drafting of the SADC Treaty. 
 




It has been shown that the importance of sub-regional human rights mechanisms cannot be 
ignored. Sub-regional human rights courts bring international justice close to victims in their 
respective regions. However, there is a debate surrounding the acquisition of human rights 
jurisdiction by the SADC Tribunal and the East African Court of Justice through broad 
purposive interpretation of their respective treaties. Many scholars however agree that the 
judges correctly afforded human rights jurisdiction to both courts. They argue that human 
rights jurisdiction is an incident of the principles rule of law, democracy and good 
governance which find meaning within the ambit of both treaties. The cases of Mike 




Secretary General of the EAC, in the EACJ resulted in the conferment of human rights 
jurisdiction on both courts. 
 
What is interesting here is the variation in the responses by the political arms of both the 
EACJ and the SADC Tribunal to these decisions. Whereas the decision in Katabazi was 
generally accepted, the decision in Campbell was met with hostility from the SADC heads 
of states and government, which led to its eventual suspension in 2010. This variation was 
explained by looking at the notable differences in nature of the human rights jurisdiction, the 
subject matter and the timing between the EACJ and SADC Tribunal cases. For illustrative 
purposes, backlashes on human rights decisions of other sub-regional courts such as the 
ECOWAS Community Court were also discussed. 
 
The Campbell and the Katabazi cases gave rise to a number of pertinent questions in 
international human rights law. The first question was whether the two sub regional courts 
have a human rights jurisdiction in the absence of a human rights protocol in the SADC 
Tribunal, and in the absence of a protocol extending the jurisdiction of the EACJ as 
contemplated by the EAC Treaty. The other question is whether the suspension and non-
compliance with the Tribunal’s judgment was a digression on the mandate of a legally 
constituted sub -regional human rights body. In this regard, an enquiry into whether the 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal and eventual adoption of a New Protocol were legal was 
made. Lastly, the question as to whether the reaction in Campbell could have been avoided 
was addressed. 
 
In addition to the above, other incidental issues include the existence of concurrent 
jurisdiction in the EACJ and concerns around the slow adoption of the Protocol extending 
the jurisdiction of the court to human rights 
 




It has been observed that the judges in both the SADC Tribunal and the EACJ correctly 
afforded the courts a human rights jurisdiction. Since human rights have increasingly 
become integral in regional and sub-regional systems, it would logically follow, therefore, 
that the courts be competent to receive human rights cases. It has been observed by various 
scholars that respect for human rights is cardinal to the human rights system. The world has 





movement of people. This necessitates the need to have a regional or sub regional standard 
for the observance of human rights. 
 
In addition to this, it has been argued that the SADC and EAC Treaties refer to the 
observance of rule of law, democracy and rule of law. These guiding principles, if 
interpreted broadly, confer human rights jurisdiction on the courts. It therefore suffices to 
say that the courts have a human rights jurisdiction. 
 
This study has shown that even though the two courts were similar in a number of ways, 
they received different reactions from the heads of states and government. These differences 
have been attributed to the nature of the cases themselves. It has been observed that the case 
of Campbell v Zimbabwe involved the issue of land, the case put to test Zimbabwe’s 
national policy of land reform judged against the standards of human rights which made it a 
highly sensitive case. On the other hand the case of Katabazi was an unlawful detention 
case; it was not a challenge on any issue of national policy. Therefore, the respondents could 
readily accept the decision of the Court. 
 
Another notable difference between the two cases was the timing. It has been observed that 
the SADC Tribunal received Campbell whilst it was still in its infancy. It had not developed 
its jurisprudence and had not then acquired institutional security. Campbell was therefore 
too big a case for a new tribunal. The East African Court received Katabazi at a time when it 
had already received similar big cases even though they did not involve human rights. It had 
therefore established itself as a sub-regional legal institution to reckon with. 
 
Given the broad discussion around whether the suspension of the SADC Tribunal was legal, 
it can be concluded that the suspension and the adoption of the New Protocol were illegal 
for the reason that the SADC Treaty does not provide for suspension of the Tribunal. It can 
also be concluded that the new protocol simply aims to prevent individuals from accessing 
the Tribunal. This is a clear violation of the right to access to courts. 
 
In respect of the protocol extending the jurisdiction of the EACJ, the slow progress made 
towards its adoption is a cause for concern and places the sincerity of the political organs of 










The existence of other courts with concurrent jurisdiction is also a cause for concern because 
of the possibility of forum shopping. 549 However, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction 
has helped litigants who face procedural obstacles in the EACJ to litigate in other courts 
with parallel jurisdiction with the EACJ. 
 
In addition to the above, this work has explored the different reactions to the Courts’ 
decisions in the two cases; thus the need to determine whether these reactions could have 
been avoided. It has been suggested that it is possible that the SADC Tribunal found itself in 
this predicament because it did not adjudicate tactfully. Examples of tactical adjudication 
were drawn from the writings of Theunis Roux.550 It has been observed that the SADC 
Tribunal was a new court in need of maintaining institutional security and legitimacy as a 
regional judicial body. In the discharge of its duty of consolidating democracy in the region, 
the Tribunal was likely to face political questions that needed to be addressed in a manner 
that avoids direct confrontation with the political arms of SADC. Campbell was one such 
case; thus the need to tactfully adjudicate so as to ensure its own survival. 
 




 Given the findings stated above, it is important to turn to the necessary 
recommendations that can be made. 


 The SADC Tribunal must be reinstated as a human rights body with human rights 
jurisdiction and accessible by individuals. The New Protocol on Tribunal should 
consequently be rejected in its entirety. However, in order to avoid abuse of the 
process, should individual petitions be restored, the procedural requirement of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies should be applied strictly. 


 The protocol to extend the jurisdiction of the EACJ to human rights should be 
adopted in order to clarify the human rights jurisdiction of the Court. 


 It is also recommended that in future cases, regional and sub-regional Courts, that 
find themselves in a similar position as that of the SADC Tribunal, should consider 
using tactical adjudication to avoid possible backlashes against them. 


 Lastly, it is recommended an entrenched enforcement mechanisms be established in 
order to avoid non-compliance. 
 
549
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550
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